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EN
The secret service and manipulation are connected. This is relevant to state security and defense. The intelligence and counterintelligence services play a pioneering role in these sectors of functioning. Each of them affects the opponent in terms of their activities. This influence requires knowledge, skills and the participation of agentry – which performs many complex tasks to distort the enemy’s information – in addition to other staff resources. Especially important is the impact agentry because of its capabilities. It is in an operational interest environment and is a participant in the decision-making process related to the state security.
EN
This article seeks to identify social influence tools and techniques in the context of information operations conducted by the Russian Federation during the 2022 war in Ukraine. An attempt to analyse the creation and spread of information threats as a result of the actions taken by Russia in the ongoing conflict is dictated by the increasing impact of communication processes on global security. This article presents the role and impact of mass media on public awareness, revealing the mechanisms of forming public opinion.
EN
The information war is beginning to play a dominant role in international relations. It is important because it occurs intensively in peacetime and determines the results of international clashes. This article aims to identify offensive elements in Russian theoretical and doctrinal views on the role and content of the information offensive in international relations. To meet this aim, a comparative analysis of research studies, documents and offcial statements was carried out. The study sets out to investigate how Russia assesses the usefulness of the information offensive for conducting international policy. The study revealed that the information war and information warfare in modern conditions in the Russian scientifc debate occupy a prominent place. Regardless of the declared defensive nature of the Russian information offensive, both the scientifc and doctrinal views emphasise the value of the information offensive for conducting international policy. Russia takes the information offensive in international relations very seriously and treats it as one of the main forms of international confrontation. This has serious consequences for countries close to Russia as it creates a new threat to their national security in peacetime.
EN
In this article, we attempt to identify Russia’s social-impact operations in the context of information operations conducted by the Russian Federation during 2022 in the war against Ukraine. The need to undertake the analysis of the creation and proliferation of information threats, as a result of Russia’s actions in the ongoing conflict, is dictated by the growing impact of communication processes on global security. This article discusses the impact and role of mass media on the shaping of people’s minds, by exposing the mechanisms behind the formation of public opinion.
EN
In the modern security environment, information warfare is an increasingly important threat. The purpose of this article is to determine the conditions for the effective achievement of political objectives through the manipulation of information and disinformation. The conducted research used system analysis, also using case studies, generalizations and synthesis. This allowed to state that the key condition for the effectiveness of conducted information attacks is the mechanism described in the works of Antoni Kępiński as information metabolism. This makes it possible to formulate a postulate on the need to counteract such attacks based on building defensive and offensive capabilities of the state in the sphere of information warfare.
Cybersecurity and Law
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2024
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vol. 11
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issue 1
105-119
EN
The article analyses important and current issues concerning the use of modern information technologies in hostile actions against the state in the international environment. First, the concept of lawfare was defined as a method of conducting information warfare. Then, the focus was on the potential manifestations of lawfare in cyberspace, indicating possible gaps in the state’s information security system and sensitive areas susceptible to methods of hostile shaping of the state’s legal system.
EN
This paper aims to evaluate the sources of Russia’s soft power as a tool which should enable it to integrate Belarus more closely with Russia. The research question is as follows: what are Russia’s main sources of attractiveness, and what kind of instruments of soft power is the Russian government applying to achieve that aim? To what extent was this soft policy successful? The author applied a qualitative research method. It is inductive and allows the researcher to explore meanings and insights into Russia’s notion of “soft power” in its foreign policy toward Belarus. The basis of it lies in the interpretive approach to the present reality of Russia – Belarus political and economic relations and in the evaluation of Russian efforts to integrate its closest neighbour by using only non-military means.
EN
The article discusses the monograph entitled “International Disinformation. Concept, recognition, counteraction”. It was pointed out that it is an excellent compendium of knowledge on this subject and can also be successfully used as an academic textbook.
EN
This paper aim to explore that Russian propaganda has a long historical tradition and a rich instrumentarium. The development of the internet and social media has increased the possibilities for distributing propaganda messages. The principal objective of Russian propaganda is to influence the public opinion in cooperation with persons acting as translators, and to distribute contents – in various national languages – in conformity with the Russian policy and ideology. A tangible objective is to change the opinion about the Russian Federation and its policy so that one negative opinion is matched with at least three positive ones.
EN
The article is devoted to the mass-media manipulation of information in Russia, in Russian-Ukrainian conflict with the help of the media controlled by government. The authors point out that the Kremlin has always manipulated the content of information, and with the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity manipulation and disinformation has gained unimaginable momentum, treating Maidan as a negative event, as a coup. At the moment of aggression in the network appeared hundreds of websites and social network groups, which “objectively” are informing about the events. The message of this campaign has become uprising against the new, legitimate government in Kiev.
EN
The article concerns the mass-media manipulation of information in Russia about RussianUkrainian conflict with the help of the media controlled by government. The authors point out that the Kremlin has always manipulated the content of information and with the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity manipulation and disinformation has gained unimaginable momentum, treating Maidan as a negative event, as a coup. At the moment of aggression, in the network hundreds of websites and social network groups appeared, which „objectively” are informing about the events. The message of this campaign is to justify the uprising against the new, legitimate government in Kiev. The propaganda potential is directed at presentation of the Russian version of events, and the overall aim is to diversify the public opinion. An important point of this strategy is to create an image of Russia as a victim of cynical game of Western establishment, accused on this occasion for a complete distortion of Putin’s image as well as the causes of Ukrainian conflict and its course.
