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Co je pragmatismus?

100%
EN
In response to the critique of Pavel Materna, I analyse the common conceptions of pragmatism which identify it, to different degrees, with utilitarianism. I argue that it is not difficult to defeat this kind of pragmatism (for example the debate between Bertrand Russell and William James) and to pronounce, along with Materna in his critique, that it is either mistaken or banal. I concentrate, in this article, on calling into question this pseudo-dilemma, as it is exhibited in the well-known ambiguity of Protagoras’ homo-mensura (man as the measure of all things, beings that they are, non-beings that they are not). On the first reading, which takes it to be the claim that whether it is day or night depends on my arbitrary choice, it is mistaken; on the second reading, which takes it to mean that I can easily call day “night”, and night “day”, it is banal, because this makes no change to things themselves
EN
The aim of the text is to explain the original background and conditions of pragmatism. The text traces four phases that greatly influenced its emergence. Firstly, the philosophical system of the most important American early-modern philosopher Jonathan Edwards is examined. The author shows how his system provides pragmatism with the notion of a reality in which relations are ontologically prior to entities. From the second phase, that is constituted by the ideas of Emerson, pragmatism inherited an emphasis on the power of humans. This enabled pragmatism to avoid predestination, one of the most important Calvinistic dogmas that had enclosed people in the cage of fate. The third phase was created by the arrival of Hegelianism into the USA that helped pragmatists grasp the reality of experience as a flux of ongoing historical stages that significantly determine the „ontological“ features of experience relations, institutions, the self-conception of both societies and individuals. The fourth phase was represented in the first works of members of „The Metaphysical Club“. There the last main tool of pragmatism was introduced i.e. the fluidity of principles that enable people to intelligently react to a problematic situation.
EN
The aim of the article is to consider the Euroscepticism of Polish political parties in the period before the accession to the EU and after 2004. Empirical material for this article is contained in electoral manifestoes of four Polish political parties defined by author as Eurosceptic (League of Polish Families, Self‑Defence, Law and Justice, Congress of New Right), published between 2001 and 2014. The author is looking for answer to the question, as far the Eurosceptic position of political party is the result of the party’s relationship to the EU and the axiology, expressed in their political manifestoes, and as far there is the tactical response to the expectations of their electorates.
EN
The article applies to the issue of perception of cultural distinctness in the context of ethical concepts. Research results presented in the text apply to the level of social distance to culturally different, the granting of rights and restrictions to the culturally different in local terrority. Taken analysis and interpretations of the research results fit into the wider context of discourse in the field of educational politics and cross-cultural education.
Human Affairs
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2009
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vol. 19
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issue 1
52-59
EN
This is a paper about Richard Rorty's notion of hope, and the role that it plays in breaking down Rorty's public/private distinction, and connecting philosophy to politics. The argument that philosophy can be engaged in and with the social-political world is one that is coherent with Rorty's position if philosophy is understood as striving towards its goals with a sense of contextualism and fallibilism. Placing Rorty within the tradition of the classic pragmatists, James and Dewey, I will argue that pluralism can and should serve as a contextual foundation for liberalism. Through an examination and analysis of Rorty's liberal ironist and anti-foundationalism, I will explore how Rortyian hope can be understood as socially and politically transformative, transforming our conception of knowledge from one based on certainty to one based on fallibility.
Human Affairs
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2013
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vol. 23
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issue 4
616-632
EN
We come prepared to track events and objects, building our knowledge base while foraging for coherence. Classical pragmatism recognizes that the acquisition of knowledge is in part a contact sport (e.g. Peirce, Dewey). One of the aims of neuroscience is to capture human experience. One route to perhaps achieve this may be through the study of the visual system and its expansion in our evolutionary history. Embodied cephalic systems, as Dewey knew well, are tied to self-corrective inquiry. A philosophy of neuroscience needs to capture how such events are tracked, tested through experience, and subsequently modified in the brain to comprise a knowledge base.
EN
The dislocation of the Pandemic caused social convulsions around the world. The middle and ruling classes seem to have rediscovered humans – essential workers, employees, members of underrepresented minorities, and children. In our rush to atone our sins and redress imbalances, we are not stopping to define words nor, as the pragmatists would want us to, think through what our moral precepts mean in practice. Nor do we have the tools in accounting, the “language of business,” to capture our efforts. However, teams that do not take the time to establish ground rules and standard definitions often get a faster start but don’t always do the best work nor have the most impact. Let’s give ourselves better changes.
8
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Vznik formalismu a nové pojetí vědy

51%
EN
According to formalism a mathematician is not concerned with mysterious meta-physical entities but with mathematical symbols themselves. Mathematical entities, on this view, become mere sensible signs. However, the price that has to be paid for this move looks to be too high. Mathematics, which is nowadays considered to be the queen of the sciences, thus turns out to be a content-less game. That is why it seems too absurd to regard numbers and all mathematical entities as mere symbols. T e aim of our paper is to show the reasons that have led some philosophers and mathemati¬cians to accept the view that mathematical terms in a proper sense do not refer to anything and mathematical propositions do not have any real content. At the same time we want to explain how formalism helped to overcome the traditional concept of science.
