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Competition law enforcement in Ukraine: challenges from on-line giants

100%
Gerasymenko A., Mazaraki N.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
|
2022
|
vol. 15
|
issue 26
57-74
FR
Le droit de la concurrence, l’économie et la politique sont confrontés à une métamorphose réglementaire due à l’essor de l’économie numérique. Les juridictions des États-Unis, de la Chine et de l’UE ont annoncé et introduit partiellement des changements systémiques dans leurs cadres juridiques de la concurrence pour suivre le rythme des développements technologiques. Le Comité anti-monopole de l’Ukraine suit le principe des ‘trois singes’, il ne voit aucune plate-forme en ligne, n’entend aucune plate-forme en ligne, ne parle d’aucune plate-forme en ligne. En conséquence, rien n’a été entrepris, ni même annoncé. La structure du papier est double. Premièrement, il analyse le contexte économique et les caractéristiques de l’économie numérique et montre pourquoi les instruments disponibles d’application de la concurrence sont inefficaces. La deuxième partie de l’article montre pourquoi le cadre juridique ukrainien actuel de la concurrence est (in)capable de faire face aux défis des géants en ligne. En ce qui concerne la nécessité de recalibrer les approches réglementaires sur les marchés numériques, l’Ukraine est confrontée au dilemme de la bonne combinaison ex ante et ex post.
EN
Competition law, economics and policy are facing a regulatory metamorphosis due to the rise of the digital economy. US, China and EU jurisdictions have announced and partially introduced systemic changes to their competition law frameworks to keep pace with technological developments. The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine is following the principle of ‘three monkeys’, it sees no on-line platforms, hears no on-line platforms, speaks of no on-line platforms, so nothing has been undertaken or even announced. The paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the economic background and features of the digital economy and shows why the available instruments of competition enforcement are ineffective. The second part of the paper shows why the current Ukrainian competition law framework is (in)capable of dealing with challenges posed by on-line giants. Regarding the need for a recalibration of regulatory approaches in digital markets, Ukraine faces the dilemma of a proper combination of ex ante and ex post measures.
2
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A Definition of Digital Markets by the Slovak Antimonopoly Office – Has the Boat to Digitalisation Already Sailed?

86%
Kováčiková H.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
|
2020
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vol. 13
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issue 21
247-258
FR
La numérisation a apporté de nouveaux défis juridiques, même en matière de droit de la concurrence. Le test SSNIP traditionnel utilisé par les autorités de la concurrence ne convient pas aux marchés en ligne, où les services ou les produits sont mis gratuitement à la disposition des consommateurs. Ce document analyse certains aspects des marchés à prix zéro et leur évaluation du point de vue de l’autorité européenne de la concurrence et du point de vue de l’autorité slovaque de la concurrence.
EN
Digitalisation has brought new legal challenges even to competition law. The traditional SSNIP test used by competition authorities does not work with online markets, where services or products are made available to consumers free of charge. This paper analyses some aspects of zero-price markets and their assessment from the point of view of European competition authority and from the point of view of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office.
3
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Przejęcie Media Regionalne przez Polskapresse okiem ekonomisty

72%
Stryszowska M.
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
|
2014
|
vol. 3
|
issue 6
52-60
PL
Niniejszy artykuł omawia decyzję UOKiK dotyczącą przejęcia Media Regionalne przez Polskapresse. Przedstawia krótkie streszczenie tej decyzji oraz wskazuje na możliwe zastosowanie narzędzi analizy ekonomicznej w celu wzbogacenia przyjętej definicji rynku właściwego oraz przeprowadzonej oceny skutków koncentracji
EN
The article discusses the decision of the Polish competition authority (President of UOKiK) concerning the acquisition of Media Regionalne by Polskapresse. It presents a brief overview of the case and suggests what economic analyses could have been used in its market definition stage and for the evaluation of the merger’s effects
4
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Ekonomiczne przesłanki opłat dodatkowych oraz zagadnienie eliminacji z rynku w działalności sieci handlowych

44%
Fornalczyk M.
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
|
2013
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vol. 2
|
issue 2
72-77
PL
Podejście stosowane obecnie na gruncie art. 15 ust. 1 pkt 4 ustawy o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji (uznk) powinno być zmienione, albowiem opłaty pobierane przez sklepy wielkopowierzchniowe stanowią zwykle integralna część łańcucha wartości danego towaru. Nie mogą więc być automatycznie traktowane jako dodatkowy i nieuczciwy dochód generowany sieci przez dostawcę. Opłaty te są niczym innym jak wynagrodzeniem za usługi świadczone dostawcy przez sieć. Nie mogą być uznawane za nielegalne, jeżeli pokrywają koszty bezpośrednie i pośrednie zarządzania i sprzedaży dostarczonych towarów. W konsekwencji, konieczne jest zastąpienie obecnego legalistycznego fundamentalizmu podejście bardziej ekonomicznym (bazującym na paradygmacie wolnego rynku.
EN
It is truly necessary to tilt the approach that has been applied nowadays towards Article 15(1)(4) of the Combating Unfair Competition Act because the charges collected by retail chains (large-format stores) constitute usually an integral part of the value chain of the given product as well as a reflection of the price policy of such store. This fact suggests that such charges cannot by automatically deemed as an additional and unfair income generated by the purchaser (retail chain) from the seller. Charges collected from sellers (which can look dubious at first glance) can be nothing more than a retail chain’s remuneration for services rendered to the supplier. If those services are connected to the value chain and the ‘slotting fees’ cover costs of managing and selling acquired stock (direct and indirect costs), than the retail-chain does not impose any illegal charges. It should also be noted that even if a retail-chain plays a significant role as a commercial partner, it cannot be seen as an unavoidable link between the producer (importer) and customers. If that was indeed so than every action taken by such retail chain would be subject to an antitrust analysis. Going down this path, it would be necessary to verify the actual legalistic fundamentalism in favour of a more economic approach (based on free market paradigm). One must note that economics is used more extensively nowadays in antitrust proceedings, contributing substantially thereto.
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