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EN
The subject of this article is political realism and misanthropic image of a man created by Machiavelli. Without denying the relevance of many observations of the famous Florentine, I put here resistance to the widespread interpretations of his thoughts, interpretations, which usually serve as a convenient (though, in my opinion, questionable) justification of violence, rape and fraud, especially in politics. In most academic and popular interpretation of Machiavelli's thought, we find variations of Machiavellianism that pretends to be a realistic description and the supposedly scientific or common-sense attitude. Meanwhile, in my opinion, Machiavelli not only describes the success of cynical tricks, but, what is more, provides immoral advice, encourages the circumvention, and even violation of the norms and principles, not only in case of an emergency, but almost without limits. The world in which we live is not a paradise, and other people often have little in common with the angels. But whether this can be concluded, as Machiavelli and his followers do, that most people are hostile and alien to us, and lurk for our property? When we look at our politicians, big business people, it may seem tempting to notion that Machiavelli is right. However, in this paper I try to show that this vision of the human world is too misanthropic, and also that in the world of politics there is a place for fair competition and a genuine desire for the common good.
EN
The article focuses on Ksawery Pruszyński’s political way of thinking which squares with political realism in many points. He aimed at developing Poles’ awareness of the fact that Stalin would be the winner of the war in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore the future status of Poland depended on Stalin’s will. Nethertheless Pruszyński seems to make a serious mistake taking Soviet Russia as an atheistic, Marxist version of Tsarist Russia. Yet as things stand the Soviet Union was a phenomenon of a new kind. Ideocracy is presumably the best qualification of this new regime.
EN
How a realist oppositionist could keep being during the martial law? He could not accept the actions of the authorities, because it would mean giving up their ideological identity. The political realism of oppositionist must lead to demands of cancellation of martial law and stop the repression. “Solidarity” during the martial law sustained idealistic goals: program of “Autonomous Republic” and in the future democratic and independent state. Realism method consisted of choosing forms of action that can be used with success. It can be said that a realistic attitude was Lech Walesa in internment, which relied on government inducements to support the martial law, and while there he didn’t give radical slogans and tried to make a realistic political action. Similarly, you can define the actions of leaders of underground “Solidarity”. They are generally approached from a distance to the ideas of a general strike, considering it is not unrealistic, but rather a legitimate considering the concept of the underground society and the long march. In terms of the discussion on political realism, you can also look at the main debate within the “Solidarity” in the second half of the 80th: for making public action and the pursuit of compromise. In conclusion we can say that all the time since martial law opposition was balanced between idealism and realism.
EN
The aim of this article is the reconstruction and analysis of the political ideas that may be conceived as the components of Konstanty Grzybowski’s (Polish conservative thinker of the interwar period) conservative attitude. Grzybowski’s case is one of the most interesting among other conservatives in this period due to at least three reasons: his reluctant attitude towards Catholic Church, his acceptation for democracy (very rare among most of the Polish conservatives) and also his controversial decisions on his political affiliations in the interwar (but also postwar) period in Poland. The authors claim is that Grzybowski’s “peculiarity” results from the ideas that shaped his conservative attitude: the acceptation of political evolution, political realism and republicanism. This combination may be understood only by taking into closer consideration his philosophical background, especially the resignation of any metaphysical foundations of the political power that may follow from religious beliefs.
EN
The subject of this article are interpretations of the policy of PUWP in which the activities of the party leadership was presented as manifestations of political realism. Author analyzes two aspects of this policy: 1) relations with the Soviet Union under the rule of Wladyslaw Gomulka and Edward Gierek, 2) two different strategies used by the party leadership to resolve socio-political crisis in Poland in the years 1980-1981. Until 1970 the main argument in favor of such “realism” was the fact that the Soviet Union was the guarantor of the western Polish border. In the 70’s Gierek allegedly led the game with Moscow: for the price of dependence on USSR he modernized the state and developed contacts with the West. Imposition of martial law in 1981 in the interpretation of Jaruzelski prevented Soviet intervention and destabilization of the situation in the country. In fact, the alleged realistic attitude PUWP leadership meant the choice of such a strategy which allowed to remain in power.