Eastern Review
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2020
|
vol. 9
121-129
EN
There are various instruments for Russia to have influence on its neighbours, such as using opinion leaders (authorities), intellectuals, and journalists to create a favourable informational context or to place the ordered materials in the media so as to have an impact on public opinion. These are the types of information attacks that can lead to the loss of statehood or the substantial limitation of sovereignty. This hybrid aggression strives to precisely this result. The main questions are: how the Russian information space, mud-slinging and troll farms functioned in Belarus during the presidential election? How the fake news which is produced in Russia impacts societies? Which political scenarios appeared in Belarus following Russia’s informational influence? It is a fact that today the Russian authorities use tools of fake news and propaganda; combined with the extra possibilities of social media. The appearance of fake news is connected with national safety because they jeopardize democratic institutions, lead to the radicalization of society, and change the balance of authority. In the research, the methodologies were used from the sociology of communication, political science and content analysis.
13
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Służby specjalne w walce z terroryzmem

75%
PL
Współcześnie najpoważniejsze zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa poszczególnych państw, w tym dla Polski, stwarza zorganizowany terroryzm międzynarodowy. Ewolucja zjawiska terroryzmu wskazuje, że ugrupowania terrorystyczne przyjęły nowe, dotychczas niespotykane metody działania. Coraz większe zaangażowanie Polski w globalne zwalczanie terroryzmu powoduje zintensyfikowanie działań terrorystycznych na jej terytorium. Sprostanie tym wyzwaniom będzie wymagać aktywnego uczestnictwa służb specjalnych.
EN
Nowadays, the most serious threat to the security of individual states, including Poland, is organized international terrorism. The evolution of the phenomenon of terrorism shows that terrorist groups have adopted new, hitherto unheard of methods of operation. The increasing involvement of Poland in the global fight against terrorism will intensify terrorist activities on its territory. Meeting these challenges will require the active participation of secret services.
EN
The paper aims to analyse how information warfare can be conducted in cyberspace and to look at this issue from the perspective of Central and Eastern European Countries. It argues that this form of hostile actions will be increasingly utilized in the region. The main assumption, following Alvin Toffler’s theory, is that “information” – as an increasingly important element of modern societies and as their strategic resource – also serves as a significant tool of modern conflicts. Since information is nowadays strongly related to new technologies, mainly the aspects connected to cybersecurity are analysed. The article looks closer at different aspects of cyberthreats and explains their possible consequences. It may serve as good material for further research and recommendations on countermeasures that may increase security in Europe.
EN
A questionnaire-based study conducted in October 2021 provided analytical material on the degree and sources of disinformation in Polish society. The material has representative qualities and is the first comprehensive research project in Poland to cover issues regarding information security in such breadth and detail. The paper aims to analyse and present a study on disinformation in Polish society conducted on a representative group of Poles in 2021. The project's key research questions are: How receptive is the Polish public to disinformation content? What are the channels of information provided to Poles? Is the notion of disinformation familiar to the Polish audience, and do the recipients of media content search for methods to verify disinformation? The analysis and interpretation of the results identified some important features of the Polish disinformation map. The concept of disinformation is now commonly familiar to the Polish public (86%), and the sensitivity to content credibility can be regarded as high; the respondents were found to verify information, actively searching through various sources. Disinformation is rife in climate, energy (52%), and health (44%).
EN
This article attempts to understand how the Russia-funded RT television website (RT.com) framed the candidacy of Donald Trump during the U.S. presidential campaign in 2015 and 2016. It aims to find out whether it was really involved in creating an artificial pro-Trump image and supported his cause against Hillary Clinton, as some reports suggest. Its secondary objective is to understand what kind of agenda (including the topics and issues discussed) was adopted by this webpage when referring to this Republican candidate. In order to reach these goals, the study was founded on the concept of agenda-setting and exploited content analysis of the textual layer of RT.com. This manuscript argues that while the attitude of this website evolved in time, it cannot be confirmed that it was overly biased in favour of Donald Trump. At the same time, however, RT.com was heavily interested in defending his argumentation on the inexistence of the Trump- Putin “bromance” and the lack of the “Russian factor” in the American elections. Moreover, it featured multiple pieces of news which provided a negative image of the U.S. democratic processes through the association of the 2016 presidential campaign with scandals, violence, extremism and crimes.
