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Human Affairs
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2013
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vol. 23
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issue 3
416-428
EN
The paper outlines the debate on European state socialism as a social and political order. There are different attempts to obtain a better understanding of the core principles of this type of society and a continuing public debate on it. Following the end of the decade of the transition from “socialism to capitalism” we can observe a renewal in the debates on the “Ancient regime” and its heritage. There are different reasons for this phenomenon; these include new insights from the archives and the recent politics on history in post-socialist societies. The new “zeitgeist” following the world financial crisis of 2008 might be an additional reason. The issues that developed are discussions on the nature of state socialism, some hypotheses on the role of reformers within the changes to late socialism from the perspective of political science, and some assumptions on the methods adopted by former reform socialists after 1989.
EN
Respect for the achievements of the USSR was one of the foundations of Belarusian politics of history even before the rule of Alyaksandr Lukashenka; this was also reflected in the identity of most Belarusians, who perceived themselves as “Soviet people”. A special place in the narrative about the Soviet period was occupied by the Great Patriotic War, which was also presented from the perspective of the enormous demographic and material losses that affected the territory of today’s Belarus. The timid attempts undertaken in the early 1990s to demythologise the cult of the war period did not lead to any significant changes in the narrative, especially since Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s rise to power in 1994 effectively blocked any further efforts to revise Belarusian historiography. For President Lukashenka, who has ruled ever since then, the Great Patriotic War was and continues to be one of the key periods defining the history of Belarus and its contemporary domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, in response to Russia’s interference in Ukraine in 2014 and Moscow’s desire to subjugate Minsk fully, the Belarusian president began playing World War II “memory card” that had hitherto been excluded from the current disputes, in order to strengthen his and his country’s own historical narrative as something separate from that of Russia.
EN
The article comments on main trends in Polish historiography of the last 30 or so years. The author verifies predictions concerning said trends that had been made in the first years of the new millennium, to conclude that they proved too optimistic in some respects. Problems such as political instrumentalization of history loom large over Polish historiography and may distort its future development. Furthermore, the simplistic understanding of parametrization manifested by the last (2022) evaluation of academic institutions, further reduces freedom of research while it does nothing to eliminate political pressures on historians. In essence, the policy of science pursued by the Polish state does very little to support original research.
Historia@Teoria
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2017
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vol. 1
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issue 3
39-51
EN
In this article the author argues for the rapprochement between the methods and questions of the history of historiography and the questionnaire of the sociology of knowledge. The sociological perspective can inspire both the research on the communities of professional historians and the functioning of the historiographical knowledge in social and political structures. The author analyzes diff erent dimensions of the political functions of historiography and emphasizes the diff erence between the utilitarian and scientific aspects of historical knowledge.
EN
Overview: Wojciech Materski. 2017. Od cara do “cara”. Studium rosyjskiej polityki historycznej [From the Tsar to the “Tsar”. A Study of the Russian Politics of History]. Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. 371 pp. ISBN 9788364091889.
EN
This article is an original attempt to define the main features of the myth of the Great Patriotic War in post-Communist Russian cinema. By combining historical, cultural and film studies, the author defines the reasons for the appearance of the above-mentioned myth and its popularity, and indicates the effects of the ideologisation of an event which has been important for politics of history during the rule of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. The article will cite examples of films containing repetitive narrative elements that appear with varying intensity and regularity in the Russian political and public discourse on the Great Patriotic War. The author will also refer to how such films have been received, and will define a potential perspective for the further development of this theme.
EN
Being borrowed from the Soviet historical narrative and successfully adapted to the needs of the Belarusian state, the memory of Victory in the Great Patriotic War has become the ideological basis for the authoritarian regime in Belarus. This article is aimed at addressing the celebration of the Victory Day in Minsk in 2020 and, through the analysis of this particular case, identify the main frames for the ideological image of Victory in the Belarusian authorities’ politics of history as well as the mechanisms for population involvement and ideological mobilisation. The year 2020 has become critical for Belarusian politics as for the first time since 1994, mass democratic protests challenged Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s complete control over Belarusian society.
EN
The authors discuss possibilities and limits for applying a research model of the study of memory politics, originally developed by them with the aim to research the Polish case only, to other countries of East Central Europe which after the WW II formed the sphere of the Soviet domination. They pose a question whether it should be appropriate to combine it with the so called transnational approach.
EN
The aim of this article is to describe and analyse the politics of history in Slovakia after the Velvet Revolution and gaining independence. Although the Slovak authorities do not have a compact vision of the politics of history, in many aspects and fields it is conducted both by central institutions and other players in public life. This study delivers a synthetic analysis of the Slovak debate on identity, changes in symbolics, lustration, “de-communisation” and education. It defines points of fundamental dispute and disagreement on history in Slovak society. The overview presented in the paper shows the complex nature of the politics of history in Slovakia.
