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PL
Liberalism and political polarization The customary classification of the ideological doctri‑ nes in democratic systems, which expanded along a left–right axis, is nowadays obsolescent and has been deconstructed. At the same time, the close and strong connection between de‑ mocracy and liberalism, on which the primary model of liberal democracy was established, has been broken in many places of the world. The emerging of illiberal democracies has made the liberal component the main criterion for the classification of contemporary political systems, instead of dividing them into democratic and nondemocratic systems as before. Numerous ideological options could also be classified as being contrary to the liberal one. Liberalism has thus become important in the typologies and analyses of contemporary political systems and ideological options as the opposite to those systems on many new axes.
EN
This article analyses the discussion concerning the place of East Central Europe in the European Union. The author focuses on issues related to political axiology. Analysing the statements of selected authors and politicians, mostly from Poland and Hungary, he tries to determine what values are at stake in this dispute. In the author’s view, the two fundamental areas of discussion are the attitude towards liberalism, and the future of the nation and the nation state. The article ends with a forecast of the possible consequences of this dispute.
EN
The purpose of the article is to analyze the discussion on the place of Central and Eastern Europe in the European Union. The author of the article focuses on issues related to political axiology. Analyzing the statements of selected authors and politicians mainly from Poland and Hungary, he tries to determine what values are at stake in this dispute. According to the author, the two basic areas of discussion are the attitude towards liberalism and the future of nation and the nation state. The article ends with a prediction of the possible consequences of this dispute.
4
75%
Avant
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2019
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vol. 10
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issue 1
59-76
EN
This essay diagnoses the condition of contemporary liberal democracies. It assumes that the current crisis of democracy is not the result of an external ideological threat, but it is the result of the lack of a coherent vision of democracy itself. The author recognises that the key symptom of the contemporary crisis is the decreasing involvement of citizens in public life and their growing reluctance to participate in public debate. He claims that the reason for this is the increasing social polarisation. The article considers two forms of polarisation: vertical (on the line: politicians–voters) and horizontal (on the line of ideological social divisions). The first form is illustrated by Colin Crouch’s considerations, while the second one by Fareed Zakaria’s thoughts. What finds its manifestation in both cases is the phenomenon of citizens’ resignation from participation in the public debate; in the first case it is because of the lack of faith in the effectiveness of this type of opiniongiving mechanism, while in the second case it is because of the lack of recognition of other political and ideological options in society. These reflections are concluded in the postulate that the basic task facing democracy today is to maintain the public sphere as open as possible, i.e. not excluding any ideological position in advance. This kind of conclusion is illustrated with the concepts of Chantal Mouffe (political perspective) and Helmuth Plessner (philosophical-anthropological perspective).
Society Register
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2020
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vol. 4
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issue 2
83-94
EN
The aim of this article is to compare the effectiveness of two political systems: liberal democracy and illiberal democracy in fighting the coronavirus pandemic. The analysis has been carried out on the basis of the theoretical assumptions and conceptualization of non-Marxian historical materialism. In the first part of my article, I present the concept of ‘regulative credit” which has been introduced in that theory. In standard socio-political conditions, the growth of power regulations is usually contested by citizens. However, in a situation of danger, when social order is undermined, citizens support the authorities’ extraordinary regulations. This social support, called regulative credit, lasts as long as the danger persists. In chapter two, I characterize shortly liberal and illiberal democracies. In liberal democracy, there is a balance between different branches of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of the individualistic type. In illiberal democracy, the executive branch of power – although it has been democratically chosen – has an advantage over the two other kinds of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of the collectivist type. Those differences result in diverse reactions of the authorities to a situation of threat. The political authorities of an illiberal democracy react faster in comparison with the political authorities in liberal democracies that react slower. Also, the attitude of citizens toward the introduced restrictions varied. Societies of illiberal democracies are more self-disciplined and more willing to accept restrictions from above. Whereas societies of liberal democracies are more individualistic and less willing to accept limitations. In the fourth part of my paper, I analyze briefly the influence of the pandemic on globalization processes and on the relations between the EU and the nation states in Europe. In the summary (chapter five), I predict that the mass use of modern technologies to control social life and strengthening of the sovereignty of nation states will be the two most important effects of the pandemic.
