Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i analiza kształtowania się pojęcia woli w starożytnej filozofii pogańskiej. W kontekście poglądów Sokratesa, Platona i Arystotelesa autor przedstawia wiele greckich intuicji dotyczących psychologii aktów moralnych i ludzkiego działania. Po pierwsze artykuł przedstawia doktrynę intelektualizmu etycznego, przypisywaną Sokratesowi, według której kognitywne elementy są głównym motywem naszych działań. Z tego powodu trudno znaleźć pojęcie wolnej woli w sokratejskiej antropologii. Po drugie artykuł prezentuje interpretację platońskiej antropologii, według której sferę thymos można nazwać proto-wolą. Ostatecznie autor ukazuje, jak trudno jest znaleźć pojęcie woli w arystotelesowskiej etyce i antropologii, pomimo że Arystoteles bardzo szczegółowo wyjaśniał relacje między przekonaniami, pragnieniami i działaniem. Ani proairesis, ani boulesis nie mogą pełnić funkcji woli, szczególnie gdy wola ma być władzą, która pragnie, może wybierać i jest samodeterminującą się władzą.
EN
The aim of the article is to present and analyze the development of the notion of the will in the pagan ancient philosophy. In the context of the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the Author presents a lot of Greek intuitions concerning the psychology of moral acts and human action. Firstly, the article examines the doctrine of ethical intellectualism, attributed to Socrates, according to which the cognitive elements are the main motives of our actions. So, it is difficult to find the notion of the will in Socratic anthropology. Secondly, the article gives the interpretation of Platonic anthropology according to which the thymos is the sphere that we can name as “proto-will.” At last, the Author shows how difficult is to find the will in Aristotelian ethics and anthropology despite the fact that Aristotle explicated very closely the relations among be liefs, desires, and the action. Neither proairesis, nor boulesis can play the role of the will, especially when the will should be something like the power that desires things, makes decisions, and is self-deremined.
The article focuses on the phenomenon of free will in Paul, taking as the starting point Rom. 8:16. At the beginning, a concise exegetical analysis of Rom 8:16 is presented, placed in the rhetorical context of Rom 8. Subsequently, a comparison is drawn between Paul’s and Epictetus’s views on divine and human agency. First, the Epictetus’s idea of freedom is presented with a special emphasis on the notion of proairesis, understood as the true self of a person, responsible for free moral choices and actions. Next, the similarities and differences between the Epictetus’s and Pauline vision of free will are discussed. What connects the apostle and the philosopher are convictions that free will can exist in a divinely determined world and that human volition requires continuous education and subordination to God’s will. The elements that clearly distinguish Paul from Epictetus are the natural image of deity to be imitated in the human pursuit of freedom, and a genuinely relational, corporeal and emotive character of free will in the apostle. The psycho-somatic nature of human personality and will in Paul invites a dialogue between the apostle and modern science but it has to be carried out cautiously, bearing in mind the different methodologies, the idea of transcendent deity and Christological foundation upon which the Pauline idea of freedom and free will is built.
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