Emotions, as recognizable only through experience and belonging to direct and extra-conceptual knowledge (a person feels something), are formed into indirect knowledge, rational and of linguistic nature. Our direct experience of what we feel is cognitively and linguistically moulded into lexicalsemantic definitions of a particular emotion. Truth conditional definitions are given preference here. The research on such definitions can imply the following types of definitions: propositional definitions by explicating the cause of an emotion (Wierzbicka 1971) and by prototype effects (Wierzbicka 1999), metonymic definitions (Davitz 1969, Mikołajczuk 1997, 2009), synonymous definitions (Mikołajczuk 1997, 2009, Jasielska 2013), definitions in the form of conceptualisations of emotions (Nowakowska-Kempna 1995, 2000, Mikołajczuk 1997, 2009) and in the form of the linguistic portrait of a concept (Apresjan 1994).
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