For many years, researchers into the history of philosophy have been arguing over whose concept of dynamic ontology can claim precedence. We have two contenders here: Ruder Josip Boscovic and Immanuel Kant. Kant has gone down in the history of philosophy as one of its greatest figures, but his concept of dynamic ontology is not widely commented today. Meanwhile Boścovic's theory was almost completely forgotten. And yet this dispute concerns the concept that became the basis of today's Theory of Everything. So let's try to solve this long-standing problem.
This paper reconstructs Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz’s understanding of logic, accentuating the differences in his evaluation of logic and systems of ‘logistics’. Leśniewski’s theory of collective sets (mereology) exemplifies logistics as understood by Witkiewicz. I present an outline of Leśniewski’s nominalism, which entails a belief in a non-abstract nature of sets. I focus on these features of mereology that could have led Witkiewicz to interpreting it as an ontological system. Witkacy (Witkiewicz’s penname) was skeptical of the usefulness of formal systems (or logistics), and of mereology in particular, for the purposes of designing a unified ontological system describing essential properties of objects (the world). According to Witkiewicz, such formal systems assumed the role of ontology but severely lacked in philosophical justification. I argue that regardless of his nominalism and corporeal conception of individuals, mereology cannot be considered a formal theory of Witkiewicz’s monads.
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