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Stanowisko nieredukcyjne w sporze o tożsamość osobową

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Grygianiec M.
Diametros
|
2018
|
issue 57
23-38
EN
In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, to present the various arguments in favour of the doctrine in question. It argues that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which could serve as the truth-conditions of identity statements. The considerations presented in the paper lead to the conclusion that, although the Simple View is faced with many theoretical difficulties, it is still a lively intellectual position in the debate on personal identity.
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Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej

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Grygianiec M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2016
|
vol. 34
5-28
EN
In the debate on personal identity many different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. Criteria of identity are usually taken to state necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are viewed, in their metaphysical interpretation, as providing truth conditions of relevant identity statements. In my paper I argue that this view is misconceived and I present some arguments for the simple view of personal identity, according to which there are no noncircular and informative criteria of identity for persons. In particular, I argue that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which would serve as truth conditions of statements concerning numerical identity. I also try to justify the view that in most cases criteria of identity should be interpreted either epistemically as a means for finding out whether identity holds or not or metaphysically as criteria of genidentity, which provide appropriate persistence conditions for objects of a given kind.
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