Human Affairs
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2010
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vol. 20
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issue 4
364-375
EN
Racism has been described as a litmus test or a barium meal which reveals other disorders and injustices within the body politic. It presupposes the legitimacy of racial classifications and the metaphysical reality of races and therefore provides a vital area of scrutiny for philosophical traditions. This paper examines racism and its anti-social effects both on the individual and the society at large. It argues that racism is generally driven by fear and hatred hence all forms of racism are dangerous, socially harmful and morally wrong in practice. The paper recommends ways of overcoming the evil of racism by emphasizing social intelligence and self-realization as moral ideals drawing on John Dewey's pragmatism in ethics. It concludes by stressing Dewey's moral pragmatism as a potent instrument of social change.
PL
The main aim of this paper is to present two possible interpretations of American Legal Realism. According to the first one, it was a pragmatic movement. Consequently, it was neither philosophical nor naturalistic (in the contemporary sense). Although the basic statements of Justice Holmes, who was the initiator of the realism, seem to be rather of pragmatic character, the naturalistic interpretations become more and more important. One of the most popular is Brian Leiter’s reinterpretation of legal realism. It is analyzed in the text.
EN
Aim. The aim of the study is to analyse the basic philosophical ideas proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in education from the pragmatic standpoint. Methods. The article is based on an extended literature review, which involves the use of such methods as interpretation (to explain incomprehensible and incomplete aspects of philosophical theory), comparative analysis (to compare Wittgenstein’s views with the views of pragmatists) and historico-philosophical reconstruction (to build a complete pragmatico-analytic conception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of education). Results. The study clarified the pragmatic aspect of Wittgenstein’s reasoning about education. The author reconstructed and critically comprehended the features of Wittgenstein’s pedagogical method, his views on the purpose and characteristics of learning, communication in the educational environment and the results of the pedagogical process. Conclusion. Wittgenstein developed an original pedagogical method, which was a synthesis of his theoretical and practical generalisations based on personal experience of teaching and learning. He supplemented them with pragmatic ideas, which were both his own developments and the result of improving the ideas of pragmatic theory. This made it possible to form the basis of the pragmatico-analytic philosophy of education and to reinterpret its basic principles and ideas.
Human Affairs
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2009
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vol. 19
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issue 1
19-27
EN
The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of the Given is then provided in terms of refinements of Dewey's theory of experience. The doctrine of the Given is implicated in the functions of inquiry insofar as one must take it that experience is a source of justification.
EN
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory-which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics-are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
EN
For many people the expression “applied ethics” sounds like a pleonasm. They tend to claim that ethics by its very nature is about practical matters. It deals with human actions and their motivations and there is no need to create an additional discipline with special practical bias. However, at least since the 1970s, there has been a growing movement of applied ethics which resulted not only in the increase of enrolment to the academic courses but also in the demand for consulting services in this field. And yet the question still remains to what extent applied ethics inherits philosophical tradition and style of thinking. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the applied ethics is a continuation of philosophical inquiry in the way adjusted well to the demands of the pluralistic and democratic societies.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2021
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vol. 10
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issue 4
975-995
EN
This paper uses the philosophical methods employed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey to formulate pragmatism’s basic ideas about education. The ideas proposed by the pragmatists are also used to compare and define their relationship between each other in order to create a new philosophy (theory) of democratic education. Based on the assumptions of pragmatism to show democracy in education, the paper explains the application of pragmatism to educational reform in Vietnam today. For pragmatism is to be what unites education.
Human Affairs
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2013
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vol. 23
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issue 4
645-657
EN
The paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”
Human Affairs
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2010
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vol. 20
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issue 3
224-231
EN
This paper explores John Dewey's theory of the emotions and his reasons for developing it. The author considers two competing accounts for why Dewey might have developed his theory: one based on his attempt to clarify rationality and one based on his attempt to make us morally responsive agents to nature. After a close examination of key texts, the author concludes that Dewey's theory is designed to make us morally responsive. Dewey's theory of the emotions serves his purpose of arguing for our re-union with nature, in a manner similar, in fact, to Hegel, with the addition that Dewey makes it our express goal to be concerned for nature in our return to it.
Human Affairs
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 3
280-293
EN
Did the pragmatic turn encompass the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy? Or was the linguistic turn a turn away from pragmatism? Some commentators identify the so-called “eclipse” of pragmatism by analytic philosophy, especially during the Cold War era, as a turn away from pragmatist thinking. However, the historical evidence suggests that this narrative is little more than a myth. Pragmatism persisted, transforming into a more analytic variety under the influence of Quine and Putnam and, more recently, a continental version in the hands of Richard Rorty and Cornel West. In this paper, I argue that proof of the linguistic turn’s presence as a moment in a broader pragmatic turn in philosophy can be garnered from close examination of a single article, W. V. O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and a single issue: whether the analytic-synthetic distinction is philosophically defensible.
Human Affairs
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2007
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vol. 17
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issue 1
22-32
EN
Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow.
Human Affairs
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2007
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vol. 17
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issue 1
71-77
EN
The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.
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