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EN
In the literature and jurisprudence there are distinguished two opposite principles ruling over revealing the truth: a material truth principle (objective) and a formal truth principle (procedural). In the proceedings based on the material truth principle, judicial decisions in the matter of the actual state should reflect the reality. The judge aims to clarify all circumstances essential to solve a case in order to reveal a really existing legal relation bounding both parties to litigation. On the other hand, in proceedings based on the formal truth principle, judicial decisions in the matter of the actual state should only reflect the factual material and evidence gathered by the parties. In the study there is presented an evolution of norms and doctrinal opinions in the matter of the endeavor to establish the truth in civil proceedings connected with amendments to the Civil Procedure Code in 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2012.
EN
Concepts of material and formal truth have a long and well-grounded tradition in the doctrine of law. It seems, however, that they need some clarification and conceptualisation in purely philosophical and logical terms. In this paper, we propose such a theoretical analysis. These considerations are followed by a review of the key aspects of the current Polish legislation, which is written from the point of view of the conclusions reached through the first level of analysis.
EN
The contemporary truth reconstructed in a trial reflects differences between the Aristotelian truth in terms of its essence and criterion (material truth – veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus – ad Aristotle, The Metaphysics IV.7.[1011b 26-27])- and its practical realisation (objective truth – in medio stat veritas – ad Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7.[1108a 19–20]). In a non-adversarial processes – such as the Polish criminal trial - as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon one - the Polish administrative procedure (an administrative court has only a controlling function, not a reformative one and does not ascertain facts on its own) or separate proceedings in the Polish civil procedure – the court is expressis verbis obliged to reconstruct the objective truth (i.e. the truth which can be ascertained by a man meeting the diligentia boni patris familias standard) and not the material truth. Nonetheless, if the judicial truth understood in this way (the truth ascertained by the court; if the court does not demonstrate an evidential initiative, then it will not ascertain the truth, but it will merely assess the reliability of the evidence submitted as in the Anglo-American criminal trial) will differ from the material truth, it can act as a statutory premise to resume the proceedings. That is, generally speaking, the main difference between the inquisitorial and the adversarial models.
PL
Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest przybliżenie relacji jaka zachodzi między obowiązywaniem w polskim procesie karnym zasady prawdy materialnej a ochroną prawa do prywatności jego uczestników. Konieczność poczynienia przez organy procesowe prawdziwych ustaleń faktycznych rodzi bowiem ryzyko ingerencji w sferę prywatną jednostek, które w różnych rolach, biorą udział w postępowaniu karnym. Instytucjami istotnymi, z punktu widzenia realizacji dyrektyw wynikających z zasady prawdy materialnej, dla ochrony prawa do prywatności, są przede wszystkim przesłuchanie świadka, przeszukanie oraz oględziny i to ich szersza analiza, w kontekście potencjalnych ograniczeń, jakich doznaje zasada prawdy materialnej, z uwagi na obowiązek poszanowania prawa do prywatności, stanowi przedmiot rozważań niniejszego artykułu.
EN
The subject matter of this article is to present the relationship between the validity of the principle of material truth in the Polish criminal proceedings and the protection of the right to privacy of their participants. The necessity for real procedural arrangements to be made by judicial bodies creates a risk of interference in the private sphere of individuals who take part in criminal proceedings playing various roles in the same time. In terms of implementation of directives resulting from the principle of substantive truth in order to protect the right to privacy, the essential institutions are as follows: hearing a witness, search and inspection, and its broader analysis, within the context of potential limitations of the principle of material truth, due to the obligation to respect the right to privacy, which in general are the subject matter of this article.
EN
In Finland, a government bill on plea bargaining is now at the parliament. In Estonia, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Latvia they have adopted similar systems already. In Sweden and Iceland plea bargaining is not possible. As a procedural instrument, plea bargaining is something quite new in Europe, and in the Baltic and in the Nordic countries. How does it fit into our systems and into our way of thinking? If we look at the current trends in criminal proceedings fairness, procedural justice, conflict resolution, negotiated law, pragmatically acceptable compromise, procedural truth, party autonomy, court service, communication and interaction are good examples of the topics which are currently being discussed. All these examples indicate that the criminal jurisdiction has become more communal. It has even been said that criminal proceedings have recently become closer civil proceedings, which seems to be quite true. Still, efficiency plays a major role in European adjudication thanks to economic crisis and lack of resources. How to understand the role of plea bargaining in this set? At least the legislator has pointed out the efficiency, the appropriate allocation of resources and the simplifying the criminal proceedings when suggesting adopting the plea bargaining in Finland. The novelty has not been put into philosophical context or into the systemic context of criminal proceedings. It looks like the legislator adopts some single instruments from the foreign legal orders if they seem to fit well into legislators’ puzzle to intensify the proceedings and to save the state money. However, there seem to be more coherent trends behind all of that as well - namely, the change of paradigm.
