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EN
According to EU competition law, the existence of an anticompetitive agreement can be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia only in the absence of another plausible explanation of the facts at stake. According to U.S. federal law (antitrust law included), only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage. What is plausible, however? After explaining the relationship between facts and evidence law, this chapter analyses the general meaning of the notion of plausibility, discusses the degree of discretion that it introduces, how it affects the justifications that judges and fact-finders make for their choices, and remarks on how this concept relates to substantial accuracy. On the other hand, it acknowledges that antitrust law, by relating our understanding of what is plausible to economic models, debunks these concerns and raises another issue. Namely, since economics is rooted in various axioms and value-choices, the antitrust link between plausibility, evidence standards and economics grants to these axioms and value-choices the possibility of affecting even antitrust decisions about facts, even though these decisions should amount to pure descriptions of the concrete facts.
FR
Conformément à la loi européenne sur la concurrence, l’existence d’un accord anticoncurrentiel peut être inférée d’un certain nombre de coïn cidences et d’indices seulement en l’absence d’autre explication plausible des faits en cause. Selon la loi fédérale américaine (loi antitrust inclus), seule une plainte qui indique une réclamation plausible pour le soulagement peut survivre à une requête en irrecevabilité à l’étape de la plaidoirie. Qu’est-ce que est plausible, alors? Après avoir expliqué la relation entre les faits et le droit de la preuve, le présent chapitre analyse le sens général de la notion de plausibilité, explique le degré de discrétion qu’il présente, comment ce notion affecte les justifications que les juges et d’enquêteurs font de leurs choix, et se penche sur la manière dont ce concept se rapporte à la précision importante. D’autre part, il reconnaît que le droit antitrust, en liant notre compréhension de ce qui est plausible aux modèles économiques, il démystifie ces préoccupations et soulève une autre question. En effet, depuis l’économie est enracinée dans des axiomes et des choix de valeur différents, le lien antitrust entre la plausibilité, les normes de preuve et l’économie fourni ces axiomes et ces choix de valeur en possibilité d’affecter même les décisions antitrust sur les fai ts, même si ces décisions ne devraient se limiter qu’aux descriptions pures des faits concrets
2
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Coping with Ethical Uncertainty

63%
Diametros
|
2017
|
issue 53
150-166
EN
Most ethical decisions are conditioned by formidable uncertainty. Decision makers may lack reliable information about relevant facts, the consequences of actions, and the reactions of other people. Resources for dealing with uncertainty are available from standard forms of decision theory, but successful application to decisions under risk requires a great deal of quantitative information: point-valued probabilities of states and point-valued utilities of outcomes. When this information is not available, this paper recommends the use of a form of decision theory that operates on a bare minimum of information inputs: comparative plausibilities of states and comparative utilities of outcomes. In addition, it proposes a comparative strategy for dealing with second-order uncertainty. The paper illustrates its proposal with reference to a well-known ethical dilemma: Kant’s life-saving lie.
3
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Argumentace v jazykové interakci

51%
EN
The article aims to introduce the fundamental features of the communicative conception of argumentation based on rhetorical and pragmalinguistic argumentation theories. Argumentation is defined as (linguistic) action grounded in accounting for a controversial position with the purpose of convincing listeners of its acceptability or in order to defend it when it is challenged. The basic form of the argumentation process is described using a three-component model which consists of the argument itself, the justified opinion and the warrant represented by the relationship between the previous components allowing the “plausibility transfer” from the argument to the disputed opinion (cf. Toulmin 2003). The article also deals with the conditions that must be met by convincing arguments, with stable content schemes of argumentation (topoi), and it seeks to answer the question of what the rationality of argumentation is based on, i.e. what the sources of its plausibility are.
PL
W artykule przeanalizowano zarządzenie MTS wskazujące środki tymczasowe w sprawie stosowania Konwencji o zapobieganiu i karaniu zbrodni ludobójstwa (Gambia vs Birma) z 23 stycznia 2020 r. Różne aspekty tradycyjnych wymagań dotyczących wskazania środków tymczasowych zostaną przedstawione w oparciu o orzecznictwo MTS, szczególnie w odniesieniu do jego mocy wiążącej, po wydaniu wyroku w sprawie LaGrand, w którym Trybunał wyjaśnił, że jego postanowienia dotyczące tymczasowej ochrony są wiążące. Przedstawiony został również jeden nowy wymóg – wiarygodności praw chronionych – sformułowany przez Trybunał po raz pierwszy w sprawie Belgia vs Senegal.
EN
This article examines the order of the International Court of Justice indicating the provisional measures in the matter of application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) from 23 January 2020. The different aspects of the traditional requirements for indication of provisional measures will be presented, based on the ICJ jurisprudence, especially as far as its binding force is concerned, after its judgment in the LaGrand case, where the Court clarified that its orders on interim protection are binding. We will also present one new requirement – the plausibility test of the protected rights – expressed by the Court for the first time in the Belgium v Senegal case.
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