Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 11

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  metaphysical realism
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Studia Ełckie
|
2015
|
vol. 17
|
issue 4
337-358
EN
Even though axiology as a separate philosophical discipline is relatively young, with estimated time of its birth in the midnineteenth century, the reflec-tion on the values, which is the subject of the axiological inquiries, has been around for centuries. It reaches the ancient beginnings of the philosophy itself. The matter of the way the values exist, their quantity and nature is being very actively discussed nowadays and creates multiple strategies, mostly connected with the realistic or idealistic starting point of philosophy itself. That is the reason why we are dealing with many definitions and classifications of axiological values. It turns out that today, the category of the values has not only inter- but multidisciplinary character. That is why we are talking about values virtually everywhere. Not only in philosophy, but we can find them in everyday life, social sciences, art, music, mathematics or economy. Unfortunately understanding of values in the latter – seems to be specifically close for many of us. This article belongs to the dynamic philosophical discussion about the metaphysics of values, from the point of view of metaphysics’ realism and objectivism. Within this strategy the author of this article tries to answer the few questions: firstly- what the values are, further on – what is their nature and the ontological status, to finish with selected examples of typology and classifi-cation of values and the possibility of sorting them out hierarchically. Accepting existential pluralism of the surrounding reality as an axiom – the author accepts axiological pluralism as well, in relation to the goodness as the condition of the hierarchization of the “world of values”.
EN
Stevens’s poems grant a curious status to material reality. Famously abstract, they refuse to abandon the realm of the material. Rather, “material reality” is inseparable from “abstract” concepts. Stevens’s position is pragmatist: the status and significance of material objects is founded by the entirely human linguistic/mental activity, which is also an interpretive activity. The poem is a site of initiating this activity. As such, Stevens’s poetics remains in opposition to other aesthetic posi­tions: the linguistic idealism of Mallarmé, the metaphysical realism of Miłosz and Herbert, and the material realism of Ponge and American “objectivists”. While the metaphysical positions tend to overcome the material, the realistic poets will reify it by “taking the side of things”. Stevens’s poetic pragmatism sees no lure in the extra-material, while also refusing to see matter as meaningful in itself, beyond the human interpretive activity.
Path of Science
|
2018
|
vol. 4
|
issue 2
2001-2006
EN
The article presents an unconventional although not absolutely unprecedented view on abstract objects defending the position of metaphysical realism. It is argued that abstract objects taken in purely ontological sense are the forms of objects. The forms possess some common characteristics of abstract objects, they can exist not in physical space and time and play a grounding role in their relation to concrete objects. It is stated that commonly discussed abstract objects – properties, kinds, mathematical objects – are forms.
EN
Sarbiewska considers the relation between the film image, phenomenological subject and the ontology of reality. She puts forward the notion of phenomenological ontology in film, which she calls “metaphysical realism”. The starting point for the proposed complex of meanings is, following André Bazin, the importance of ontological nature of film, which permits a very particular contact with reality. Using the notion of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, Sarbiewska takes the film camera (a subjective act of perception), to be the equivalent of an act of pure, intentional awareness, that is directed towards revealing the “ineffable” essence of things (the truth of being). At the same time she emphasizes that the type of contemplative viewing, open in film vision, permits one to go beyond clear dualism of subject and object and that through per visibilia ad invisibilia leads the way for phenomenological intuition in film. In her analysis the author uses the work of Werner Herzog, and in particular the ontology and aesthetics contained in his films.
EN
The aim of this article is to show the undeniable influence of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s artistic method on Yuri Mamlejev’s literary works in particular in relation to his novel The Other. Relying on these determinants of fantastic realism, which for many researchers are referred to as the most significant elements of Dostoyevsky’s artistic method, we make an attempt to show that the carnival which combines the two orders in the works of the 19th century writer: the real (scientific) and the surreal (magic), makes the fantasy become an integral part of the surrounding space. Simultaneously the concept of fiction should be understood through such categories as: paradoxicality, iconicity, a word as a vessel, sleep, hallucinations, picture in picture, doppelgänger that foster deep psychological self-understanding of the entity. In the article we aim to expose some of the abovementioned categories of constructing the world of Dostoyevsky’s works and making up, as defined by the author himself “the realism of higher sense” which, in a slightly modified form, although still clearly visible, is also reflected in Mamleev’s artistic method – metaphysical realism. The main emphasis is put on the categories of sleep and doppelgänger which are the clearest examples of Yuri Vitalevich’s inspiration.
