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PL
Artykuł zajmuje się problemem warunkowo-prawdziwościowej teorii znaczenia zdań wiązanej zazwyczaj z doktryną metafizycznego realizmu. Składa się z dwóch zasadniczych części. W pierwszej przedstawiono rozbudowaną obronę realizmu ze strony Michaela Moore’a poprzez omówienie szeregu argumentów mających podważać tę doktrynę. Wnioskiem tej części jest uznanie, iż nawet jeśli odparcie tych prób obalenia realizmu jest trafne, to można postawić dwa dodatkowe argumenty mające za zadanie poddać w wątpliwość jego teorię: argument z kontekstualizmu oraz argument z nonfaktualizmu, które są opisane i rozwinięte w drugiej części tekstu.
EN
The article tackles with the problem of truth-conditional theory of meaning for sentences, which are usually connected with the doctrine of metaphysical realism. It consists basically of two parts. The first part describes several arguments aimed at rejecting realism. The conclusion of this part is a claim that even if Moore’s defense in this regard is successful there are two additional attempts to undermine his theory, namely the argument from contextualism and the argument from nonfactualism that are described and developed in the second part of the paper.
EN
What follows is an introductory investigation into phenomenological realism represented by Dietrich von Hildebrand, who builds his system on the rational intuition supported with spiritual affectivity in the form of intentional responses. In that context we turn our attention to metaphysical realism represented by St. Thomas Aquinas. Even both authors are strongly committed to what really exist we notice the entirely different philosophical grounds they employ. For that we focus on these essential features of two aforementioned schools to show whether they could be considered as paralell, complimentary or rather incomparable when cognitive realism is considered.
EN
The aim of this article is to show the undeniable influence of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s artistic method on Yuri Mamlejev’s literary works in particular in relation to his novel The Other. Relying on these determinants of fantastic realism, which for many researchers are referred to as the most significant elements of Dostoyevsky’s artistic method, we make an attempt to show that the carnival which combines the two orders in the works of the 19th century writer: the real (scientific) and the surreal (magic), makes the fantasy become an integral part of the surrounding space. Simultaneously the concept of fiction should be understood through such categories as: paradoxicality, iconicity, a word as a vessel, sleep, hallucinations, picture in picture, doppelgänger that foster deep psychological self-understanding of the entity. In the article we aim to expose some of the abovementioned categories of constructing the world of Dostoyevsky’s works and making up, as defined by the author himself “the realism of higher sense” which, in a slightly modified form, although still clearly visible, is also reflected in Mamleev’s artistic method – metaphysical realism. The main emphasis is put on the categories of sleep and doppelgänger which are the clearest examples of Yuri Vitalevich’s inspiration.
PL
The aim of this article is to show the undeniable influence of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s artistic method on Yuri Mamlejev’s literary works in particular in relation to his novel The Other. Relying on these determinants of fantastic realism, which for many researchers are referred to as the most significant elements of Dostoyevsky’s artistic method, we make an attempt to show that the carnival which combines the two orders in the works of the 19th century writer: the real (scientific) and the surreal (magic), makes the fantasy become an integral part of the surrounding space. Simultaneously the concept of fiction should be understood through such categories as: paradoxicality, iconicity, a word as a vessel, sleep, hallucinations, picture in picture, doppelgänger that foster deep psychological self-understanding of the entity. In the article we aim to expose some of the abovementioned categories of constructing the world of Dostoyevsky’s works and making up, as defined by the author himself “the realism of higher sense” which, in a slightly modified form, although still clearly visible, is also reflected in Mamleev’s artistic method – metaphysical realism. The main emphasis is put on the categories of sleep and doppelgänger which are the clearest examples of Yuri Vitalevich’s inspiration.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2024
|
vol. 72
|
issue 1
43-60
PL
Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) miał skłonność do zmieniania swoich poglądów filozoficznych oraz do ich ciągłej modyfikacji. Ostatni okres rozwoju jego filozofii jest znany jako faza realizmu naturalnego lub zdroworozsądkowego. Realizm ten został najpełniej przedstawiony w Wykładach Deweyowskich z 1994 r. Artykuł dotyczy trzech aspektów stanowiska w nich wyłożonego, a następnie ulepszanego i uzupełnianego. Wskazane są trzy trudności tego stanowiska. Po pierwsze, Putnam twierdzi, że we współczesnym sporze o realizm mamy z jednej strony do czynienia ze zwolennikami ekstrawaganckiego realizmu metafizycznego, z drugiej zaś z entuzjastami rozmaitych wersji nieodpowiedzialnego antyrealizmu. Niestety Putnamowski zarys tej debaty jest zbyt uproszczony, ponieważ jest wiele postaci realizmu metafizycznego, natomiast scalanie w jedną całość różnych odmian antyrealizmu prowadzi na manowce. Po drugie, naiwny realizm bezpośredni Putnama trudno pogodzić z zaproponowanym przez niego transakcjonalizmem w teorii percepcji. Po trzecie, przez jakiś czas Putnam był pod wpływem Wittgensteinowskiego kwietyzmu, który zniekształcał charakter wysuwanych przez niego koncepcji filozoficznych.
EN
Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.
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