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EN
This paper is an analysis of the category of power in Michel Foucault’s philosophy. In the whole work of the philosopher it is definitely abused and often used as a hyperbole or a metaphor only, not as a specific social relation. I argue that especially in Foucault’s writings of 1970s the category of power is used not only as a hypothesis, but also as a justification, which makes much of Foucault’s interesting analysis only a postmodern narrative. In this respect philosophy of Foucault remains Hegelian, trying to enclose the rich experience of European modern culture in one mind, with one superior rule.
Financial Law Review
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2022
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vol. 25
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issue 1
126-145
EN
The statutory concept of justification in public finance discipline comes down to clear exclusion of unlawfulness of discipline’s tort. It is assumed that the reason for the existence of justification of torts is a collision of interests and resulting from it, the necessity to indicate the interest excluding unlawfulness, and later waiving liability for breaching law. Justification behavior refers to actions which in typical situations are incorrect and unwanted, but because of special circumstances may constitute justification and hence need to be tolerated, accepted or even approved in the legal order. Regulations shaping the new premises excluding liability for breaching public finance discipline in connection with COVID-19 are included in legal regulations included in so called Anti-Crisis Shield. The aim of the study is to analyze the established legal solutions and to formulate de lege ferenda postulates.
EN
Lutheran authors throughout the XX century have attempted to apply the Pauline doctrine of “justification by faith alone” to the whole of Christian theology, life and spirituality, as a unique determinative, criteriological or hermeneutical principle. Justification would point to the action of God who in Christ saves sinful humans, thus going to the very core of Christian life and identity. However, the fundamental principle needs to go beyond a purely existential reading of the human situation which considers man primordially as a sinner, and God only as his Saviour. It needs to be ontologically founded, on the basis of God’s good creation. It needs to take into account the fact that man, alongside the experience of sinfulness and pardon, truly encounters the goodness of God both through the reality of creation and on account of personal filiation in Christ’s Spirit.
PL
This article develops a conception of linguistic meaning that treats it as an attitude on the part of language users towards pairs of expressions. As with propositional attitudes, these meaning attitudes are subject to being deliberately altered over time by language users, with the aim of maximizing the efficiency of their language use. Therefore, meaning attitudes can be justified or refuted in practical terms. Our instrumentalist-coherentist approach, which allows for meanings to be advocated for alongside beliefs, provides a viable theory of justification of that kind. This view fits better with the evolutionary nature of linguistic phenomena, and resolves the problem of substitutability in opaque contexts.
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Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

88%
XX
The aim of this article is to determine how useful to us are the notes from the late work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, in dealing with one of the modern sceptical problems. By determining the usefulness I have in mind whether or not his thoughts and descriptions of everyday linguistic practice help solve the sceptical problem and, if so, in what way. The sceptical problem in question is the Cartesian argument about the external world – the argument of ignorance. We will endeavour to show that if we accept Wittgenstein’s remarks as adequate descriptions of epistemic practice, they will help to make it possible to block the argument in question. However, there arise questions of whether Wittgenstein’s descriptions of epistemic practice are adequate, on the one hand, and whether the sceptical claims about the external world really spring from this practice, on the other hand. I hold the view that these questions are basically empirical. This has the relatively unusual consequence that the worth of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as well as the cogency of the problem of the external world, cannot be judged in a purely philosophical way.
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Rortyho pojetí poznání

88%
EN
This study is a systematic interpretation of Rorty’s conception of knowledge as it can be reconstructed on the basis of the book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Although Rorty is sweeping in his criticism of theories of knowledge, it can still be shown that he himself works with a certain positive conception not only of what knowledge does not consist in, but also of what it positively concerns. The study describes the basic points of Rorty’s conception of knowledge (knowledge as the practice of justification, knowledge as description, knowledge as the modification of theory, knowledge as coping), and it presents Rorty’s critique of epistemology in favour of the concept of self-determination. The conclusion of the study looks at the question of how Rorty is able to justify the rejection of epistemology and the acceptance of a hermeneutical viewpoint.