PL
Od kilku lat zmiany polityczne na Węgrzech i w Polsce utożsamiane są z koncepcją illiberalnego charakteru demokracji. W związku z przyjęciem takiego założenia, w niniejszym artykule postawiona została teza mówiąca o tym, że liberalno-demokratyczne systemy polityczne obydwu państw okazały się niedojrzałe w wymiarze instytucjonalnym i nie odporne na wyzwania rzucone przez projekt illiberalny. Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie przyczyn oraz przebiegu politycznych zmian we wspomnianym wcześniej kontekście. Wnioski płynące z badań wskazują na społeczną dezaprobatę sytuacji politycznej i ekonomicznej, która przyczyniła się do tego, że elektorat poparł populistyczne partie na Węgrzech i w Polsce. Te formacje z kolei, po zdobyciu władzy są odpowiedzialne za redefinicję założeń reżimowych w kontekście demokracji liberalnej. Wśród metod wykorzystanych w badaniach znalazły się: analiza i synteza danych, analiza systemowa, podejście instytucjonalne oraz metoda porównawcza.
EN
The article analyzes the concept of illiberal democracy exemplified by two case studies of Hungary and Poland. The thesis of the paper states that their political systems showed signs of immaturity and institutional weakness of liberal democracy that caused the impossibility of rejection of illiberal project of political changes. To explain the breakdown of liberal democracy the paper aims at revealing both social and institutional aspects of transformation. The conclusions of the research let us to formulate the four-staged concept of the development of illiberal democracy in Hungary and Poland. The concept bases on the trajectory that begins with the social frustration of liberal democracy that leads to support for a populist party, which after victorious elections, implement the illiberal pattern of democracy. Methodologically the research benefits from the analytic and synthetic methods, the comparative method and institutional approach.
EN
Relying on Grażyna Skąpska’s theory of the constitution as a theory of the society, the paper considers the ‘theory of the society’ provided by the constitutions (public law) of illiberal political regimes, applying a sociolegal perspective. Illiberal democracies are understood as electorally endorsed regimes produced by populism. The present paper concentrates on EU member states, using Hungarian examples. The constitution is understood as a symbolic order with a vision of society that changes social and political realities. The paper argues that illiberal constitutions do not need to depart from mainstream liberal constitutions, notwithstanding the strong nationalist element. The constitutional reality is mostly sub-constitutional and it operates at the level of statutes. The emerging political structure is based on the primacy of the executive branch which in turn serves personalistic rule in the tradition of Weberian Caesarism. The rule is centralistic and creates and consolidates social, cultural and economic dependencies. Following Szelényi and Max Weber, this traditionalist, and therefore antiliberal society (or the selection of these social structures among competing formations by the political management of the society) is described in terms of neo-feudalism. The emerging social relations are reflected in and enabled by public law. The illiberalism of the regimes is not imposed on society and it is greeted as liberation by a considerable part. This genuine sentiment, together with electoral and media manipulation is capable to sustain the illiberal personalistic regime through formally democratic processes.
EN
One of the basic principles of civil rights is that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. The life protection, liberty and property should be equally guaranteed to citizens to exclude discrimination of minorities or other parts of the population. These rights are an important part of civil liberties and are considered as an essential element for effective citizenship. Arbitrary arrest, terror, torture or other serious and unlawful interference, both by state and private actors, significantly affect the well-being of democracy as it affects the very essence of it. In liberal democracies, leaders legitimized by the people must be involved within the norms and principles of the rule of law in order to establish a healthy relationship between the state and the citizen. This relationship is considered to be damaged in non-liberal democracies as it is affected by the suspension of individual freedoms and rights. This paper aims to analyze whether these individual rights are guaranteed and protected in Albania, considering from the perspective of the legal framework as well as in the political reality. This study aims to analyze the development of human rights, judicial rights and their implementation in our country to come to the conclusion, whether our system is that of a liberal democracy or not.