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Realizm polityczny i ekonomiczny Mirosława Dzielskiego

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EN
Mirosław Dzielski (1941-1989), a Polish philosopher and a political activist, in his academic life at the Jagiellonian University (Krakow) he focused on analyses of metaphysical subtleties of Newton’s and Leibniz’s conceptions of space and time but his main interest were the major problems of ethics and political philosophy combined with economics. Influenced by L. von Mises, F. A. von Hayek and M. Friedman and the idea of the undesigned results of human activities, he identified the main problem of his native country Poland and the whole region under a totalitarian control of the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, as a search for forces, which would stop its civilizational collapse and begin its rebirth. His idea was to destroy the oppressive system in an evolutionary way through the invigoration of natural propensities to improve one’s situation. Members of the Communist nomenklatura were no exception, and their involvement in economic activities backed by the free market legal framework were to open opportunities to all members of society (individual liberty) and to lead to the economic and civilizational progress followed by a political liberal constitution.
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Realizm polityczny "Tygodnika Powszechnego" (1945-1989)

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EN
In the history of „Tygodnik Powszechny” under the administration of the communist government, I distinguish four periods – each one characterized by a different attitude of its environment to communism. The first one (1945‑1948) was dominated by the aim to create an ideological alternative towards the new power; the second one (1949‑1953) in which the goal of survival, in the face of communism’s inevitable victory, prevailed; the third one (1956/7-1976), characterized by willingness to cohabitate and limited collaboration; and the fourth one (1977‑1989), which saw the exit from People’s Republic of Poland communist system. Glancing on this history through the prism of political realism, one can establish, that „Tygodnik” disregarded its guidelines in the first period (1945‑1948), tried to fulfill them – in a very original way nonetheless – in the second period (1949‑1953), and finally became its eulogist, having created its own doctrine of catholic political realism in the actuality of a communist state, in the third one (1956/7‑1976). The fourth period (1977‑1989), however, is difficult to classify in this aspect.
EN
So – called “democratic centralism”, originally created by W. Lenin, was the main principle used by the communist party (PPR/PZPR) in Poland after the World War II to control the society and its organizations. One of them was a Democratic Party established in the 1939 by the politicians and activists rooted in the left – oriented independence movement, of whom Marshall Józef Piłsudski said to has been the icon and the undisputed leader. After the war the Democratic Party was enslaved by the communists and became the part of the rule system. It was said to be the representative of the systematically vanishing middle class (craftsmen, merchants, intelligence), due to the thesis of Stalin concerning the raging class struggle. Until the fall of the totalitarian system in 1989 the Democratic Party officially supported the communists who overwhelmed every aspect of political reality. That is why the phenomenon of political realism was not involved in its policy despite of being the part of the official propaganda. Nevertheless, in the party structures dwelled the resistance that headed for the independence, of whom Karol Głogowski or Przemysław Górny were the leaders. The Democratic Party conversed in 1989 and supported the first democratic government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
EN
Over the past two decades, Russian foreign policy has evolved significantly. Its aim is to seek a change in the global balance of power. This evolution proceeded from attempts to establish cooperation with the West, through a confrontational narrative, ending with political and military actions. The purpose of this article is to analyze the present Russian view of the current international order and to define its future shape based on assumptions and specific actions in the sphere of the aforementioned foreign policy. Particularly useful for the needs of the conducted research is the reference to the theory of political realism. This is determined by the fact that the Russian Federation, contesting the current hegemonic international order, aims to create a multipolar world with the key balancing role of the great powers.
EN
For long Aung San Suu Kyi has been considered a global hero. After 2012, however, that deification has given way to condemnation. Suu Kyi was a hero; a hero who after 2012 betrayed the alleged values. The reason of this radical change of perception is the fact that until 2012 Suu Kyi had been considered a personification of idealism in politics and for “betraying” these values she has been criticized since then. This article claims that both mentioned discourses on Suu Kyi miss the point and are being built on wrong assumptions. Contrary to popular belief Suu Kyi has always been a politician; more: a realist politician. Therefore, the aspects that should be questioned are not whether is she a good or bad one or whether she turned away from the people or even whether she has changed or not, etc. The question is, whether she is a skillful politician – she must be judged by the ethic of responsibility. Suu Kyi’s tactics evolved according with changing political circumstances – she combined two archetypes of political behavior: that of a “lion”, or rather “lioness” and that of a “fox”. That itself shows one thing: Suu Kyi possesses prudence, the ultimate political value.
