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Postulat jasności w polemikach metafilozoficznych Kazimierza Twardowskiego

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Zegzuła-Nowak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 16
51 - 73
EN
The article presents a dispute over unclear philosophical reasoning (in works, statements). This issue was started by Kazimierz Twardowski, and developed by philosophers both engaged in polemics with him: Joachim Metallman, Roman Ingarden, as well as defending his theses, David Einhorn. Many years later Twardowski’s student, Tadeusz Czeżowski, referred to this issue, as well. In his article Kazimierz Twardowski considered the problem of understanding philosophical works with regard to a method and style of their authors. This raised important methodological and metaphilosophical issues, which were essential foundations of philosophical attitude and the way of practicing philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. He was wondering whether an unclear reasoning can be always unequivocally and definitely disqualified with regard to science. He rejected the view that the more difficult philosophical issues the author raises, the more intricate style of his reasoning can be. He argued, that the main reason of unclear philosophical style is vague and unclear way of thinking. In this regard, he postulated that it is not worth to try to understand the works written in an intricate and unclear way. Philosophers engaged in polemics with him considered his position as too radical, and pointed out the existence of causes and factors which may only lead to an apparent vagueness of philosophical reasoning. They postulated that one should consider the cause of a vague statement in the first place, and only then, on this basis, consider whether the work is worth the attemps to understand it. On the other hand, Einhorn, defending Twardowski’s theses, tried to show absurdity of their positions, while Czeżowski claimed that objection of vagueness should be applied with caution and upon consideration. He also marked, that there are cases in which objection of vagueness should not put responsibility on the author alone, but it obliges the recipient (reader, debater) to overcome difficulties standing in the way of agreement. Just like Ingarden and Metallman, he showed causes of apparent vagueness, and cases in which, despite vagueness of reasoning, it was worth entering philosophical discussion. The dispute over objection of vagueness is a part of a considerably broader philosophical discourse of the 20th century, regarding not only the way of practicing philosophy, but also the question how to convey its content in the most valuable cognitive manner.
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Postulat jasności w polemikach metafilozoficznych Kazimierza Twardowskiego

100%
Zegzuła-Nowak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 16
51-73
EN
The article presents a dispute over unclear philosophical reasoning (in works, statements). This issue was started by Kazimierz Twardowski, and developed by philosophers both engaged in polemics with him: Joachim Metallman, Roman Ingarden, as well as defending his theses, David Einhorn. Many years later Twardowski’s student, Tadeusz Czeżowski, referred to this issue, as well. In his article Kazimierz Twardowski considered the problem of understanding philosophical works with regard to a method and style of their authors. This raised important methodological and metaphilosophical issues, which were essential foundations of philosophical attitude and the way of practicing philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. He was wondering whether an unclear reasoning can be always unequivocally and definitely disqualified with regard to science. He rejected the view that the more difficult philosophical issues the author raises, the more intricate style of his reasoning can be. He argued, that the main reason of unclear philosophical style is vague and unclear way of thinking. In this regard, he postulated that it is not worth to try to understand the works written in an intricate and unclear way. Philosophers engaged in polemics with him considered his position as too radical, and pointed out the existence of causes and factors which may only lead to an apparent vagueness of philosophical reasoning. They postulated that one should consider the cause of a vague statement in the first place, and only then, on this basis, consider whether the work is worth the attemps to understand it. On the other hand, Einhorn, defending Twardowski’s theses, tried to show absurdity of their positions, while Czeżowski claimed that objection of vagueness should be applied with caution and upon consideration. He also marked, that there are cases in which objection of vagueness should not put responsibility on the author alone, but it obliges the recipient (reader, debater) to overcome difficulties standing in the way of agreement. Just like Ingarden and Metallman, he showed causes of apparent vagueness, and cases in which, despite vagueness of reasoning, it was worth entering philosophical discussion. The dispute over objection of vagueness is a part of a considerably broader philosophical discourse of the 20th century, regarding not only the way of practicing philosophy, but also the question how to convey its content in the most valuable cognitive manner.
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