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Filozofia przyrody po niemiecku

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PL
Recenzja książki: Hans-Dieter MUTSCHLER, Wprowadzenie do filozofii przyrody. Wybrane zagadnienia, przeł. Józef Bremer, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2005, s. 238.
EN
Review of: Hans-Dieter MUTSCHLER, Wprowadzenie do filozofii przyrody. Wybrane zagadnienia, przeł. Józef Bremer, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2005, s. 238.
EN
This essay will present Hobbes as the most consistent philosopher of the 17th century, and show that in all areas his endeavors have cogency that is unrivalled, in many ways even to this day. The second section will outline Hobbes’ conception of philosophy and his causal materialism. Section 3 will deal briefly with Hobbes’ discussion of sensation and then present his views on the nature and function of language and how reason depends upon language. Section 4 portrays his views about the material world; Section 5 deals with nature of man; and the 6th section with the artificial body of the commonwealth and the means of its creation.
EN
The objective of this article is to provide an answer to the question as to how to philosophize within the context of science, which constitutes a more specific version of one of the essential metaphilosophical questions: how should one philosophize? A compelling answer to such inquiries was proposed at the end of the 20th century by the Cracow philosophers of nature and went under the name of „philosophy in science” research program. In this elaboration, on the basis of findings originating in the cosmological domain, I analyze to what extent this is indeed an innovative answer to the metaphilosophical question stated above – that is how to philosophize within the context of science.
EN
Source literature lists several versions of creationism as well as numerous manners of understand- ing evolutionism. Creationist views may be limited to four basic ones: fundamentalist creationism, creation science, intelligent design and evolutionary creationism. In my article I will justify which of these versions of creationism may be considered as dialoguing with science, and which of them turn out, to a greater or lesser degree, unable to enter into this dialogue. I will answer the question how creationism should be understood in order for it to be able to engage in a debate with modern science. In other words, the central question of this article will be: how is the dialogue between religion (creationism) and science (evolutionism) feasible?
EN
In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no coming-to-be ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem.
EN
The paper deals with the theories of Ruđer Bošković (1711–1787) on senses. Bošković did not systematically present his approach, but it can be considered on the basis of his works on optics, but, firstly, in his Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis redacta ad legem unicam virium in natura existentium (Vienna 1758). In this study the basic concepts of Bošković’s viewpoints on senses regard the genesis of our individual ideas that are acquired through the senses, which are based on the principle of causality. For Bošković senses are directly related to the ideas, actually to the so-called acquired ideas. Our senses are, however, limited and that is the reason why we cannot experience the absolute change of state.
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Book review: Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton and Natural Philosophy, Reaktion Books, London 2018, ss. 268.
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Recenzja książki: Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton and Natural Philosophy, Reaktion Books, London 2018, ss. 268.
PL
The basic concept in the philosophy of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker is the concept of time. Playing the dominant role in the thought and philosophy of Weizsäcker, the concept is the point of departure for an attempt to find ways to cognize and recreate the unity of Nature, to understand “the unity of physics” and its reconstruction in the neo-Kantian spirit, as well as seek and analyse conditions of the possibilities of science and its ethical dimension. In this context Weizsäcker analyses relations between the structure of time and the ethical responsibility of a man practising science. The present study aims to demonstrate the basic elements of this relation as the foundation of the ethics of scientific research. Responsible scientific research is only possible when men operating within the field are guided by objective principles of the ethics of responsibility.
EN
Some early modern scholars believed that Scripture provided more certain knowledge than all secular authorities – even Aristotle – or investigating nature as such. In this paper, I analyse one such attempt to establish the most reliable knowledge of nature: the so-called Mosaic physics proposed by the Reformed encyclopaedist Johann Heinrich Alsted. Although in his early works on Physica Mosaica Alsted declares that his primary aim is proving the harmony that exists between various traditions of natural philosophy, namely between the Mosaic and the Peripatetic approaches, and despite the fact that his biblical encyclopaedia of 1625 was intended to be based on a literal reading of the Bible, he never truly abandoned the Aristotelian framework of physics. What is more, in his mature encyclopaedia of 1630, he eventually openly preferred Aristotle to other naturalphilosophical traditions. I argue, therefore, that Alsted’s bold vision of Mosaic physics remained unfulfi lled and should be assessed as an unsuccessful project of early modern natural philosophy.
CS
Někteří raně novověcí učenci byli přesvědčeni, že Písmo poskytuje jistější poznání nežli všechny světské autority – s Aristotelem včele – či zkoumání samotné přírody. Ve své studii se zabývám jednou z takových snah o získání toho nejspolehlivějšího vědění o přírodě: takzvanou mosaickou fyzikou, jak ji koncipoval reformovaný encyklopedista Johann Heinrich Alsted. Ačkoliv ve svých raných dílech, jež se Physica Mosaica týkají, Alsted za svůj nejvyšší cíl prohlašuje dokázání souladu mezi různými podobami přírodní fi losofi e, především mezi mosaickým a peripatetickým přístupem, a navzdory tomu, že jeho biblická encyklopedie z roku 1625 měla být založena na doslovném čtení Bible, Alsted ve skutečnosti nikdy neopustil aristotelská východiska přírodní fi losofi e. Co je ještě pozoruhodnější, Alstedova vrcholná encyklopedie z roku 1630 již přímo upřednostňuje aristotelismus před jinými přírodně-fi losofi ckými přístupy. Tvrdím proto, že Alstedova smělá vize mosaické fyziky zůstala nenaplněna a měla by být hodnocena jako neúspěšný projekt raně novověké přírodní filosofie.
