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Problem konceptualizacji doświadczenia metafizycznego

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The critical approach to metaphysics has usually two dimensions: methodological dimension on the one hand, and semantic one on the other. From the methodological point of view a main problem of metaphysics can be defined in terms of lack of proper procedures that may lead to the verification of metaphysical theses. The semantic criticism is based on the assumption that all conceptual schemata of a scientific domain should be characterized as having two semantic properties: meaning and reference. Critics argue that metaphysical concepts have the real problem both with reference and meaning. In this paper I argue for a different approach to the aforementioned problems. My claim is that metaphysics is in trouble because a metaphysical experience essentially goes beyond the descriptive power of conceptual schemata. I analyze that thesis in two perspectives: nature and function of experience in general as well as limits of conceptualization as a main cognitive activity. In the third part of the paper the idea of fundamental concepts of metaphysics will be introduced as an illustration of the main thesis of my paper.
EN
The critical approach to metaphysics has usually two dimensions: methodological dimension on the one hand, and semantic one on the other. From the methodological point of view a main problem of metaphysics can be defined in terms of lack of proper procedures that may lead to the verification of metaphysical theses. The semantic criticism is based on the assumption that all conceptual schemata of a scientific domain should be characterized as having two semantic properties: meaning and reference. Critics argue that metaphysical concepts have the real problem both with reference and meaning. In this paper I argue for a different approach to the aforementioned problems. My claim is that metaphysics is in trouble because a metaphysical experience essentially goes beyond the descriptive power of conceptual schemata. I analyze that thesis in two perspectives: nature and function of experience in general as well as limits of conceptualization as a main cognitive activity. In the third part of the paper the idea of fundamental concepts of metaphysics will be introduced as an illustration of the main thesis of my paper.
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Epifanie metafizyczne I. Ingardena i S.I. Witkiewicza

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EN
The author in his article approaches and confronts metaphysical threads of conceptions authors mentioned above. It deals with some fundamental questions of aesthetics and widely comprehended philosophy: symbolization, metaphysical experience and symbolic participation. Apart from drawing a comparison between Ingarden’s metaphysical qualities and metaphysical feelings of Witkacy one can f ind here considerations concerning an event of epiphany and its metaphysical derivative – metaphany (this term was constructed and def ined by the author of the article). In this context it is proper to notice the analysis of basic symbolic senses: the vertical, the depth, the surface. At the end, the author sketches the universal structure of reality in which is situated metaphanical subject, i.e. the subject experiencing metaphysical epiphany.
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