PL
The aim of this article is to show the undeniable influence of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s artistic method on Yuri Mamlejev’s literary works in particular in relation to his novel The Other. Relying on these determinants of fantastic realism, which for many researchers are referred to as the most significant elements of Dostoyevsky’s artistic method, we make an attempt to show that the carnival which combines the two orders in the works of the 19th century writer: the real (scientific) and the surreal (magic), makes the fantasy become an integral part of the surrounding space. Simultaneously the concept of fiction should be understood through such categories as: paradoxicality, iconicity, a word as a vessel, sleep, hallucinations, picture in picture, doppelgänger that foster deep psychological self-understanding of the entity. In the article we aim to expose some of the abovementioned categories of constructing the world of Dostoyevsky’s works and making up, as defined by the author himself “the realism of higher sense” which, in a slightly modified form, although still clearly visible, is also reflected in Mamleev’s artistic method – metaphysical realism. The main emphasis is put on the categories of sleep and doppelgänger which are the clearest examples of Yuri Vitalevich’s inspiration.
PL
Artykuł zajmuje się problemem warunkowo-prawdziwościowej teorii znaczenia zdań wiązanej zazwyczaj z doktryną metafizycznego realizmu. Składa się z dwóch zasadniczych części. W pierwszej przedstawiono rozbudowaną obronę realizmu ze strony Michaela Moore’a poprzez omówienie szeregu argumentów mających podważać tę doktrynę. Wnioskiem tej części jest uznanie, iż nawet jeśli odparcie tych prób obalenia realizmu jest trafne, to można postawić dwa dodatkowe argumenty mające za zadanie poddać w wątpliwość jego teorię: argument z kontekstualizmu oraz argument z nonfaktualizmu, które są opisane i rozwinięte w drugiej części tekstu.
EN
The article tackles with the problem of truth-conditional theory of meaning for sentences, which are usually connected with the doctrine of metaphysical realism. It consists basically of two parts. The first part describes several arguments aimed at rejecting realism. The conclusion of this part is a claim that even if Moore’s defense in this regard is successful there are two additional attempts to undermine his theory, namely the argument from contextualism and the argument from nonfactualism that are described and developed in the second part of the paper.
EN
What follows is an introductory investigation into phenomenological realism represented by Dietrich von Hildebrand, who builds his system on the rational intuition supported with spiritual affectivity in the form of intentional responses. In that context we turn our attention to metaphysical realism represented by St. Thomas Aquinas. Even both authors are strongly committed to what really exist we notice the entirely different philosophical grounds they employ. For that we focus on these essential features of two aforementioned schools to show whether they could be considered as paralell, complimentary or rather incomparable when cognitive realism is considered.
8
Content available remote

Lidská práva existují objektivně

51%
EN
In this text, I will address the question of whether human rights as moral rights exist objectively. This issue is of great practical importance because the recognition of human rights should not depend on anyoneʼs whim. Moral objectivity can be understood in different ways. A metaphysical realist considers moral objectivity in a strong sense. This means he assumes the existence of moral facts of a metaphysical nature. The expressivist prefers a weaker conception of moral objectivity. This conception can be explained by moral attitudes of the second order. These attitudes are one of the defining features of the language of human rights. The disadvantage of metaphysical realism is the epistemic uncertainty about the existence and content of metaphysical moral reality. This permanent uncertainty has the potential for moral skepticism. I will conclude that human rights are objective at least in a weaker sense. The objectivity of human rights is an entirely human matter. It is not encoded in metaphysical reality but rather in the way we think and talk about human rights. If we have doubts then the only thing we need is better self-understanding. This conclusion is optimistic because it means that human rights are objective regardless of the existence of a moral reality in a metaphysical sense. Moreover, a metaphysical realist can accept the expressivist solution as a good choice in case of loss of his faith.