EN
The subject matter of the article is a short reflection on the concept of truth in criminal proceedings. The author raises the question about the manner of understanding the truth in a criminal trial, as well as about the relation of truth to proof and probability - are such concepts compatible, mutually exclusive or differentiated in terms of categories? As a result of such contemplation, the author decided that the text of Article 2 § 2 of the Code of Crimi¬nal Procedure concerning material truth - in view of the today’s criminal law scholars and commentators - is similar to the concept of ontological truth, i.e. the understanding of truth in a way that does not refer to the state of affairs only (ontic truth), but also to the statements and judgements made with respect thereto. Such an understanding of truth also allows one to acknowledge the fact that the truth and belief that a certain event (that needs to be proven or made plausible) occurred are two different epistemic categories.
EN
The object of the Constitutional Tribunal’s review is Article 168a of the Code indicating the reasons of inadmissibility of evidence. The draft Sejm’s position contains a conclusion that the above provision is consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The applicant (the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights) claims that the challenged provision expresses an absolute obligation to include any evidence in the Polish criminal trial, regardless of how it was collected, including evidence obtained in violation of the prohibitions on collecting evidence. In the justification of the Sejm’s draft position it was stated that the purpose of the amendment was to ensure that the offender would be held criminally responsible and that any innocent person would be released from this liability in any situation where material evidence could be subject to exclusion only due to a defect in the procedure for obtaining it.
EN
The article presents the relationship between the principle of adversarial procedure and the principle of material truth. It shows legal consequences, including procedural ones, and social and sociological effects of this relationship. The paper draws attention to the legal shaping of the behavior of subjects that are addressees of these norms.
PL
W artykule podjęto próbę wskazania relacji zachodzących pomiędzy zasadą kontradyktoryjności a zasadą prawdy materialnej oraz skutków prawnych tej relacji w tym procesowych, społecznych i socjologicznych. Zwrócono też uwagę na kształtowanie zachowań podmiotów będących adresatami tych norm.
EN
The contemporary truth which applies to journalists (as required by the Council of Europe standards and domestic law) reflects differences between the essence and criterion of Aristotelian truth (material truth – veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus – ad Aristotle, The Metaphysics IV.7. [1011b 26‒27]), and its practical implementation (objective truth – in medio stat veritas – ad Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7. [1108a 19‒20]). A journalist is obliged to reconstruct the objective truth (the truth ascertainable by a man who meets the Roman law standard of diligentia boni patris familias, here referred to as diligence expected of a responsible journalist) and not the material truth. Nonetheless, a substantial discrepancy between this journalistic truth and the material truth will constitute a sufficient reason for statutory rectification. As regards the assessing statements, as well as the satirical ones, the proof of truth is only required if the assessment is a conclusion derived from descriptive statements, i.e. the factual basis, and that conclusion must be logical (proportional and therefore just). Satire may not contain words commonly considered as offensive. If a satirical statement is to enjoy the legal protection, it cannot amount to a mere personal attack. Regardless of the fact that satire is a negative assessment and an exaggerated one, it must derive from application of facts, meaning that it must reflect the reality and in that sense it can neither attack human dignity nor contain any discriminatory statements, as confirmed by the latest case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Analogical conclusions can be reached upon reading the works of Romanian satirists, for instance Horace.
EN
This article presents considerations of the various legal institutions that make reaching the truth possible, on the other hand, those that reduce such possibility. This text also shows the influence of such institutions on cognitive possibilities of procedural bodies, as well as the advisability of the truth’s guarantees and limitations in criminal proceedings. After all, the truth is one of the values that are realized by the Polish system of criminal procedural law, and therefore the procedural law must create the possibility of reaching the truth. On the other hand, however, the truth may come into conflict with other values that are expressed by the Polish legal order, so that many times the truth must be limited or excluded for the sake of another value. The considerations are devoted to the relationship between the truth and other principles of the criminal process, institutions of the evidence law, the appellate process and procedural guarantees. This article outlines also the possible extra-legal threats for possibility of reaching the truth.
PL
W pracy przedstawiono rozważania dotyczące poszczególnych instytucji prawnych, które z jednej strony umożliwiają dotarcie do prawdy w trakcie postępowania karnego, z drugiej zaś – ograniczają taką możliwość. Ukazano wpływ tych instytucji na możliwości poznawcze organów procesowych, a także celowość istnienia zarówno gwarancji, jak i ograniczeń prawdy w procesie karnym. Prawda jest bowiem jedną z wartości realizowanych przez polski system prawa karnego procesowego, w związku z czym musi ono zapewniać warunki, by można było do niej dotrzeć. Niemniej prawda może wchodzić w konflikt z innymi wartościami wyrażanymi przez polski porządek prawny, dlatego niejednokrotnie musi zostać ograniczona lub wyłączona. Rozważania poświęcono relacjom między prawdą a innymi zasadami procesu karnego, instytucjami prawa dowodowego, postępowaniem odwoławczym i gwarancjami procesowymi. Zarysowano także potencjalne pozaprawne zagrożenia dla możliwości osiągnięcia prawdy.
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