Economic and debt crises, as well as the crisis of migration and identity have exacerbated divisions within the European Union and strengthened disintegration forces among EU Member States. The key dilemma currently faced along the way to EU integration regards the nature and extent of multipolarity trends at the regional level. The aim of this study is an analysis of the risk of disintegration of the European Union in its current form. The research problem is an attempt at answering the question whether the proposed ‘multi-speed Europe’ will contribute to EU’s disintegration or rather to its development in another format. The whole structure of the paper and the analysis performed serve this purpose. The following research hypothesis has been adopted: implementation of a multi-speed Europe policy will transform the current process of European integration into its opposite and thus cause serious economic and political consequences of the collapse of this form of integration project. The hypothesis has been positively verified. The following research methods were employed in the analysis: historical (the essence and meaning of the disintegration concept in doctrines and the literature), content analysis (research into the solutions adopted), as well as a quantitative and qualitative method (analysis of figures). The result of the research performed is a description of the risks and threats that will occur if the multi-speed Europe policy is continued and Member States depart from the original integration model.
In the face of a dynamically changing world and the crises that have painfully affected us in recent years, the question arises - is this the end of the era of globalization? After almost 3 years of COVID - 19 pandemic, more than a year after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the world seems to be entering a new era. Many analysts say that the era of the end of globalization is coming. However, is this really the case? Is globalization on the decline and is it regressing? This paper will give an answer to this question, as well as synthetically define the concept of globalization in relation to new trends and events on the world stage.
What are the primary drivers of the relationship between Xi’s China and Lukashenko’s Belarus? The present research paper uses the historical process-tracing method to provide an answer to this question. Furthermore, it uses quantitative data analysis regarding the economic intercourse between Belarus and China. It examines whether China’s opposition regarding the unipolar American-led world order and Belarus’s security concerns are the primary drivers of the relationship between Minsk and Beijing. The present article concludes that the congruence of beliefs and Minsk’s desire to ensure survival are drawing the two countries closer together. China’s new strategy encompasses Beijing’s increasing participation in world affairs. China opposes the world order led by a single hegemon, the United States of America. In the interim, Belarus, a relatively weak state insignificant in the global balance of power, shares Beijing’s beliefs about the desired nature of the contemporary world order. However, the Belarusian economy’s condition, which relies heavily on external funding, does not allow the economic cooperation between Minsk and Beijing to thrive. China gradually increases its engagement with Belarus, yet it obscures its ambitions, for Minsk lies in Moscow’s sphere of influence.
Przez wiele lat w badaniach nad stosunkami międzynarodowymi dominującą rolę odgrywała szeroko rozumiana myśl zachodnia, skupiona wokół amerykańskich i europejskich ośrodków naukowych. Obecnie, wraz z rosnącym znaczeniem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej na arenie międzynarodowej, wiele koncepcji i teorii jest redefiniowanych w duchu myśli chińskiej. Stanowi to potencjalną alternatywę dla wartości reprezentowanych przez szeroko rozumiany Zachód. Jednym z pojęć poddanych redefinicji jest globalizacja, która zdaniem Chińczyków przestała przynosić korzyści światu, preferując najbogatsze i najbardziej rozwinięte państwa, ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi na czele. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie chińskiej wizji globalizacji jako odmiennej względem globalizacji rozpatrywanej w ujęciu zachodnim. Szczególnej analizie zostanie poddane przemówienie przewodniczącego Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej Xi Jinpinga wygłoszone podczas Światowego Forum Ekonomicznego w 2017 roku, w którym zawarte zostały kluczowe założenia „nowej” globalizacji, a także chińska w niej rola. Ponadto przeanalizowane zostaną chińskie przedsięwzięcia mające na celu rozwój i współpracę międzynarodową w duchu wzajemnych korzyści, na czele z projektem Jednego pasa i jednej drogi. W zarysie zostanie także przedstawione dążenie Chin do zmiany obecnie panującego ładu międzynarodowego i stworzenia wielobiegunowego świata, w którym byłyby one jednym z ośrodków decyzyjnych.
EN
For many years, Western thought, centered around American and European research centers, played a dominant role in the study of international relations. Today, with the growing importance of the People's Republic of China internationally, many concepts and theories are redefined in the spirit of Chinese thought. This is a potential alternative to the values represented by the broadly understood West. One of the concepts redefined is globalization, which according to the Chinese ceased to benefit the world, preferring the richest and most developed countries with the United States at the forefront. The purpose of this article is to present the Chinese vision of globalization as different from the globalization in Western terms. Particular analysis will be given to the speech of the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, delivered at the World Economic Forum in 2017, which contained the key assumptions of the "new" globalization, as well as China's role in it. In addition, Chinese enterprises will be examined to develop and cooperate internationally in a spirit of mutual benefit, including the Belt and Road Initiative. Article will also outline China's desire to change the current international order and create a multipolar world in which they would be one of the decision-making centers.
The author begins the article by calling attention to Duverger’s methodological principles, which he then draws on to analyse and interpret ‘Duverger’s laws’ concerning the effect electoral systems have on parties and party systems. Duverger’s classification of party systems, which he asserts are closely linked to electoral systems, is dealt with in the conclusion of the article, where the author draws attention to the more elaborate version of the classification that is hinted at in parts of his 1951 book Les partis politiques and that he then formulated explicitly in 1960. The author compares this later version with Sartori’s famous typology of party systems.
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