CS
Studie je vnitřně soudržnou interpretací Rortyho pojetí poznání, jak je lze rekonstruovat na základě knihy Filosofie a zrcadlo přírody. Ačkoli Rorty kritizuje v podstatě všechny teorie poznání, lze ukázat, že sám pracuje s jistou pozitivní představou nejen o tom, v čem poznání nespočívá, nýbrž také o tom, oč v něm pozitivně jde. Studie popisuje podstatné ohledy Rortyho pojetí poznání (poznání jako praxe zdůvodňování, poznání jako popis, poznání jako upravování teorie, poznání jako zvládání) a předvádí Rortyho kritiku epistemologie s pozitivní oporou v konceptu sebeurčení. Závěr studie tematizuje otázku, jakým způsobem Rorty může zdůvodnit odmítnutí epistemologie a přijetí hermeneutického hlediska.
EN
The purpose of the paper is to analyze, how rules of the burden of proof and rules of the burden of argumentation justify a thesis, which is found as a true statement by court. Two concepts of the truth discussed in the Polish civil procedure (the objective/material truth and the judicial truth) are compared in connection with the rules of the burden of proof and the burden of argumentation. The rules of burden of proof and the rules of the burden of argumentation are constitutive rules. They state under what conditions a thesis counts as justified. The justification of a decision of applying law based on the rules of the burden of proof or rules of the burden of argumentation is institutional, not substantial.
EN
The aim of this article is to discuss the ecumenical aspect of justification. Martin Luther was of the opinion that the road to justification was only through faith and grace, expressed by the principle simul iustus et peccator. The Council of Trent emphasized that justification is not only the remission of sins but is also sanctification. Catholic-Lutheran ecumenical dialogue formally began after the Second Vatican Council, which resulted in a consensus regarding the basic truths of the doctrine of justification and likewise looked at the person of Martin Luther, his demands, and the reformation.
EN
The so-called debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concentrated mainly on the latter’s political liberalism. It dealt with the many aspects of Rawls’s philosophical project. In this article, I focus only on one of them, namely the epistemic or cognitivistic nature of principles of justice. The first part provides an overview of the debate, while the second part aims to show that Habermas has not misinterpreted Rawls’s position. I argue that Habermas rightly considers Rawls’s conception of justice as a moral one. In the last part, I discuss two key questions raised by Habermas. The first concerns the relation between justification and acceptance of the principles of justice. The second concerns the relation between two validity terms: truth and reasonableness.
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Skepticizmus – rôzne podoby, rôzne problémy

88%
EN
This article focuses on the presentation of the basic forms of scepticism and sceptical argumentation denying the possibility of gaining knowledge in the sense of its tripartite definition (justified true belief). The author presents a selection of historical objections to the attainability and knowability of truth and the possibility of gaining complete or adequate true justification of knowledge, but also objections concentrating on the understanding of knowledge as conscious and fully-reflected true belief. In the second part of the article the author attempts to argue against advocates of the unjustifiability of knowledge (holding that there do not exist any sufficient or partly good reasons for knowledge) by pointing to the existence of various levels of persuasiveness of particular opinions and beliefs and by showing the meaninglessness of the distinction between knowledge and supposition in conceptions that deny knowledge any kind of good reasons. In conclusion there is an attempt to demonstrate that falsification of a certain piece of knowledge is itself a piece of knowledge that is grounded on the adequate reasons of its soundness.
EN
In the first part of the article the concept of associative duties and their justification as distinctive from general moral duties are analyzed. The second part considers associative duties to fellow citizens and distinguishing features of those duties such as reciprocity, mutuality and equal status. In the final part the author deals with specific cases concerning refugees and stresses arguments as to why the associative duties of co-citizens should overcome duties to refugees, as well as the failures of those arguments. It is argued that the status of refugees is different from the status of other non-citizens, such as immigrants, due to the lack of institutional representation and protection.
EN
In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argumentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation. In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deductivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully adequate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work. I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor exhaustive.
Polish Sociological Review
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2011
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vol. 174
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issue 2
217-234
EN
Re-organization of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme-the European carbon market-is a strategic moment when actors come onto the European arena to voice their claims, represent their interests, propose alternative policy solutions and open up controversies for a public debate. By problematizing rules of the carbon market, actors engage in re-drawing boundaries between economics and politics. This paper adopts a constructivist perspective on the studies of markets and examines strategies adopted by the European Commission and the European industrial federation to inscribe their interests into the ETS rules in 2008. Actors provided justifications for their alternative proposals of the European carbon market by constructing an objective market quality-the market efficiency.