EN
This article aims to analyse the transformation of the culture of memory in Lithuania and the most important directions of Lithuanian politics of history in the period from 1989 to 2018. While discussing these questions, special attention is paid to the role of political factors (internal and external) and interstate relations, as well as to changes in the relationship between Lithuania’s culture of memory, and the cultures of memory and identity of the national minorities in Lithuania. The paper emphasises the processes of transformation of the Lithuanian culture of remembrance which started around 2005, when it was most recently updated. The research material presented herein shows that Lithuania’s culture of memory is full of contradictions and conflicts, and that its central figure has changed.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza myśli politycznej współczesnego ruchu narodowego w zakresie polityki historycznej. Główna hipoteza badawcza zakłada, iż ruch narodowy propaguje własną wizję polityki historycznej. Odpowiednio modelowana polityka historyczna ma przede wszystkim kształtować tożsamość narodową oraz ułatwić określenie granic wspólnoty narodowej. Z tej perspektywy oceniano przedsięwzięcia podejmowane przez inne podmioty polityczne działające w Polsce. Zarzucano im często prowadzenie antynarodowych działań. Liberałów krytykowano za pomijanie historii i akceptowanie jej krytycznej postaci, natomiast konserwatystom zarzucono brak zdolności organizacyjnych oraz uległość wobec konkurencyjnych modeli polityki historycznej kształtowanych przez inne narody. Stąd wynikał ofensywny charakter dyskursu i usprawiedliwianie dla posługiwania się językiem defaworyzacji czy wręcz wrogości i nienawiści. Interes narodowy, pozostający główną kategorią myśli politycznej, często stawał się argumentem uniemożliwiającym polemikę lub dyskusję. Nie unikano też prób przemilczania niewygodnych wydarzeń historycznych czy też zmiany ich sensu. Dyferencjacja ugrupowań narodowych ułatwiała dyskusję wewnątrz samego środowiska, natomiast w obrębie polskiej myśli politycznej praktycznie nie odegrało ono samodzielnej roli, wzmacniając przekaz związany z konserwatywnym modelem polityki historycznej, a w sferze politycznej wspomagając niejednokrotnie działania Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Dostrzegając jednak użyteczność polityki historycznej, podkreślano, iż nie stanowi ona działania typu doraźnego politycznego eventu, ale oznacza długofalową pracę polityczną.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyse the political thought of the contemporary National Movement in terms of politics of history. The main research hypothesis assumes that the National Movement promotes its own vision of politics of history. The properly shaped politics of history is primarily intended to shape national identity and facilitate the definition of boundaries of the national community. The actions taken by other political entities operating in Poland were assessed from this perspective. They were often accused of conducting anti-national activities. Liberals were criticised for ignoring history and accepting its critical form, while conservatives were accused of lacking organisational capacity and being submissive to competing models of the politics of history shaped by other nations. Hence the offensive character and the justification for using the language of disfavour or even hostility and hatred. The national interest, remaining the main category of political thought, often became an argument that made polemic or discussion impossible. Attempts to pass over uncomfortable historical events or to shift meanings were not avoided either. The differentiation of national groups facilitated discussion within the milieu, but it practically did not play an independent role within Polish political thought, reinforcing the message associated with the conservative model of politics of history and, in the political sphere, often supporting the activities of Law and Justice. Recognising the usefulness of politics of history, however, it was emphasised that it is not a short-term political event-type activity but a long-term political work.
EN
This article summarises the concepts behind the direction of Polish politics towards Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia in placing Poland’s new international relations in Central and Eastern Europe due to its historical ties with the countries of the region. A significant verbal role was played by the reception in Polish politics of the doctrine of Mieroszewski and Giedroyc-the so-called ULB (Ukraine–Lithuania–Belarus). It assumed the establishment of special relations with these countries, and, at the same time, waiving claims to territories lost by Poland after 1939. The application of this idea was conditioned by the internal political dynamics of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Lithuania, and their mutual relations that determined the effectiveness of this doctrine. A key role in shaping Poland’s policy towards these countries was played by an “historical factor”-the exchange of mutual declarations concerning the past; this sometimes included the transmission of documentation-for instance the Katyn massacre evidence documents were transferred to Poland in 1990 by the Russian authorities. These actions served as tools of political rapprochement, and they sometimes resulted in opening the way to re-examine previous historical interpretations (especially in Polish–Lithuanian and Polish–Ukrainian relations). The question of investigating the crimes of the USSR against Poles, including above all the Katyn massacre (1940), played an important role in the rapprochement in Polish–Russian relations in the early period of President Yeltsin’s rule. One of the repercussions of implementing this concept and its conciliar priorities in Polish foreign policy and in its internal formal discourse was the suppression of some recently recreated areas of collective memory and currents of historical discourse; this especially concerned Polish–Ukrainian relations, in the context of, among others, the massacre in Volhynia in 1942–1943. Another result was transferring possible settlements to the responsibility of the state and the Polish community-a particular example of which was a resolution of the Polish Senate concerning Operation “Vistula” (Akcja “Wisła” in 1947) that was adopted in 1990.
