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EN
In this paper, the author examines the burden of proof in the argu- mentative confrontations taking part in practices of political accountability. She does so by explaining how politicians maneuver strategically with the burden of proof in an attempt at winning the discussion in which they are involved. After making clear the role of the burden of proof in defining the difference of opinion in argumentative confrontations, the author outlines the constraints imposed by practices of political accountability on the burden of proof. Finally, she analyzes in detail a concrete case in which a politician maneuvers in such a way that his burden of proof is significantly diminished.
EN
The author discusses the functioning of the parliamentary-cabinet system in Italy before the First World War. This model of government was brought into use in the Kingdom of Sardinia, shortly after the entry into force of the Albertine Statute (1848), and then was applied in the united monarchy in which the Statute was recognized as a Basic Law. The then Italian parliamentary system was based solely on practice, and not on the provisions of the Constitution, according to which ministers were appointed and dismissed by the monarch. Discussing the Italian parliamentary system , the author shows that the vote of censure could either take the form of an explicit resolution of the Chamber of Deputies containing demand for resignation of the Cabinet or a vote could be implied if the reason for the resignation of the government was the defeat in the parliamentary vote, for example, on the bill. The author also discusses the tools of parliamentary oversight over the executive used in the Kingdom of Italy and views on the political responsibility of the government presented the former Italian literature.
EN
From the 1970s to the end of the 1990s analyses of state, government and society in Western Europe were preoccupied with crisis of governability and legitimacy. Governance began to be regarded as the dominant institutional response to problems of governability. Governance is a term in good currency, but there are too few analyses of the precise extent to which it has or has not eclipsed government. This article explores characteristics of the governance transition taking under consideration that governance often complements and, on some occasion, even compete with government but there are some cases of fusion (policy instruments). This paper offers a discussion on how to asses relations between government and governance. It argues that key element of reforms of regulation in Western Europe was the creation of independent or semi-independent regulatory agencies at the national and European levels. Various reasons have been put forward to explain why governments decide to delegate authority in this way. Yet key questions about agency autonomy and their influence on policy making remain unanswered. This paper critically reflects on claim that the transfer of resources from departments to agencies created differing power-dependent relations between minister, department and agency. It is not clear does the regulatory regime represent a stable arrangements or does it suffer from its own peculiar dilemmas which could affect nature of the states.
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