In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a greater amount of good to justify doing a certain harm than it does to justify allowing that same harm. In this reply, I argue that Liu fails to show, from within a consequentialist framework, that there is an asymmetry between the evils produced by doing and allowing harm. I conclude with some brief remarks on what may establish such an asymmetry.
Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862) develops an understanding of human beings as “part and parcel of nature” that includes the idea that we are physically, spiritually, and attitudinally (more or less) connected to the world around us. The image he offers is one in which life spent too much in civilization, where work and social expectations determine the quality of one’s daily life and personal character, lead to lives of boredom, conformity, and misplaced priorities. Time spent in more natural environments is the antidote. Such experiences have the potential to jar us out of the conformist and-to his mind-personally stunting existence into which most fall. Growth and liberation come from experiencing the “More” of which both nature and we are a part. Thoreau calls us to reevaluate our values and priorities by being in a right relationship with nature, which does not require that we accept all of his particular ontological commitments. The argument that emerges for greater protection of the environment is admittedly quite human-centered. However, Thoreau’s insight that we are part and parcel of nature is important because, as Aldo Leopold later argues, we can only progress beyond a prudential approach to nature when we see ourselves as part of the larger whole. The world looks different when it is our home and community as opposed to being mere material to be used or a stage on which our lives unfold.
Der Artikel legt die Theorie der ästhetischen Werte von C. I. Lewis in ihrer Beziehung zur Ästhetik von I. Kant dar. Ich zeige grundsätzliche Wechselbeziehungen zwischen dem konzeptuellen Pragmatismus und dem Transzendentalismus von Kant. Die Basisthese ist die Feststellung, dass die Theorie der ästhetischen Werte von Lewis eine Anpassung der grundsätzlichen Voraussetzungen der Kantischen Ästhetik an die Erfordernisse des konzeptuellen Pragmatismus bildet. Der Artikel umfasst: 1) eine allgemeine Einführung in die Axiologie von Lewis mit Hervorhebung der Rolle des pragmatischen A-Priori in seinem Gedanken, 2) die Charakteristik und Klassifizierung der Werte mit der Akzentuierung der Eigenart der ästhetischen Werte in Lewis’ Theorie der Werte, 3) die Charakteristik der ästhetischen Erfahrung - hier wird der Akzent auf ihren besonderen Präsentationscharakter gelegt, 4) die Betrachtung der ästhetischen Kriterien nach Lewis, 5) die Gegenüberstellung der Theorie der ästhetischen Werte von Lewis mit der Ästhetik von Kant.
EN
The text is a presentation of the theory of aesthetic values by Clarence Irving Lewis’ in relation to I. Kant’s aesthetics. Its main contention that the Lewisian theory of the aesthetic is an attempt of adaptation and interpretation of the basic assumptions of Kantian aesthetics in the light of the requirements of conceptual pragmatism. The essay involves: (1) the general introduction to the axiology of C. I. Lewis with accentuation of the role of pragmatic a priori in his thought; (2) characteristics and classification of values, with emphasis on the specificity of aesthetic values in Lewisian theory of values; (3) characteristics of aesthetic values as they are presented in AKV – here the accent is put on its particularly presentational character, (4) consideration of the criteria of aestheticity in Lewisian axiology, (5) juxtaposition of Lewis’ theory of values with Kantian aesthetics.
PL
Artykuł prezentuje teorię wartości estetycznych C. I. Lewisa w jej relacji do estetyki I. Kanta. Wskazuję podstawowe zależności między konceptualnym pragmatyzmem a transcendentalizmem Kanta. Bazową tezą jest stwierdzenie, że teoria wartości estetycznych Lewisa stanowi przystosowanie podstawowych założeń estetyki Kanta do wymogów pragmatyzmu konceptualnego. Artykuł obejmuje: (1) ogólne wprowadzenie do aksjologii Lewisa, z podkreśleniem roli a priori pragmatycznego w myśli Lewisa, (2) charakterystykę i klasyfikację wartości, z zaakcentowaniem specyfiki wartości estetycznych w Lewisowskiej teorii wartości, (3) charakterystykę doświadczenia estetycznego – tu akcent pada na jego szczególnie prezentacjonistyczny charakter, (4) rozważenie kryteriów estetyczności wedle Lewisa, (5) zestawienie teorii wartości estetycznych Lewisa z estetyką Kanta.
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