EN
The aim of the study is critical analysis of the idea of so-called “secondary legality” of an act used by some jurists to explain types of behaviour falling into the category of circumstances excluding lawlessness of an act (justification), namely to define the relation between such types of behaviour and the legal system as a whole, and the various sanctioned norms that are part of the system. First, the author examines the relation between the assumption that a type of behaviour which falls within the category of circumstances excluding lawlessness of an act constitutes a legal transgression of the sanctioned norm, and the basic assumptions made in the Polish legal culture concerning the process of creation and application of the law as well as its systematic analysis. He demonstrates that consistent use of the secondary legality category would require a considerable remodelling of these assumptions, above all, rejection of the assumption that legal norms are introduced to be met as well as all consequences stemming from this assumption as well as abandonment of the approach to the law as a set of legal norms that is internally cohesive. Next, the author analyses the internal aspects of the idea of secondary legality of an act. He demonstrates that it encompasses contradictory statements: on the one hand that justifi able behaviour constitutes socially harmful, negative and thus a typical attack on legal interest, and on the other hand that the social benefits ultimately outweigh losses in the case of justifiable behaviour. All the above justifies the author’s final conclusion that the category of secondary legality of an act is not useful.
EN
The following article aims at discussing the attributes of the directness of attack and the commensurateness of the means of necessary self-defense, which constitute the most significant, but also the most controversial, prerequisites for the justification of necessary self-defense. The author conducts his study on the basis of selected case law of appeal courts and the Supreme court, dating back four years. In this way, the article allows to delineate the limits of necessary self-defense, as well as present particular cases of exceeding the limits of necessary self-defense.
EN
The debate between Habermas and Rawls that took place in 1990s concerned how philosophy can justify the principles of justice under the conditions of pluralism of different and irreconcilable moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines. The context of the debate was mainly Rawls’ Political Liberalism and Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms as well. This paper argues that a wider geo-cultural perspective is pertinent in order to better comprehend the different justification strategies in Habermas and Rawls, concerning the principle of justice. This goes for their different geo-cultural experiences and presuppositions – in short, Rawls living in a self-confident North America in the post-war period versus Habermas’ German experience of civilization breakdown. However, it might also be relevant for the assessment of these two strategies in our time, faced with new kinds of geo-political differences and conflicts.
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2016
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vol. 8
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issue 2
206-218
EN
Lutherans and Catholics in Australia have engaged in fruitful ecumenical dialogue for forty years, producing eight documents that have consistently had a view toward reception in the two respective churches. In recent years this Dialogue has been encouraged on its journey by the concept of receptive ecumenism. Ecumenical encounter is a work of the Holy Spirit, and each church can be enriched by recognising and receiving the charism of a partner church.
19
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Kant’s Justification of Welfare

75%
Diametros
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2014
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issue 39
1-28
EN
For several decades, theorists interested in Kant’s discussion of welfare have puzzled over Kant’s position on the issue of the redistribution of goods in society. They have done this both in order to clarify his position and as a source of inspiration for current conceptual problems faced by contemporary political philosophers who attempt to reconcile the ideal of equal freedom with the asymmetric interference necessary for redistribution and social provision. In this paper, I start with Kant’s brief discussion of welfare in Rechtslehre and I identify four claims that Kant clearly asserts as characteristic for his view. I then outline five main interpretative directions in the literature, I evaluate and rank them. The most accurate view of Kant’s justification of welfare, which I call the “genuinely Kantian” position is, however, unable to explain the nature of the duty of welfare that it asserts. By going back to Kant’s text, I suggest one solution. This solution, together with some further questions, can be seen as initiating a new interpretative direction in the literature.
EN
This article presents the particular treatment of selected epistemological problems in the framework of Hans Albert’s critical rationalism. The first part examines the question of whether true knowledge is possible. In his endeavour to address this question, Albert firstly distinguishes himself from classical epistemologists who connect true knowledge with the justification of certain truth. He shows that the requirement that knowledge must provide final justification leads to irresolvable paradoxes, if not to dogmatism. The justifying claims of classical epistemology, therefore, are strictly rejected in the framework of critical rationalism, and Albert postulates the permanent openess of all knowledge to critique. In the second part, the paper then focuses on Albert’s specific understanding of the question of whether pure theory of knowledge is possible. Albert, in looking for an answer to this question, distinguishes his own approach from that of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism. At the same time, however, he is to an extent inspired by Kant, and he describes his own position as trancendental realism.
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