EN
This article aims to examine how to think about illiberal democracy which is a threat democracy is currently facing. In some detail, three models of democracy are analysed, which differ in how they understand the relationship between liberal and democratic principles, likewise demonstrating what conception they have of illiberal democracy. First of these is Schumpeter’s theory of competitive democracy, which seeks the liberal taming of democracy. Second, Schmitt’s argument that liberal and democratic principles are contradictory, and third, Urbinati’s theory of democracy, which acknowledges their inner coherence. Urbinati, however, rejects the concept of illiberal democracy as an oxymoron. Thus, this article also examines how illiberal democracy could be meaningfully and with some theoretical advantages considered, even within the framework of the internal coherence of both principles. In such a case, illiberal democracy will refer to the systematic effort to weaken liberal principles in the process of the formation of political will and public opinion in a democratic setting, thus bringing the regime at the edge of an authoritarian one. It shows the point where democracy ends.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie frekwencji wyborczej w Polsce na poziomie ogólnokrajowym w latach 1990–2019. W szczególności autor skupił uwagę na roku 2019, gdyż zanotowano wówczas najwyższą frekwencję w wyborach parlamentarnych w analizowanym okresie. Celem badań było ustalenie przesłanek, które miały wpływ na wskazaną sytuację, na wzrost aktywności wyborczej obywateli RP. Przeprowadzona analiza skłania do wniosku, iż po przejęciu władzy przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość w 2015 roku doszło do istotnych modyfikacji systemu społecznego, w tym politycznego, co przyczyniło się do zmiany wybranych cech sytuacji wyborczej i podwyższenia poziomu emocji politycznych. Konsekwencją był znaczny wzrost frekwencji wyborczej w 2019 roku, gdy odbyły się wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego, jak również do Sejmu i Senatu. Podczas badań zastosowanie znalazły: metoda analizy i krytyki piśmiennictwa (źródeł), metoda systemowa, metody statystyczne.
EN
The article addresses the issue of voter turnout at the national level in Poland in 1990–2019. In particular, the author focused on 2019, when the turnout in parliamentary elections was the highest throughout the period under analysis. The aim of the study is to determine the reasons for this increase in the electoral activity of Polish citizens. The analysis leads to the conclusion that after the Law and Justice party took power in 2015, significant modifications of the social system, including the political system, ensued, thereby altering selected features of the electoral situation and raising the level of political emotions. The outcome involved a significant increase in voter turnout in 2019, when the elections to the European Parliament, as well as to the Polish parliament (the Sejm and Senate) were held. The study employs the following methods: analysis and criticism of literature (sources), the systemic method, and statistical methods.
PL
Zjawisko lobbingu, rozumiane jako wszystkie działania wykonywane przez bądź w imieniu grup interesu, ukierunkowane na oddziaływanie na proces podejmowania i implementowania decyzji politycznych, występuje w każdym reżimie politycznym. W niniejszym artykule zbadano czy nieliberalny model demokracji funkcjonujący na Węgrzech (2010–2014) wywierał wpływ na poziom efektywności działań mających na celu kontrolowanie lobbingu. Nieliberalna demokracja różni się od swego liberalnego odpowiednika w pięciu obszarach: rządów prawa, kontroli działań rządu i parlamentu przez niezależne od władz państwowych instytucje, poziomu korupcji wśród elit politycznych, stopnia wolności mediów oraz ochrony praw mniejszości. W artykule wykazano, że Węgry spełniały kryteria demokracji nieliberalnej dla każdego z obszarów w latach 2010–2014. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań stwierdzono, że nieliberalny model demokracji istniejący na Węgrzech zmniejszał efektywność kontroli działań lobbingowych w tym państwie.
EN
Lobbying, understood as all actions performed by or on behalf of interest groups directed at influencing of the process of policy formation and implementation, occurs in every political regime. The article examines whether the illiberal type of democracy that exists in Hungary (2010–2014) exerts an influence on the effectiveness of lobbying control. Illiberal democracy differs from liberal democracy with regard to five systemic core principles, such as the rule of law, government control and accountability, the integrity of political elites, media freedom and civil rights and protection of minorities. This article shows that all of these systemic criteria constituting illiberal democracy were met in Hungary between 2010–2014. Examination of the case of Hungary with regard to lobbying control suggests that illiberal democracy had diminished the effectiveness of lobbying control in this country.
PL
Argumentacja niniejszego artykułu opiera się na założeniu, że proponowany przez Węgry model funkcjonowania UE i imitująca go polska wizja Unii opierają się na eurosceptycyzmie i są koncepcjami równie nieprzystającymi do zachodnich standardów demokracji i poglądów dominujących w UE. Silna artykulacja skrajnych opinii prowadzi do izolacji, podczas gdy w świetle liberalnej międzyrządowości polska koncepcja podważa względną pozycję tego państwa w systemie UE bardziej niż węgierska. W porównaniu z Węgrami Polska ma bowiem zupełnie inne interesy oparte na zagrożeniu ze strony Rosji oraz położeniu geograficznym. Ponadto, ze względu na swoją wielkość, Polska może być stosunkowo silnym graczem w UE, a prezentacja radykalnej koncepcji osłabia jej rolę, czyniąc niemożliwym odgrywanie roli mediatora, uczciwego pośrednika lub lidera grupowego. W przeciwieństwie do tego model węgierski, oparty na podobnej koncepcji, ale stosowany przez niewielkiego aktora politycznego, może wzmocnić relatywnie marginalną pozycję tego państwa i być korzystnym sposobem osiągania niektórych celów w grach taktycznych.
