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PL
This article is drafted on the basis of three complementary essays by Professor Jerzy Janik. The author takes a look at selected issues in the field of quantum mechanics – especially the problem of quantum superposition and supersymmetry – from perspective of great philosophical systems. The author draws attention to the fact that some of these issues reflect old philosophical problems (e.g., empiricism vs rationalism), and – in some cases – philosophical perspective may save interpretations of quantum mechanics from paradoxes.
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The current 50th issue of Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) summarizes the efforts of both philosophers and scientists to understand how a broader philosophical context sets the stage for the development of scientific research, with physics playing a leading role. In particular, the paper reviews the content of the last twenty-five issues of the journal with an emphasis on the philosophical problems that arise in the practice of physics. The overview reveals that these problems reflect the main conceptual division in physics between the treatment of the micro-world described by quantum mechanics and the macro-world governed by the general theory of relativity. Both of these theories, taken separately, generate a host of philosophical concerns such as their proper interpretation (Bell’s Theorem and its consequences) or the meaning and the eventual validity of the notions of space and time. Other philosophical problems in physics, such as chaos and determinism, are also considered. The authors are well aware that the formulation of the future theory of quantum gravity will be a demanding task requiring profound philosophical reflection.
PL
Unlike in the classical regime, the measurement performed on a quantum system perturbs the state of the system and its properties remain unknown between measurements. Several early interpretations of quantum mechanics suggested that the reduction of the wave vector that occurs in a measurement is effected by a conscious act of an observer. For example, London and Bauer fostered the conviction that it is the act of observation that decides on the fate of the Schrodinger cat. Later developments of quantum mechanical formalism, e.g., decoherence, indicated that there was no need to causally link the mental states of an observer with the purely physical process of a quantum measurement. In particular, the novel quantum models of human brain put forward by Roger Penrose suggest that it is the reduction of the wave vector that causes conscious act of the observer. Although this reversal does not clarify the specifics of the quantum measurement process directly, it illustrates the principle of methodological naturalism whereby externally introduced heuristic postulates are replaced by well justified scientific explanations.
PL
Phenomenological concepts describing electromagnetic interactions were expressed mathematically by Maxwell in his theory of electromagnetic field. His work was not free of mechanistic influences. It also broke down some elements of inductionistic paradigme. Maxwell's theory cannot be reduced to a simple methodology of solving equations. Physical theories imply a deeper understanding of equations which carry an 'immaterial content'. The 'higher symmetries' hidden in the equations should to use Einstein's expressions be viewed as a 'stuff of the Universe'.
EN
Actually the problem of the mathematical nature of the world is a purely philosophical one, although it lies at the very foundations of physics and mathematics (and thus is very interesting for scientists) and as such it is extremely difficult to solve; in consequence any progress in the field is slow and for many it is unconvincing. In view of that I endeavour to give a more precise meaning to the statement that the structure of the material world is determined by an independent world, that of mathematical notions. The nature of the relationship between these two worlds is a great riddle and the core of this riddle is surrounded by a dense cloud of other philosophical riddles which are closely related to it, though (it seems at present) they are independent of it. I successively peel off these surrounding problems in order to get to the very core of „the mathematicality of the matter”. First I argue that physics cannot establish whether the matter might not be subject to mathematical laws of nature, then I discuss two conceptions of the nature of the physical law, the dualistic and monistic one. It seems that independently of which conception is true, none of these helps to solve the problem. In conjunction with the famous Wigner’s article of 1960 on unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences I indicate that the problem concerns solely the inanimate matter and does not apply to living or­ganisms. As a next inevitable step I discuss the view of mathematics as intellectual inquiries independent of the physical world, which nonetheless perfectly fit this world; in particular I briefly present the Einstein’s conception of forming physical laws. Finally I make comments on the problem which unavoidably appears in this context, namely of whether mathematical notions are discovered or freely created; I indicate (following A. Pelczar and others) that these two concepts do not exclude each other. After this journey through a collection of problems closely ac­companying that of „the mathematicality of the matter” it turns out that we come back to the starting point and we are helplessly fac­ing the Mystery.
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The 1935 thought experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen is one of the most important episodes in the history of the dispute about the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics. The present paper deals with the origin of the EPR paper and discusses some other thought experiments that preceded the formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument. Special attention is paid to the evolution of a simply photon-box experiment, which was devised by Einstein in 1930 and then modified by him several times before 1935. It is argued that the scheme of the original EPR argument is in fact contained in these few seminal experiments.
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PL
The double slit experiment is a relatively simple physical test that can be useful for demonstrating the corpuscular-wave dualism of light and matter, which is the supreme mystery of the whole quantum physics. A particular riddle here is especially the mechanism responsible for the formation of a interference pattern in a situation when single quantum objects pass through the experimental setup. In the article the main idea of the experiment is discussed and two possible explanations of its results are briefly shortly presented: the view of the Copenhagen school and the de Broglie-Bohm’s pilot wave theory.
PL
The article deals with the so called missing mass problem which during the last three decades has become one of the most serious difficulties in physics. There is some strong empirical evidence that the Universe contains not only matter that can be seen (by telescopes or radio telescopes) but the huge quantities of the unseen matter as well. The ordinary matter known to physics is but a small part of all matter the Universe is composed of. The missing mass is supposed to be in the form of the dark matter and the dark energy. In the paper the arguments in favor of the existence of these two entities are outlined, and some scientific as well as philosophical implications of the missing mass problem are discussed. It is argued that all the proposed solutions of this problem lead to serious changes in the scientific and philosophical worldview.
PL
The arrow of time problem belongs to the most discussed questions of the contemporary philosophy of physics. Some aspects of this problem are discussed in this paper in the context of Henry Mehlberg's philosophical views. Mehlberg devoted a significant part of his work to the enigma of time. He argues that all major empirical theories are invariant with respect to time reversal. In the present paper, the difference between temporal isotropy as expressed in the everyday language and in scientific theories is first presented, then Mehlberg's arguments on behalf of temporal symmetry are analyzed and, finally, some philosophical implications of arrowless time are discussed.
EN
This paper presents the works developed by a group of researchers mainly in the South of Brazil on the philosophy of physics, dealing mostly with the logic and metaphysics of the notions of identity, indistinguishability, and individuality of quantum entities.
PL
There has been a long-standing debate in philosophical literature about the relationship of predictability and determinism. Some philosophers have claimed that determinism implies predictability; some have claimed the opposite and the others that there are no direct implication relations between these two concepts. According to the above, there are various notions of determinism and predictability at work in the philosophical literature. In contrast, in scientific tradition, the belief that any deterministic system is predictable has long history and is based on the power of the intuitions lying behind the concept of physical determinism, confirmed by many experiments. In this essay, the author focuses on the Laplacean vision for determinism and predictability (or more precisely on what he takes to be such a vision). While many forms of predictability are inconsistent with this vision, he argues that a suitably modified notion of predictability, defined within a framework of model notion of physical determinism, is implied by the Laplacean concept of determinism and, after some modifications, by other modern theories in physics, chemistry and related sciences. It is also argued, that such modified concept of predictability is consistent with common practice of scientists, and any attempt to find out whether a given scientific theory is deterministic, should be accompanied by careful analysis and appropriate modification of constituent elements of modern notion of determinism.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono koncepcję teraźniejszości przyjmowaną w czasoprzestrzeni klasycznej oraz wskazano problemy, jakie napotyka jej aplikacja do czasoprzestrzeni Minkowskiego. Autor pracy pokazuje, że klasyczne spojrzenie na odnośne pojęcie zostaje zachowane, gdy przyjmie się koncepcję punktowej teraźniejszości. W tekście zaproponowano również ogólny schemat punktowego podejścia do teraźniejszości w szczególnej teorii względności oraz rozważono płynące stąd konsekwencje dla przedmiotów zlokalizowanych w czasoprzestrzeni Minkowskiego.
EN
The article analyses the concept of present assumed in classical spacetime and problems faced by its application to Minkowski spacetime. The author of the paper shows that preservation of the classical notion of present is possible when the concept of point present is adopted. The text proposes a general scheme of the point approach to present in Special Theory of Relativity and presents its consequences for objects located in Minkowski space-time.
PL
Jednym z głównych problemów filozofii czasu jest określenie statusu teraźniejszości. Zagadnienie teraz pojawia się explicite choćby w dyskusji prezentyzm-eternalizm czy w pytaniu o możliwość uzgodnienia idei obiektywnego upływu czasu z rozumieniem czasu we współczesnej nauce. Filozofia nauki ujawnia zaś – wcześniej nie dostrzegany – problem zdefiniowania równoczesności. Dyskusje na temat obiektywności lub realności upływu czasu nie są domeną filozofii ostatniego stulecia ani też pokłosiem odkryć fizyki XX wieku. To właśnie jednak na gruncie fizyki nastąpiło spektakularne zderzenie intuicyjnego rozumienia czasu, w tym tak oczywistych – zdawałoby się – idei, jak równoczesność czy współistnienie, z filozoficznymi implikacjami teorii naukowej. Rozbieżność intuicji temporalnych z czasem relatywistycznym analizowali pod kątem konsekwencji metafizycznych Gödel, Rietdijk i Putnam. Próby uzgodnienia klasycznych kategorii tensalnych z pojęciami STW, podejmowane m.in. przez Sklara, wskazują na konieczność wyeksplikowania odmiennych założeń ontologicznych obu schematów pojęciowych oraz potrzebę oddzielenia metafizyki od epistemologii. Radykalną propozycję wyeliminowania konfliktu między intuicją upływu czasu i relatywistycznym obrazem czasu wysunął Prior, który przypisał fundamentalną rolę potocznym kategoriom temporalnym (A-teoria), pojęcia relatywistyczne zaś uznał za czysto konwencjonalne i wtórne. Pogląd taki jawnie przeczyłby jednak ontologicznym założeniom STW, sformułowanym przez samego Einsteina. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu wyeksplikowanie wspomnianych trudności w oparciu o fundamentalne założenia i własności klasycznej oraz relatywistycznej koncepcji czasu.
EN
The status of “nowness” is one of the most important problems of the philosophy of time. The question of “the now” remains relevant in the discussion between presentism and eternalism, or in the problem of reconciliation between the classic idea of objective sense of the flow of time and the concept of time in the modern science. Philosophy of science also reveals the never-recognized-before problem of defining “simultaneousness.” The discussions on the objectivity or reality of the flow of time neither are the domain of the 20th-century philosophy, nor are the result of the discoveries in the modern physics. It was right on the grounds of relativistic physics, however, where the intuitive perception of time (including the supposedly obvious ideas of “simultaneousness” or the “coexistence”) and the philosophical implications of the scientific theory spectacularly collided. The dissonance between temporal intuitions and ontological implications of relativistic time was studied by Gödel, Rietdijk, and Putnam. The attempts to reconcile the classic tensal categories with the STR definitions, made by Sklar and the others, indicate the need of explication of the different presumptions of the two frameworks of conceptual schemas as well as the need of the separation between metaphysics and epistemology. A radical attempt of elimination of the conflict between the intuition of the flow of time and the relativistic concept of time was presented by Prior, who assigned a fundamental meaning to the tensal categories (A-theory) and who considered the relativistic concepts to be conventional and secondary. Such an idea, however, would explicitly negate the ontological presumptions of the STR, formulated by Einstein himself. The article presents this difficulties on the basis of the fundamental presumptions and features of the classic and relativistic concept of time.
EN
Lars Q. English’s book consists of an introduction, eight chapters and a short ending. The author shows how the latest discoveries of physics are changing thinking about the world, approving the occurrence of emergence. As a physicist himself, he combined the results obtained in physics with philosophical reflection, hence this book is worth recommending to students and graduates of science with philosophical tendencies.
PL
Książka Larsa Q. Englisha składa się ze wstępu, ośmiu rozdziałów i krótkiego zakończenia. Autor ukazuje w niej jak najnowsze odkrycia fizyki zmieniają myślenie o świecie, aprobując zachodzenie emergencji. Sam będąc fizykiem, połączył wyniki otrzymywane w ramach fizyki z refleksją filozoficzną, stąd książkę tę warto polecić studentom i absolwentom kierunków ścisłych posiadających zapędy filozoficzne.
PL
The aim of this paper is to present the views of one of prominent Polish chemists, namely Bohdan Szyszkowski. Presented views are concerning the relation of the concepts of aether, continuity and causality in the context of revolution in physics that took place at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries. The issues particularly concern his thoughts related to the old quantum theory and special relativity. In particular, this article presents the role of these concepts in the foundations of physics and – in a more general aspect – in the recognized fields of knowledge. The nature of Szyszkowski’s analysis allows him to be considered a very interesting thinker in the area that today is called the philosophy of physics or, perhaps more accurately, the philosophy in science. An important observation made by Szyszkowski is emphasized that mathematical structures cannot have physical properties. Attention was also paid to the Polish intellectual community, which was formed in Kiev before 1919.
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