EN
Documentary nature of photography convinces the viewer that the image is exactly the same as reality. A photo causes trust and this property of photos is repeatedly used in manipulating public opinion. In the report perception means of the image are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the fact how photojournalism becomes the powerful tool in terms of information war against a backdrop of military conflicts. Especially in today’s conditions, when, according to Oksana Zabuzhko: “Era of »bombed cities« passed — the era of »bombed brains« began…”. History of photodocumentary and history in general can argue that wars and disasters always attracted the attention of the news. A photo neutralized the distance between the viewer and the event. But at the same time, in terms of Russian aggression against Ukraine, it became a popular and effective weapon in the “information” or “psychological war”. The meaning and the true scale of this war are often underestimated. It is perceived like a sort of supplement to “main”, “hot” armed phase of the war. But in reality the meaning is reversed: the information war is total. Moreover, the visual aspect of it is paid the main attention. Photos and their variations are successfully used as a technology of hybrid war. The consequences of this are so powerfully felt by Ukrainian media space. To the most used means we include misrepresentations, information provokes, fakes, manipulations, photo collages, false testimonies of witness, fake experts and witnesses and others. These technologies are analyzed in the report as manipulative tools of modern information and hybrid war.
EN
The term ‘wars of memory’ refers to the Russian specificity of the issues described in the West as ‘politics of history’ or the ‘politics of memory’. The historical arguments which are employed in the Russian Federation in the context of information and cultural warfare, and are identified with the war over the interpretation of history, are being used to achieve the Kremlin’s political objectives in both its domestic and external arenas: any visions which conflict with the official one are discredited as anti-Russian and falsifications of the history of Russia. This text consists of three parts. The first discusses the evolution of the problem in Russian public discourse since the collapse of the USSR; the second describes the historical-cultural standard currently operative in Russia (its pattern of assessments and historical interpretations); and the third, outlines the manifestations of the state’s involvement in implementing its specifically understood politics of memory, with particular emphasis on the role of the Russian Historical Society and Rosarkhiv. The ‘wars’ discussed in this article have become one of the systemic mechanisms for Russia’s confrontation with both the external environment and its internal opposition. The memory and historical-cultural identity as disseminated now are leading to a secondary Sovietisation of society and the mobilisation of imperial and nationalist (ethnocentric, ethnically Russian) resentments within the Russian Federation.
EN
The changing conditions of the functioning of a country(ies) generate many complex threats that hinder and sometimes prevent the performance of basic tasks by individuals, social groups, a nation and a state. The scale and dynamics of occurring threats very often surprise both rulers and societies. In order to avoid a critical situation, eligible civil and military entities must continuously secure their information needs. It is essential to appreciate the importance of information, to be able to use it to prevent or minimize the consequences of a critical situation. This means the need to build the information system of the state, as well as subsystems at every level of its management, which are the basis for the decision-making process. Setting and evaluating tasks, the skillful use of information resources in the state crisis management process, all allow for its save functioning in both internal and international environment.
PL
Zmieniające się środowisko funkcjonowania państwa (państw) generuje wiele złożonych zagrożeń, które utrudniają, a niekiedy i uniemożliwiają wykonywanie podstawowych zadań przez jednostki, grupy społeczne, naród i państwo. Skala i dynamika zachodzących zagrożeń, bardzo często zaskakuje rządzących i społeczeństwo. Celem niedopuszczenia do sytuacji kryzysowej uprawnione podmioty cywilne i wojskowe muszą zabezpieczać swoje potrzeby informacyjne w sposób ciągły; doceniać znaczenie informacji, potrafić je wykorzystać, by nie dopuścić do wystąpienia sytuacji kryzysowej lub zminimalizować jej następstwa. Oznacza to konieczność budowania systemu informacyjnego państwa, a także podsystemów na każdym poziomie jego funkcjonowania, które będą podstawą dla procesu decyzyjnego. Stawianie zadań, rozliczanie i umiejętne wykorzystywanie posiadanych zasobów informacyjnych w procesie zarządzania kryzysowego państwem pozwala na jego bezpieczne funkcjonowanie w otoczeniu wewnętrznym i środowisku międzynarodowym.
EN
The research covers the early years of Ukraine’s and Poland’s cooperation in their bilateral relations in the context of building up security policies between the NATO and the CSTO in 1991–1994. Various information influences from state and non-state actors, internal and external, made it so the processes of the search for security guarantees ended up quite different between the two neighboring countries. Covering sources and literature that provide evidence for influences from sources such as the Kremlin, the non-lustrated “old guard” former Communist party functionaries in Ukraine, and the former opposition in Poland, the research shows how the two countries’ relations with the NATO differed, and why, though both countries joined the Partnership for Peace program at roughly the same time, Poland managed to start active Euro-Atlantic integration much earlier than Ukraine did. Using sources such as the text of the treaties, the establishing documents and legislature guidebooks of organization, public writings of diplomats and former policy makers, the research shows what exactly were the risks that the NATO assessed in the joining of former Eastern Bloc countries (with the unstated reasons for the small number of contacts of those countries with NATO in the 1991–1994 relevant to the West’s suspicion of post-Soviet intelligence and military), and which points of the first Ukraine-NATO proved “too much” for the former. Furthermore, Ukraine’s early success with the number of NATO exercises it partook in during the first years of the Partnership for Peace became an example to other Eastern Europe countries seeking better relations with NATO and defense sector reforms, including the Republic of Poland. The paper also highlights the tendencies of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the context of NATO enlargement and the various aspects of Atlantic integration. The most important among them was cooperation in security and defense, both bilateral and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.
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