EN
The fundamental direction of politics of history in Belarus under the rule of Aleksandr Lukashenko has been to maintain and cultivate the memory of the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet period. Although the Republic of Belarus remains the most faithful heir to the Soviet inheritance, over time its politics of memory has begun to shift towards the establishment and consolidation of its own history of Belarusian statehood. The last several years have more actively revealed the authorities’ new trend in the field of politics of history, which involves the creation of a heroic image for the secret service (NKVD, KGB) and the militia in the history of the Belarusian state. This tendency is characterised by a nonaggressive, but national-level, wide range of commemorative measures which are aimed at creating a myth of the KGB and the militia. Starting from the Great Patriotic War, which remains central to the Belarusian government’s politics of history, new historical heroes have begun to emerge in the form of officers of the security services. The military and intelligence services are still linked to the figure of Felix Dzerzhinsky, and the cultivation of his memory in Belarus still predominates over the commemoration of other historical figures. A number of events (including those at state level) dedicated to the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Belarusian militia and the KGB in 2017 gave a particular boost to these commemorative measures. In this article, the author will analyse the Belarusian authorities’ current politics of history in this regard by introducing readers to a variety of commemorative practices (the unveiling of monuments, official speeches, films, historical reconstructions, etc.). Moreover, attention will be drawn to the current policy in Belarus and the place within it for the special services, as well as the lack of any consideration of the Soviet past (the Stalinist repressions, Kurapaty, the NKVD, access to archives), the international aspects of Belarus’s current politics of memory (links to Russia), and the martyrological and sacral character of the memory of the KGB and militia.
EN
The term ‘wars of memory’ refers to the Russian specificity of the issues described in the West as ‘politics of history’ or the ‘politics of memory’. The historical arguments which are employed in the Russian Federation in the context of information and cultural warfare, and are identified with the war over the interpretation of history, are being used to achieve the Kremlin’s political objectives in both its domestic and external arenas: any visions which conflict with the official one are discredited as anti-Russian and falsifications of the history of Russia. This text consists of three parts. The first discusses the evolution of the problem in Russian public discourse since the collapse of the USSR; the second describes the historical-cultural standard currently operative in Russia (its pattern of assessments and historical interpretations); and the third, outlines the manifestations of the state’s involvement in implementing its specifically understood politics of memory, with particular emphasis on the role of the Russian Historical Society and Rosarkhiv. The ‘wars’ discussed in this article have become one of the systemic mechanisms for Russia’s confrontation with both the external environment and its internal opposition. The memory and historical-cultural identity as disseminated now are leading to a secondary Sovietisation of society and the mobilisation of imperial and nationalist (ethnocentric, ethnically Russian) resentments within the Russian Federation.
20
75%
EN
This article discusses selected publications which reinterpret Russian history in a spirit of rehabilitating the Soviet past and highlighting the USSR’s role as a vehicle for Russia’s assumed historical role (including Utkin 1993, Utkin 1999a, Utkin 1999b, Solzhenitsyn 1995, Solzhenitsyn 2001–2002, Mel’tyukhov 2001, Narochnitskaya 2005c, Narochnitskaya 2005a, Mitrofanov 2005). In addition to this, it contextualises them with initiatives undertaken by the Russian Federation’s government (including the standardisation of history textbooks’ content and the activities of the Presidential Commission to counteract attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russian interests). The points of view presented here, which are considered representative for a certain part of the historical discourse in contemporary Russia, integrate Russia’s totalitarian period (the USSR from 1917 to 1991) into the course of its broader history, as the basis of an interpretation which accepts a priori statements regarding the sense of Russia’s history and her role in world history. Among the observed trends, this text highlights the approval of certain features of the communist dictatorship as corresponding to Russian ideology; the adaptation of Soviet ideology to Russia’s policy of memory; the emphasis on ideological, political and military confrontation with the Western world as a permanent feature of Russian history; and the reinterpretation of Russian history in such a way as to continuously justify all the actions of the Russian state over the centuries, both externally (interpreting Russian aggression and imperialism as a means of defence against her enemies, liberation, or the reintegration of the Russian community) and internally (presenting terror as a means of defence against an alleged ‘fifth column’, or as the modernisation of the country).
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