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The Idea Of The Common Good

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EN
The notions of common good and the reason of state were always present, usually in a joint way, in the teachings of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. They came to the foreground, especially in the periods of post-war crises in Poland, moments of growing social tension. Despite the fact that the primate did not want to be a politician, because the main sphere of his activity was concern for the souls of Poles, he became a statesman, for whom the welfare of Poland and Poles was the primary task. This was largely due to the primate’s concern for the broadly understood common good – Poland as a subject of common concern for all members of society, regardless of their views. Most importantly, Cardinal Wyszyński was able to look at the political situation without ideological bias or obstinancy. If he believed that communists somehow work for the common good and care about the fate of society, he supported their activity (an example of this could be the fight against social pathologies – especially alcoholism).   
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Antoni Walewski: historiozofia wyklętego lojalisty

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EN
The aim of this article is the reconstruction and analysis of the historical and political beliefs of Antoni Walewski, Polish monarchist and conservative historian of the 19th century. In his youth, Walewski participated in the November Uprising and along with other Polish statesmen and soldiers went on exile to France, where he backed up Prince Adam J. Czartoryski and supported the controversial concept of “the kingship de facto”. According to this idea, all Poles should submit to Czartoryski (who himself was the king de facto; despite the lack of any legal arguments) in order to spread the new insurrection (far more powerful and well organized than the previous one) against the Commonwealth’s invaders. Later on, in 1848 Walewski totally changed his political orientation. He resigned from his insurrectionism, became a loyalist and started to support the governments of Austria and Russia. This sudden turn in his political beliefs may be understood on the ground of historiosophy. It appears that Walewski’s political statements had deeper roots in a very interesting perspective on the nature of the history, especially the Polish one.
EN
From the perspective of the history of political and legal doctrines, the dichotomous way of looking at actuality through the prism of the struggle between realism and idealism is one of the classical approaches to social sciences. The basic source of knowledge for the political realism idea is the achievements of politicians, historians and philosophers, who are often at the same time creators of political and legal thought. In the research on political realism, however, one should, based on subsidiarity, also use the message found in the rhetorical speeches, recorded and preserved until today. Taking these reservations into account, the subject of the article is to analyze – in a rhetorical perspective – the classical political realism, with the simultaneous narrowing of the research field to international relations. The subject of the analysis are selected ancient Greek rhetorical speeches by authors such as Cleon, Diodotus, Pericles, Demosthenes, Andocides, Isocrates and Lysias.
PL
Z perspektywy historii doktryn polityczno-prawnych dychotomiczny sposób spojrzenia na rzeczywistość przez pryzmat zmagań między realizmem a idealizmem stanowi jedno z klasycznych ujęć nauk społecznych. Podstawowym źródłem poznania idei realizmu politycznego jest dorobek polityków, historyków czy filozofów, którzy często znajdują się jednocześnie w gronie twórców myśli polityczno-prawnej. W badaniach nad realizmem politycznym należy jednak, na zasadzie subsydiarności, korzystać także z przekazu znajdującego się w utrwalonych i zachowanych do dzisiaj mowach retorycznych. Uwzględniając te zastrzeżenia, przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza – w retorycznej optyce – klasycznego realizmu politycznego, z jednoczesnym zawężeniem pola badawczego do stosunków międzynarodowych. Przedmiotem analizy są wybrane starożytne greckie mowy retoryczne takich autorów, jak Kleon, Diodotos, Perykles, Demostenes, Andokides, Izokrates i Lizjasz.