EN
This article attempts to analyse the influence of William of Ockham’s views upon the transition from the medieval to the modern understanding of the final directedness of nature (i.e. the non-rational entities). To begin, the views of a number of modern authors on the idea of natural final causality are analysed. A “traditional” interpretation according to which the transition from the medieval period to modern times involved giving up the notion of a final causality in the natural sciences, and replacing it with efficient causality is criticised. The author favours instead a recent and more subtle interpretation, pointing out that modern philosophy does not reject final causality; rather, it offers a reinterpretation of this notion. Accordingly, the author proposes to distinguish between two different strands within modern philosophy. The next part of the article is an analysis of Ockham’s views , focusing in particular on the themes that – it is claimed here – could have influenced the birth of the modern understanding of natural final causality. The author characterises and discusses four such themes, and tries to associate them with the aforementioned two strands in the modern approach to the teleology of nature.
PL
Artykuł ten stanowi próbę omówienia wpływu, jaki poglądy Williama Ockhama wywarły na przejście od średniowiecznego do nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury (tj. celowości bytów nierozumnych). Rozważeniu poddaje się sposób, w jaki do idei celowości świata natury odnosili się wybrani autorzy nowożytni. Krytyce poddaje się „tradycyjną” interpretację przejścia, jakie dokonać miało się w tym aspekcie między średniowieczem a nowożytnością, podług której nowożytność miała przynieść całkowity kres posługiwaniu się celowością w filozofii natury, zastępując ją odwołaniami do przyczynowości sprawczej. Następnie wskazuje się na nowsze, bardziej subtelne próby podejścia do tego zagadnienia, wskazujące na to, iż w filozofii nowożytnej mamy raczej do czynienia z reinterpretacją, a nie porzuceniem idei przyczynowości celowej. W związku z tym autor artykułu proponuje wyróżnienie w obrębie owej filozofii dwóch głównych nurtów. Dalszą część stanowi analiza koncepcji Ockhama, polegająca na wskazaniu w niej tych wątków, które – jak się twierdzi – mogły wywrzeć szczególny wpływ na narodziny nowożytnego rozumienia celowości świata natury. Autor wymienia cztery takie wątki, próbując je powiązać z wyróżnionymi wcześniej dwoma nurtami nowożytnego rozumienia teleologii natury.
Forum Philosophicum
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2014
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vol. 19
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issue 2
227–239
EN
In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradiction or that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines or propositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is an important qualifier to the traditional line of scholarship’s flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds with Jan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religious doctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction.
PL
The aim of this paper is to present the views of one of prominent Polish chemists, namely Bohdan Szyszkowski. Presented views are concerning the relation of the concepts of aether, continuity and causality in the context of revolution in physics that took place at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries. The issues particularly concern his thoughts related to the old quantum theory and special relativity. In particular, this article presents the role of these concepts in the foundations of physics and – in a more general aspect – in the recognized fields of knowledge. The nature of Szyszkowski’s analysis allows him to be considered a very interesting thinker in the area that today is called the philosophy of physics or, perhaps more accurately, the philosophy in science. An important observation made by Szyszkowski is emphasized that mathematical structures cannot have physical properties. Attention was also paid to the Polish intellectual community, which was formed in Kiev before 1919.
EN
The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period.
CS
Hlavním tématem této studie je rekonstrukce přírodní filosofie raně novověkého prešovského učence Jana (Johannese) Bayera (1630–1674) se zvláštním zřetelem k jejímu mosaickému profilu. Na základě kritické analýzy dosavadního bayerovského výzkumu dospívá autor ke zjištění, že dosud nebylo uspokojivě analyzováno ani Bayerovo přírodně-filosofické dílo jako takové, ani dostatečně prozkoumána jeho návaznost na předpokládané dva nejvýznamnější zdroje, Francise Bacona a Jana Amose Komenského. Studie je proto soustředěna na kritickou analýzu Bayerova výkladu stvoření a popisu přírody, které jsou následně zasazeny do dobového filosofického kontextu. Autor konstatuje, že ačkoliv Bayerův projekt vystavění originální a na (především aristotelské) tradici nezávislé mosaické přírodní filosofie skončil neúspěchem, lze myslitelovo dílo hodnotit jako cenný pokus o syntézu baconovských a komeniánských motivů, odrážející však rovněž širší dobové intelektuální souvislosti.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2021
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vol. 10
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issue 1
71–102
EN
In this article the author discusses Dennis F. Polis’ defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics. Some of Polis’ methodological and metaphysical arguments are examined and it is explained why they are unfaithful to the Thomistic tradition of metaphysics. There is a discussion of why metaphysics can, within certain parameters, critique the science of evolutionary biology, as well as a discussion of the role of metaphysics in the hierarchy of the sciences. The relationship between biological species to the notion of species in philosophy, including related metaphysical topics, such as essences and Divine ideas in God, is discussed. It is determined that Polis’ view suffers from a kind of relativism and nominalism that is incompatible with the moderate realism of Aquinas. Some of Aquinas’ key existential insights in metaphysics are discussed in this context as well. In addition to being corrective, this essay helps point the way to a better defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics.
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