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EN
In contemporary positive law there are legal institutions, such as conscientious objection in the context of military service or “conscience clauses” in medical law, which for the sake of respect for judgments of conscience aim at restricting legal obligations. Such restrictions are postulated to protect human freedom in general. On the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy, it shall be argued that human dignity, understood as the existential perfection of a human being based on special unity (individuality and particularity), provides a foundation for imposing limitations on the scope of legal obligations in general. Human freedom plays a crucial role in understanding dignity as perfection based on the special individuality of a personal being, which in turn is based on the free choice to pursue a unique way of life. Therefore, Aquinas’ argumentation is, at its core, liberal – the perfection rather than the imperfection of a human being underlies the requirement to limit legal obligations. Dignity understood as the special unity of a person also provides the basis for limiting obligations in the case of conscientious objection; however, in that case, such limitations aim at safeguarding internal integrity rather than the individualisation of a given way of life.
EN
This article is a comparative analysis of the legal nature and the rights and obligations of parties concluding property insurance contracts under the provisions of the Maritime Code and the Civil Code. When navigating a ship, the shipowner conducts a business commonly referred to as the operation of a ship, which includes, inter alia, its use for business purposes. The shipowner business is therefore an economic activity and the owner is the entrepreneur who runs his business which s/he is liable for. It is his/her broad interest to insure permanent assets of his/her company against damage as well as his/her civil liability. As the text indicates, s/he is treated by the legislature more severely than a person conducting a standard property insurance. In addition, the legal nature of the policy, due to the requirements of maritime traffic, differs from that from the Civil Code. The purpose of this study is to identify the key differences between the two regulations.
PL
Artykuł zawiera analizę porównawczą charakteru prawnego oraz praw i obowiązków stron zawierających umowy ubezpieczenia majątkowego na gruncie przepisów Kodeksu morskiego i Kodeksu cywilnego. Uprawiając żeglugę, armator prowadzi działalność powszechnie określaną jako eksploatacja statku, co obejmuje m.in. używanie go do celów gospodarczych. Działalność armatorska jest zatem działalnością gospodarczą, a armator jest przedsiębiorcą prowadzącym swoje przedsiębiorstwo, za którego działalność ponosi odpowiedzialność. W jego szeroko rozumianym interesie leży ubezpieczenie trwałych składników majątku tego przedsiębiorstwa od szkód losowych, jak również swojej odpowiedzialności cywilnej. Jak wykaże niniejszy tekst, przedsiębiorca jest traktowany przez ustawodawcę surowiej niż osoba zawierająca standardowe ubezpieczenie majątkowe. Ponadto sam charakter prawny polisy, ze względu na wymogi obrotu morskiego, różni się na podstawie regulacji Kodeksu cywilnego od tej zamieszczonej w Kodeksie morskim. Celem niniejszego opracowania jest wskazanie kluczowych różnic obu tych regulacji.
EN
Ukraine, upon giving up the nuclear arsenal left on its territory by the USSR, entered in 1994 into a Memorandum on Security Assurances with the United Kingdom, United States and Russian Federation (Budapest Memorandum). Since the crisis began between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in February 2014, a number of States have invoked the Budapest Memorandum. Unclear, however, is whether this instrument constituted legal obligations among its Parties or, instead, is a political declaration having no legal effect. The distinction between political instruments and legal instruments is a recurring question in inter-State relations and claims practice. The present article considers the Budapest Memorandum in light of the question of general legal interest – namely, how do we distinguish between the legal and the political instrument?
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