EN
The purpose of the article is to analyze the transformations of the relations betweenPolandand theSoviet Unionin Aleksander Bochenski’s journalism since the 1930s to 1952. The author also tries to establish if they were an effect of international situation or maybe stemmed from the journalist’s ideological views.The analysis of historical sources has proven the existence of two stages in Bochenki’s writings about the Soviet Unionin this period. Before 1939, he called for the liquidation of this state by Polandthrough military aggression, the liberation of bordering nations and the creation of a “sanitary cordon” between Polandand Russia, which was in Polish interest. The publicist perceived the Soviet Union as another form of imperial Russia. He disregarded ideological issues. Thus, in the years 1939–1945, he sought the possibility of agreement with Germany. However, at the end of the war, when the Soviets occupied Poland, Bochenski referred to 19th century positivism and he thought about a compromise with communists. As a result, he become involved in the creation of the progressive Catholics movement. He claimed that the Soviet Union was the only guarantor ofPoland’s western border and thatPoland should become a credible ally of Moscow.The analysis of Bochenski’s narrative about the Polish-Soviet relations allowed to perceive him as a political realist. His attitude to theSoviet Uniondepended on the correlation between geopolitical situation and national interests, which could justify both the strive to liquidate this state and to agree with it.
PL
Prezentowany artykuł ma na celu zobrazowanie przemian, jakim uległ obraz Związku Sowieckiego w publicystyce Aleksandra Bocheńskiego od lat trzydziestych XX wieku do 1952 roku oraz udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy zmiany te były zależne jedynie od sytuacji międzynarodowej, czy też warunkowały je kwestie ideowe.Analiza materiału źródłowego wskazuje na dwa etapy w podejściu Bocheńskiego do Sowietów w omawianym okresie. W międzywojennym okresie swej publicystyki nawoływał on do uderzenia Polski na wschód, w celu wyzwolenia narodów kresowych i utworzenia z nich pasa buforowego oddzielającego Polskę od Rosji. Służyć to miało mocarstwowym interesom Polski. Publicysta postrzegał Związek Sowiecki jako kolejną formę moskiewskiego imperializmu, lekceważąc kwestie ideologiczne. Toteż, gdy w latach 1939–1945 poszukiwał możliwości porozumienia z Niemcami, jednocześnie (wobec spodziewanego zajęcia ziem polskich przez Armię Czerwoną, nawiązując do tradycji dziewiętnastowiecznego pozytywizmu) przemyśliwał o porozumieniu z Sowietami. Znalazło to wyraz w jego zaangażowaniu w tworzenie ruchu katolików postępowych oraz w koncepcjach politycznych, w których prezentował Związek Sowiecki jako gwaranta polskiej granicy zachodniej, a także wskazywał, że Polska powinna zabiegać o to, aby stać się wiarygodnym sojusznikiem w oczach wschodniego sąsiada.Narracje Bocheńskiego o relacjach polsko-sowieckich pozwalają określić go jako politycznego realistę. Uzależniał on swój stosunek do Związku Sowieckiego od korelacji sytuacji geopolitycznej i interesów narodowych, uznając, że w ich imię można dążyć zarówno do likwidacji tego państwa, jak też porozumienia z nim.
PL
Artykuł traktuje o realizmie politycznym u Hermanna Rauschninga. Pokrótce zostały tu omówione historyczne podwaliny poglądów H. Rauschninga, zestawienie teorii realizmu politycznego z jej wersją u niemieckiego autora, wyróżnienie dwóch typów realizmu oraz zestawienie teorii z praktyką. Autor chciał podkreślić defensywny charakter rauschningowskiego realizmu nastawiony na obronę stanu posiadania sprzed rewolucji narodowosocjalistycznej. H. Rauschning nie wymagał od realistów tworzenia nowych podejść – opierał się na założeniu, że kontynuowanie polityki pokojowego rozwoju stosunków między państwami podtrzyma pomyślną koniunkturę. W temacie dwóch typów realizmu, H. Rauschning wymienił realizm sensu stricto, opierający się na wcześniej wymienionej obronie stanu posiadania oraz realizm narodowosocjalistyczny, który opierał się na podporządkowaniu prawideł prowadzenia działania politycznego dla abstrakcyjnych celów. Zdaniem H. Rauschninga, takie działanie wypaczało sens realizmu, ponieważ z jednej strony zacierało granicę między rzeczywistymi uwarunkowaniami polityki a spłaszczeniem ideologicznym; z drugiej strony stwarzało możliwość realizowania scenariusza politycznego niezgodnego z żywotnymi interesami społeczności, która została objęta jurysdykcją danej władzy. Autor wymieniał także enumeratywnie zagrożenia związane z wypaczonym stosowaniem wyznaczników teorii realizmu, które prowadziły do utraty pierwotnego znaczenia przez uniwersalne pojęcia polityczne.