EN
The argument of this article is based on the assumption that the Hungarian EU model and the imitative Polish EU vision are based on Euroscepticism, creating the concepts equally incompatible with Western standards of democracy and the EU mainstream views. The strong articulation of extreme opinions leads to the isolation, while in the light of liberal intergovernmentalism it is the Polish concept that undermines the relative position of that state in the EU system more than the Hungarian one. First, compared with Hungary, Poland has completely different interests based on a Russian threat and geographical location. Second, due to its size Poland could be a relatively strong player in the EU, while presentation of a radical concept weakens its role, making it impossible to act as intermediary, an honest broker or a group leader. On the contrary, the Hungarian model, based on a similar concept but applied to a small political actor, can strengthen the relatively marginal position of that state, being a beneficial way to achieve some goals in tactical games.  
PL
Polexit to pojęcie, które pojawiło się w dyskursie politologicznym w momencie, kiedy w Wielkiej Brytanii w dniu 26 czerwca 2016 roku przeprowadzono referendum dotyczące dal szego członkostwa tego państwa w Unii Europejskiej. W artykule tym dokonano analizy przyczyn, dla których stała się możliwa dyskusja na temat wystąpienia Polski z Unii Europejskiej. Jest ona, z jednej strony, efektem sporów na temat kierunków ewolucji projektu europejskiego, jaki daje się zauważyć w dyskusji między „starymi” i „nowymi” państwami członkowskimi. Z drugiej, jej intensywność jest warunkowana dynamiką sporu, jaki rząd polski toczy z Komisją Europejską, na temat stanu praworządności w Polsce. Dla zwolenników zmiany relacji między instytucjami europejskimi a państwami członkowskimi wybory do Parlamentu były szansą na rozpoczęcie dyskusji dotyczącej zmiany traktatów. Jednak z uwagi na fakt, że zwolennicy zmiany traktatów nie zdobyli odpowiedniej liczby mandatów, staje się realną realizacja wizji Unii „dwóch prędkości”. Może to oznaczać początek sekwencji zdarzeń, których końcem będzie referendum w sprawie wystąpienia Polski z Unii Europejskiej.
EN
Polexit is a concept that emerged in the political science discourse when the United Kingdom held a referendum on its continued membership of the European Union on June 26, 2016. The article analyzes the reasons which facilitate a discussion on the withdrawal of Poland from the European Union. On the one hand, this results from disputes on the direction of the evolution of the European project between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states. On the other, its intensity is affected by the dynamics of the dispute between the Polish government and the European Commission on the state of the rule of law in Poland. For supporters of a change in relations between European institutions and member states, the European parliamentary elections offered an opportunity of starting a discussion on the change of treaties. However, due to the fact that proponents of treaty changes failed to win the appropriate number of seats, the vision of an EU of ‘two speeds’ is becoming realistic. This may mark the beginning of a sequence of events concluded with a referendum on the withdrawal of Poland from the European Union.
PL
Since the parliamentary elections in 2015, Poland shifted towards an illiberal model of democracy, largely inspired by the Hungarian experience. One of the first and key signs of the shift towards illiberal democracy in Hungary in the era of FIDESZ was undermining the capacities and autonomy of local governments. Taking into account the ideological proximity of the Hungarian and the Polish ruling parties, there were strong grounds to expect similar tendencies in Poland. This paper reviews the legislation adopted since 2015 in order to explore whether the supposed shift towards recentralization occurred. It proves that while a “creeping centralization” is a fact, the foundations of local and regional self-government have not been dismantled. The nature of this “creeping centralization” is sectoral rather than horizontal, i.e. it focuses on limiting the capacities and powers of local and regional governments in selected areas (particularly education and environmental protection) rather than dismantling the fundamental institutional guarantees of local and regional autonomy or enhancing central supervision over them. This may lead to a conclusion that the foundations of local and regional self-government in Poland are not at risk, yet the scope of decentralization is being gradually rolled out. This paper also demonstrates potential explanations for lack of radical shift towards recentralization. The major hypothesis analyzed in this context relates to the massive public support for local governments and decentralization, manifested in the opinion polls showing the highest trust rate to local governments in their history.