CS
V tomto textu se budu věnovat otázce, zda lidská práva jakožto morální práva existují objektivně. Tato otázka má velký praktický význam, protože přiznání lidských práv by nemělo záviset na něčím rozmaru. Morální objektivitu lze chápat různými způsoby. Metafyzický realista uvažuje morální objektivitu v silném smyslu. To znamená, že předpokládá existenci morálních faktů metafyzické povahy. Expresivista preferuje slabší koncepci morální objektivity. Tu lze vysvětlit morálními postoji druhého řádu, které jsou jedním z defi­ ničních znaků jazyka lidských práv. Nevýhodou metafyzického realismu je epistemická nejistota, zda vůbec existuje něco takového jako metafyzická morální realita, respektive jaký má obsah. Tato trvalá nejistota má potenciál k morální skepsi. Své úvahy dovedu k závěru, že lidská práva jsou objektivní alespoň ve slabším smyslu. Objektivita lidských práv je veskrze lidská záležitost. Není zakódovaná v metafyzické realitě, ale ve způsobu, jakým o lidských právech myslíme a mluvíme. Jestliže máme pochybnosti, pak jediné, co potřebu­ jeme, je lepší sebeporozumění. Tento závěr je optimistický, neboť znamená, že lidská práva jsou objektivní bez ohledu, zda existuje morální realita v metafyzickém smyslu. Navíc, metafyzický realista může přijmout expresivistické řešení jako dobrou volbu pro případ ztráty své víry.
PL
Autor podzielił tekst na pięć części. W pierwszej krótko zaprezentował najważniejsze strony w toczonej coraz gwałtowniej dyskusji nad badaniami społeczno-kulturowej tożsamości płciowej. Zasugerował także, że określenie miejsca gender studies w obrębie podstawowych metafizyczno-teoriopoznawczych stanowisk umożliwia wskazanie najważniejszych kierunków, w których winna podążyć krytyka gender studies. Część druga została poświęcona charakterystyce podstawowych metafizyczno-teoriopoznawczych nastawień do rzeczywistości. Kolejno autor zaprezentował: metafizyczny realizm, metafizyczny idealizm, teoriopoznawczy realizm oraz teoriopoznawczy idealizm. W partii trzeciej omówione zostały najważniejsze założenia, tezy oraz postulaty stawiane w ramach gender studies. Czytelnik może zapoznać się z przedstawicielami gender studies, ich poglądami i założeniami. W części czwartej ukazano punkty styczne, napięcia oraz sprzeczności pomiędzy gender studies a kluczowymi metafizyczno-teoriopoznawczymi stanowiskami. W części ostatniej autor dochodzi do przekonania, że gender studies wydają się być przejawem idealistyczno-metafizycznego oraz realistyczno-teoriopoznawczego nastawienia do rzeczywistości. Na tej podstawie formułuje pięć najważniejszych wskazań, które winni uwzględnić krytycy gender studies.
EN
The paper The Attempt of Location of Gender Studies within the Fundamental Metaphysical and Epistemological Attitudes to Reality. Some Tips for the Critics of Gender Studies has five parts. In the first part the author briefly presents the most important participants of the discussion about the gender identity. He also suggests that the definition of gender studies within the basic metaphysical and epistemological positions enables the identification of the most important directions, in which criticism of gender studies should follow. The second part is devoted to the characteristics of the basic metaphysical and epistemological attitudes to reality. Sequentially presented afterwards are metaphysical realism, metaphysical idealism, epistemological realism and epistemological idealism. The third part discusses the most important assumptions, arguments, and demands placed within gender studies. It also summons the typical representatives of gender studies. The fourth part shows the points of contact, tension and conflict between gender studies, and key metaphysical and epistemological positions. In the last part the author comes to the conclusion that gender studies seem to be a manifestation of the idealistic-metaphysical and realistic-epistemological attitude to reality. On this basis, he formulates five key indications that the critics of gender studies should take into account.
DE
Der Aufsatz Der Standort der Gender-Studien in der metaphysischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Haltung zur Wirklichkeit. Einige Tipps für die Kritiker der Gender Studien hat fünf Teile. Im ersten Teil präsentiert der Autor die wichtigsten Gruppen in der Diskussion der sozio-kulturellen Geschlechtsidentität. Er zeigt auch, dass die Definition des Standortes der Gender-Studien in den metaphysischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Grundpositionen die Identifizierung der wichtigsten Richtungen ermöglicht, in die die Kritik erfolgen soll. Der zweite Teil wird auf die Merkmale der metaphysischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Grundhaltungen zur Wirklichkeit gerichtet: metaphysischer Realismus, metaphysischer Idealismus, erkenntnistheoretischer Realismus und erkenntnistheoretischer Idealismus. Im dritten Teil diskutiert man die wichtigsten Annahmen, Argumente und Forderungen der Gender-Studien. Der Autor stellt auch die typischen Vertreter der Geschlechterforschung vor. Ein Fragment des vierten Teiles zeigt Berührungspunkte, Spannungen und Konflikte zwischen Gender-Studien und metaphysischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Grundpositionen. Im letzten Teil kommt der Autor zu dem Schluss, dass die Gender-Studien eine Manifestation der idealistisch-metaphysischen und realistisch-erkenntnistheoretischen Haltung zur Realität zu sein scheinen. Auf dieser Basis formuliert er fünf Hinweise, die die Kritiker der Gender-Studien berücksichtigen sollen.