EN
The article deals with the political realism of Hermann Rauschning. Briefly discussing the historical backgrounds of Rauschning’s views, the theory of political realism with its version in the German author, the distinction of two types of realism, and the compilation of theory and practice. The author wanted to emphasize the defensive character of the Rauschning’s realism aimed at defending the state of possession before the National Socialist revolution. Rauschning did not require realists to create new approaches- it was based on the premise that continuing the policy of peaceful development of relations between states would sustain a prosperous situation. In the topic of two types of realism, Rauschning listed the perfect realism, based on the previously mentioned defense of state of possession and national-socialistic realism, which was based on subordinating the rules of political action to abstract purposes. According to Rauschning, such action distorted the sense of realism, because on the one hand it blurred the boundary between real policy conditioning and ideological flattening; On the other hand, it provided the opportunity to pursue a political scenario that was incompatible with the vital interests of the community, which fell under the jurisdiction of the authority. The author also listed extensively the dangers associated with the distorted use of the determinants of the theory of realism, which led to the loss of primordial significance by universal political concepts.
EN
The research objective of this paper is to analyse the trends in contemporary nationalist and conservative political thought from the system and problem-based perspectives through the lens of Poland's international status in the 21st century. The subject of the analysis is the political thought of two parties −  the League of Polish Families (representing the nationalist trend) and Law and Justice (the conservative trend) in two dimensions. First − in the ideological dimension, covering political views with the greatest degree of generalisation. Second − in the programme dimension, understood as a set of specific political proposals, creating concepts and defining the conditions for their fulfilment in the future. The research objective is to be reached by providing answers to the following research questions. How did LPR and PiS define and describe international order? What values were assigned key roles in shaping Poland's international position? What international roles were assigned to Poland?
PL
Celem poznawczym artykułu jest analiza dwóch nurtów współczesnej polskiej myśli politycznej (narodowego i konserwatywnego) w perspektywie systemowej i problemowej przez pryzmat pożądanej pozycji międzynarodowej Polski w XXI w. Analizie poddano myśl polityczną partii politycznych − Ligi Polskich Rodzin (nurt narodowy) oraz Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (nurt konserwatywny) w dwóch jej wymiarach. Po pierwsze −  w wymiarze ideologicznym, obejmującym poglądy polityczne o największym stopniu uogólnienia. Po drugie −  w wymiarze programowym, który należy rozumieć jako zestaw konkretnych propozycji politycznych, koncepcji pożądanego ładu międzynarodowego i miejsca w nim Polski. Realizacji celu badawczego służyły odpowiedzi na postawione pytania badawcze: W jaki sposób LPR i PiS definiowały i opisywały ład międzynarodowy? Na jakich podstawach aksjologicznych chciano opierać proces kształtowania pozycji międzynarodowej Polski? Jakie role międzynarodowe przypisywali Polsce politycy obu badanych partii?
PL
Realizm polityczny jest pojęciem trudnym w definicji. Pomocna może być w tym przypadku analiza specyficznych przykładów. Niniejszy tekst dotyczy problemu realizmu w myśli politycznej Aleksandra Bocheńskiego. Wyrażana przez publicystykę, ulegała znamiennej ewolucji. Przed 1939 r. był on rzecznikiem Polski „mocarstwowej”, podczas wojny snuł plany kolaboracji z Niemcami, po 1945 r. był apologetą Polski Ludowej, broniąc jej także w III Rzeczypospolitej. Bocheński szukał politycznego realizmu, nie oznacza to jednak, że zawsze udało mu się pozostać w tym nurcie refleksji o polityce.
EN
Political realism is not easy to define. The analysis of specific cases may help. In this text, I wonder whether Aleksander Bocheński was a political realist. His journalism has undergone a significant evolution. He was a supporter of the Polish „power state” before 1939, he wanted to collaborate with the nazi Germans during the war years, and after the war he was an apologist for People's Poland and a critic of the Third Polish Republic. My considerations prove, that Bocheński was looking for political realism in his life and oeuvre, not always, however, entering this trend of reflection on politics.