EN
The present paper aims to demonstrate that the political changes observed in some countries of Western civilization, including Poland, questioning some of the principles of liberal democratic order, originate from the reconfiguration of the systems of social values. Axiological reshuffles result from emerging threats to existential (right-wing) values. The theoretical basis of the analysis is the model of social values developed by the author based on the matrix of basic human values by Shalom H. Schwartz.
PL
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że przemiany polityczne, które można zaobserwować w niektórych państwach cywilizacji zachodniej, w tym w Polsce, a które polegają na kwestionowaniu części zasad, na których opiera się liberalny ład demokratyczny, mają swoje źródła w rekonfiguracji społecznych systemów wartości. Aksjologiczne przetasowania są funkcją pojawienia się zagrożeń dla wartości egzystencjalnych (prawicowych). Teoretyczną podstawą analizy jest autorski model wartości społecznych skonstruowany na bazie macierzy wartości podstawowych Shaloma H. Schwartza.
EN
Liberal and illiberal democracies can be defined on the basis of five criteria distinct in both types of democracy: the rule of law, the government’s control, political elites’ integrity, media freedom and minorities’ protection. The article shows that four out of five criteria constituting illiberal democracy were fulfilled in Poland while Beata Szydło’s government was functioning (the rule of law, the government’s control, media freedom and minorities’ protection), whereas only one systemic norm forming illiberal democracy (minorities’ protection) was fulfilled when the previous governments (Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz’s governments) operated. Thus, it can be stated that the transition from liberal to illiberal democracy took place in the period of the functioning of Szydło’s government.
EN
In 2017 we observed the deterioration trends of the liberal democracy in the Czech Republic which had been present there for some time. The two highest-ranking politicians responsible for that decline are: Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and President Miloš Zeman. Their policies border on the deformation of liberal democracy, which can lead towards illiberal democracy in the future. The aim of the article is to analyze how their attitudes influence democracy in the Czech Republic. In contrast, the strong rule of checks and balances makes it impossible for the authorities to destroy liberal democracy. The methods used during the process of research are as follows: synthesis and analysis, the institutional approach. The article-specific bibliography includes Czech, English, and Polish source materials.
PL
Rok 2017 wiąże się nie tylko z kontynuacją negatywnych zjawisk w czeskiej demokracji, ale z ich pogłębieniem. Głównymi podmiotami odpowiedzialnymi za taki stan rzeczy są dwaj najwyżsi przedstawiciele władzy państwowej, czyli premier Andrej Babiš i prezydent Miloš Zeman. Ich działania w wielu wymiarach są sprzeczne z zasadami demokracji liberalnej, co rodzi podstawę do możliwości pojawienia się demokracji illiberalnej. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie postaw dwóch najważniejszych postaci w czeskim życiu publicznym w kontekście łamania zasad liberalnej demokracji. Warto jednak zauważyć, że silne zakorzenienie zasady “checks and balances” utrudnia wskazanym podmiotom przeobrażenie liberalnej w illiberalną demokrację w Czechach. Metodami analizy używanymi w procesie badawczym są: analiza i synteza danych oraz podejście instytucjonalne. Baza źródłowa artykułu opiera się na pozycjach czesko-, polsko- i anglojęzycznych.
EN
Recent years have witnessed the publication of a number of research papers and books seeking to assess threats of electoral victories of anti-establishment politicians and political parties, described as authoritarian populists. This essay focuses on three books directly addressing the origins and threats of authoritarian populism to democracy. It consists of six sections and the conclusion. The first section presents findings (Norris and Inglehart) based on surveys of values of voters of various age cohorts concluding that authoritarian populism is a temporary backlash provoked by the post-materialist perspective. The second section examines the contention, spelled out in Levitsky and Ziblatt, that increase in openness of American political system produced,  unintentionally, a degradation of the American political system. The third section continues brief presentations focusing on to the causes and implications of “illiberal democracy,” and “undemocratic liberalism” (Mounk). The fourth section examines developments in the quality of democracy in the world showing that despite the decline in Democracy Indices, overall there was no slide towards non-democratic forms of government in 2006–2019. The next two sections deal with dimensions missing in reviewed books; the notion of nation-state, international environment, civic culture and, in particular, dangers of radical egalitarianism to democracy. The last section concludes with regrets that the authors ignored rich literature on fragility of democracy and failed to incorporate in their analyses deeper structural factors eroding democracy: by the same token, return to the pre-populist shock trajectory is unlikely to assure survival of liberal democracy.
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