10
45%
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2024
|
vol. 72
|
issue 1
43-60
PL
Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) miał skłonność do zmieniania swoich poglądów filozoficznych oraz do ich ciągłej modyfikacji. Ostatni okres rozwoju jego filozofii jest znany jako faza realizmu naturalnego lub zdroworozsądkowego. Realizm ten został najpełniej przedstawiony w Wykładach Deweyowskich z 1994 r. Artykuł dotyczy trzech aspektów stanowiska w nich wyłożonego, a następnie ulepszanego i uzupełnianego. Wskazane są trzy trudności tego stanowiska. Po pierwsze, Putnam twierdzi, że we współczesnym sporze o realizm mamy z jednej strony do czynienia ze zwolennikami ekstrawaganckiego realizmu metafizycznego, z drugiej zaś z entuzjastami rozmaitych wersji nieodpowiedzialnego antyrealizmu. Niestety Putnamowski zarys tej debaty jest zbyt uproszczony, ponieważ jest wiele postaci realizmu metafizycznego, natomiast scalanie w jedną całość różnych odmian antyrealizmu prowadzi na manowce. Po drugie, naiwny realizm bezpośredni Putnama trudno pogodzić z zaproponowanym przez niego transakcjonalizmem w teorii percepcji. Po trzecie, przez jakiś czas Putnam był pod wpływem Wittgensteinowskiego kwietyzmu, który zniekształcał charakter wysuwanych przez niego koncepcji filozoficznych.
EN
Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.
11
32%
EN
This article focuses on different conceptions of natural rights in scholars of the high Middle Ages (Henry of Ghent,Duns Scotus, Ockham,Marsilius of Padua,Gerson, Summenhart) and of early Modernity (Vitoria, Suárez,Grotius). First the opinions of these scholars’ on natural law are presented, then their „definitions“ of ius as right, their use of permissive natural law and finally their conceptions of natural rights are analysed (natural right to private property is used to demonstrate the last point). Instead of the „dividing line“ between medieval and modern ideas on natural rights the paper argues for the continuity that lies in the fact that the same or similar concepts are reinterpreted and used to build new theoretical constructions. It tries to show that various natural „rights“ (in Henry of Ghent, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham) are in fact Hohfeldian liberties and not Hohfeldian claims and in this sense they are not rights. It criticizes the thesis which is still common (at least in the Czech and Slovak literature) that natural rights theories were triggered by the development of metaphysical nominalism and voluntarism in the high Middle Ages. Instead it tries to find reasons for the development of particular natural rights theories in various ways the scholars reacted on the particular problems of their times.
CS
Tento článek se pokouší zmapovat různé názory na přirozená práva myslitelů vrcholného středověku (Jindřich z Gentu, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Marsilius z Padovy, Gerson, Summenhart) a raného novověku (Vitoria, Suárez,Grotius) tak, že nejdříve představí jejich názory na přirozené objektivní právo, jejich vymezení ius jakožto subjektivního práva, operace s permisivním přirozeným objektivním právem a konečně jejich koncepce přirozených práv (k jejichž demonstraci používá především právo na soukromé vlastnictví). Místo někdy postulovaného předělu mezi středověkem a novověkem ukazuje naopak kontinuitu v názorech, která podle autora spočívá v tom, že často stejné či podobné koncepty jsou různými autory reinterpretovány a použity v nových kontextech. Ukazuje, že přirozená „práva“ u některých myslitelů (Jindřich z Gentu,Marsilius, Ockham) nejsou hohfeldovskými nároky (claims), a tedy subjektivními právy, ale hohfeldovskými volnostmi (liberties). Kritizuje také (minimálně v tuzemské literatuře převládající) tradiční přístup hledající spojitost mezi koncepcemi přirozených práv a nástupem metafyzického nominalismu či voluntarismu. Naopak hledá důvody pro partikulární rozvinutí koncepce přirozených práv v tom, jak zde představení myslitelé reagují na problémy, které před ně postavila doba, v níž žili.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.