The article presents Robert Spaemann’s position on two directly related issues: human dignity and human rights. While Spaemann spoke directly about human dignity on many occasions, he raised the question of human rights, rather incidentally, in several contexts, especially the question of human dignity, in order to indicate the adequate source of the ideas underlying these rights (ontological dignity), its importance in our times, and to define some ways of implementing them. These issues are discussed in the article. The considerations are devoted predominantly to the problem of human dignity as a “pra-phenomenon.” The issue of dignity in the ontic sense (especially the assertion of what it is and what kind of argumentation supports its recognition in every human being) is discussed from the point of view of contemporary debates. The author also specifies how the inviolability of dignity, in both the moral and the ontic sense, should be understood, which is a problem Spaemann did not directly address.
In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.
This article discusses different ways of understanding compositions of being, and different methods for discerning them. It considers non-metaphysical (physical, scientistic, phenomenological, abstractionist) interpretations in order to decide whether metaphysics can use them to discover and gain knowledge of the elements that determine the deepest structure of beings, and which set their mode of being. The paper also shows how much the metaphysical method for discerning the compositions of being is different from non-metaphysical methods.
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