EN
Polish secular Catholics in their press in the first post-war years often dealt with the assessment of Polish national uprisings and the conclusions that could be drawn from them for the present and future. However, these narratives were not only depreciating for anti-Russian uprisings, but tried to understand the motivations of their participants. It has often been written about the need for political realists to consider “realism in relation to the feelings of the nation” but also to shape attitudes towards the rational assessment of political phenomena. Texts that were extremely romantic but also extremely realistic and pacifist were published. The discussions and polemics presented resulted from both disappointment with the results of the war and the failure of their own ideas. Awareness of losses recently suffered by the Polish nation as a result of the implementation of insurgent policy and the conviction that the next uprising could bring disastrous effects for the community had a great impact on their formulation. The most characteristic of the dispute between realists and romantics about the very definition of these concepts, the discussion of “Monte Cassino” in the pages of “Tygodnik Powszechny” proved a certain ideological confusion of journalists, desperate to find themselves in a new reality.
PL
Polscy katolicy świeccy w swej prasie w pierwszych latach powojennych częstokroć zajmowali się oceną polskich zrywów narodowych i wnioskami, jakie z nich można było wyciągnąć dla teraźniejszości i przyszłości. Narracje te nie były jednak tylko deprecjonujące antyrosyjskie powstania, ale starały się zrozumieć motywacje ich uczestników. Podnoszono często konieczność uwzględnienia przez politycznych realistów „realizmu względem uczuć narodu”, ale i kształtowania postaw w kierunku racjonalnej oceny zjawisk politycznych. Zdarzały się teksty pozostające w nurcie skrajnie romantycznym, ale i skrajnie realistycznym oraz pacyfistycznym. Prezentowane dyskusje i polemiki wynikały zarówno z rozczarowania wynikami wojny, jak i niepowodzenia własnych koncepcji. Duży wpływ na ich formułowanie miała też świadomość strat, jakie naród polski poniósł w ostatnim czasie na skutek realizowania powstańczej polityki oraz przekonania o tym, że kolejny zryw może przynieść katastrofalne już dla zbiorowości skutki. Najbardziej charakterystyczna dla prowadzonego między realistami a romantykami sporu o samą definicję tych pojęć, dyskusja „o Monte Cassino” na łamach „Tygodnika Powszechnego”, dowiodła pewnego ideowego zagubienia publicystów, rozpaczliwie niejako chcących odnaleźć się w nowej rzeczywistości.
EN
The article features a short recapitulation of intellectual achievements in the sphere of politics of Niccolò Machiavelli. On many points he broke with the established way of thinking about politics and steered it in new directions. His revolution was expressed, among other things, in the positioning of politics as a central human activity, in the development of a new methodology for penetrating political matter, in the development of a new perspective on the tasks of political power and on relations between states, in the re-drawing of the relationship between morality and politics, and in an innovative view of the nature of man.
PL
Celem artykułu jest prezentacja i krytyczne omówienie poglłdów generała Carla von Clausewitza, na temat polskiej niepodległości oraz samych Polaków. W tym celu została wykorzystana dostępna literatura żródłowa w postaci jego głównej pracy, którą jest traktat O wojnie oraz szeregu nieznanych szerzej pism wojskowych, politycznych i historycznych. Wykorzystane zostały również wybrane fragmenty korespondencji oraz opinie uznanych autorów z literatury przedmiotu. Konkluzją jest stwierdzenie, że negatywna opinia Clausewitza na temat polskiej niepodległości wynika z konkretno-historycznej analizy podyktowanej wiernością autora pruskiej racji stanu.
EN
The aim of the article was to present and maintain critical dicussion of General Carl von Clausewitz’s views on Polish independence and Poles themselves. For this purpose, available source literature has been used in the form of his main work On War and a number of not well known military, political and historical writings. We also used are selected fragments of correspondence and opinions of recognized authors in the literature of the subject. The conclusion is that Clausewitz’s negative opinion on Polish independence stems from a concrete historical analysis dictated by the fidelity of the author of Prussian raison d’etat.
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