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Kwestia Utrum universale nihil sit aut posterius suis singularibus z zachowanych w rękopisie BJ 2118 Collectanea de anima

100%

Stanek M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2020

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vol. 2

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issue 9

229-237

EN

Presented paper contains the critical edition of the question Utrum universal nihil sit aut posterius suis singularibus of the Collectanea de anima preserved in MS. BJ 2118. Collectanea de anima is a provisional title of the collection of 6 questions dealing with the problem of the soul, composed in Krakow in the 2nd half of the 15th century. This manual has a heterogenic character, since every question differs from the others regarding its form, multidimensionality of undertaken issues and the degree of doctrinal independence. Surely, the 3rd question edited here (precisely its part that has been preserved till today, i.e. the introduction and first passage of articulus 1) is not too original work and does not include any remarkable statements. But yet, it is an important testimony of work of compilers, that nowadays only uncommonly is a subject of studies. The edited text in general is doctrinally dependent: first of all, it is based on the works by Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great and Alexander Bonini of Alexandria (the author explicitly quotes these sources), but also on treatises by Heymericus of Campo and Pseudo-Aquinas (their works are not induced by the author). Concerning the substance of the edited question, the most interesting and “original” is a kind of ignorance of the historical background of the problem of universals and the occurrence of quite numerous mistakes. Mostly they can be easily explained, since they often arise from improper decipheration of abbreviation, overinterpretation or basing on a corrupted source. The accumulated mistakes lead the author to draw his own (singular) conclusions, that all testify the correctness of the Aristotle’s sentence: Parvus error in principio maximus erit in fine.

2

Arystoteles i początki pojęcia powszechnika

100%

Tiuryn T.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2022

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vol. 70

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issue 3

297-324

EN

The aim of this paper is to discuss Aristotle’s concept of the universal, and in particular to defend the claim that Aristotle’s concept is different from the modern concept of the universal, which is understood as the entity common to many individuals. For Aristotle, the universal is first and foremost an object which is predicated, is the object of the acts of the intellect, and is the object of the definition. In the text I also show that universals in Aristotle’s theory are causally inert, so they cannot be properties or causes of properties of individuals. This makes them similar to the modern concept of abstract objects such as Frege’s senses. The immediate point of reference for this paper is Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne [Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations] (2019). I argue here against Rojek’s reading of the classical concept of the universal, and above all, against his interpretation of the theory of Thomas Aquinas.

PL

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja Arystotelesowskiej koncepcji powszechnika, w szczególności zaś obrona tezy, że pojęcie powszechnika u Arystotelesa jest znacząco inne niż współczesne pojęcie powszechnika, zgodnie z którym powszechnik to byt wspólny wielu rzeczom jednostkowym. Dla Arystotelesa powszechnik jest przede wszystkim przedmiotem orzekania, aktów intelektu oraz definicji. W tekście pokazuję również, że powszechniki u Arystotelesa nie pełnią funkcji przyczyn, nie mogą więc być własnościami lub przyczynami cech indywiduów. Upodabnia je to do współczesnego pojęcia przedmiotu abstrakcyjnego, takiego jak sensy Fregego lub sądy. Bezpośrednim punktem odniesienia artykułu jest książka Pawła Rojka Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne (2019). Polemizuję tu z Rojka interpretacją klasycznej koncepcji powszechnika, przede wszystkim z jego odczytaniem teorii Tomasza z Akwinu.

3

The Compatibility of Evolution and Classical Metaphysics

80%

Polis D. F.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2020

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vol. 9

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issue 4

549-585

EN

The compatibility of evolution with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is defended in response to Fr. Michal Chaberek’s thesis of incompatibility. The motivation and structure of Darwin’s theory are reviewed, including the roles of secondary causality, randomness and necessity. “Randomness” is an analogous term whose evolutionary use, while challenging, is fully compatible with theism. Evolution’s necessity derives from the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, the vehicle of divine providence. Methodological analysis shows that metaphysics lacks the evidentiary basis to judge biological theories. Species are entia rationis whose immutability does not conflict with the evolutionary succession of biological populations. While Darwin’s theory was unknown to Aquinas, he endorses the possibility of new species immanent in the initial state of the universe, nor does his understanding of exemplar ideas offer ground for objection. Finally, five arguments given by Fr. Chaberek are answered.

4

Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics

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Polis D. F.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2021

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vol. 10

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issue 4

847-891

EN

I respond to Michał Chaberek’s and Robert A. Delfino’s criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution’s directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new species concepts. This accords with projective realism, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based on the multiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nominalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowledge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek’s thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species concept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) confuses Aristotle’s four causes and (4) limits God’s creative omnipotence. Finally, Chaberek is out of step with contemporary theology.

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2 Studia Gilsoniana

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2 2020

Kwestia Utrum universale nihil sit aut posterius suis singularibus z zachowanych w rękopisie BJ 2118 Collectanea de anima

Arystoteles i początki pojęcia powszechnika

The Compatibility of Evolution and Classical Metaphysics

Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics