Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help
Authors help
Years help

Results found: 42

first rewind previous Page / 3 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  reductionism
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 3 next fast forward last
EN
Psychology is one of the victorious sciences and professions of 20th Century. Still, form its onset on doubts are accompanying its possibility, its assumed intellectual sterility, and practical sterility. These doubts reemerge today. However, one is able to ironically refute them not in the name of the oppressed and endangered, but in the light of clearer professional identity. In the second half of the 19th Century, the naissant psychology was challenged on the one hand by Comte claiming that its supposed contents could be divided between sociology and neurobiology, while on the other hand by Dilthey, Frege, and Husserl who considered it to be intellectually plain and lacking phantasy. These challenges were dealt with in mid-twentieth century by the three aspect theory of Karl Bühler (experience, behavior, and objectivations) and by the role of cultural mediation in the theory of Lev Vygotsky, and later on by Jean Piaget with his cross disciplinary position of psychology. Amongst these interpretive debates, the show went on undisturbed. During the early stages of the last century the best theoreticians took part in forming the practical profession of modern psychology. Binet, Ebbinghaus, Stern, S. Freud, Lewin, Lurija, Bowlby, while being outstanding theoretical researchers, played a crucial role in the formation of the basic frames of the profession as well, in a similar way as Ferenczi, Szondi, Harkai or Mérei in Hungary. The threats and challenges towards psychology never stopped while professional psychology was being formed. Just think of the dubious victories of Pavlovianism in the East-European countries, or the insatiable hunger of pedagogy this ethernel dedicated formator of humanity. All of this is merely the past to be remembered by historians of psychology. On the present day intellectual landscape, psychology is again challenged and questioned form two directions. In science, the new interdisciplinary field seem to digest psychology. Cognitive science, neuro-philosophy, and neuroscience all tend to question the independent future of psychology. Once we would know everything, there will not be anything but neural patterns of excitations, though in fact the real gurus of neuroscience like Gazzaniga and Ramachandran question the victorious nature of the reductionism of their own field. Experimental psychologists should not panic when witnessing the questioning of their existence partly initiated by them. The neural interpretation of man can indeed provide a causal model of behavior, but only the psychological interpretation of behavior can account for what do we have a causal model of, e.g. in the fMRI magnet, is the person reading, flirting, or fighting. And this is further complicated by the subjective experiences of the subject accompanying these behaviors. The other threat of today comes from the half-prepared representatives of rival professions, from trainers, coaches, and gurus of all sorts. Present day psychology should clearly see that it is not involved in a freedom fight any more, but it protects a clear professional image. With regard to intellectual reductionisms, it protects the idea that psychological science is supported in its identity by an existing profession, while there are no professions of cognitive scientist, or neuroscientist. Against the half-trained professional rivals it should claim that in the profession of psychology, in line with the ancestors mentioned, theoretical foundations have their place. Psychologists are not technicians or paramedics of behavior, but its engineers and doctors.
EN
„Let’s not be too eager about equality” – brain sex, heteronormativity, and the scientific mystiqueThe article analyses the role of brain sex in Polish public discourse of the last years. The authors of a popular book Brain Sex claim that differences between women and men stem from differences in the brain structure, and because of that they are universal and unchangeable; feminism is based on misrepresentation of science. This thesis was overtaken by right-wing journalists, as it gave scientific justification to conservative gender politics and contemplementarity – the gender ontology of the Catholic church. However, in the rightwing journalism a significant aspect of brain sex theory is silenced, namely, the claim that homo- and transsexuality result from disorders in brain development; they are unchangeable and should be accepted. Despite its conservative roots, brain sex was popularized in liberal media as well. The aura of science that accompanied this popular theory allowed to naturalize its anti-feminism and heteronormativity. This phenomenon is discussed on the basis of media activity of two Polish scientists who are popular both in right-wing and liberal media: Anna Grabowska and Jerzy Vetulani. Both present brain sex theory as objective, universally accepted truth, which is attacked in the name of the leftist ideology by ignorant activists who deny science. „Nie popadajmy w przesadę z tą równością” – płeć mózgu, heteronorma i mistyka naukowościArtykuł analizuje rolę płci mózgu w polskim dyskursie publicznym ostatnich lat. Autorzy niezwykle popularnej w Polsce książki Płeć mózgu twierdzą, że różnice między kobietami i mężczyznami wynikają z różnic w budowie mózgów, a przez to są uniwersalne i niezmienne, feminizm zaś jest oparty na fałszowaniu nauki. Teza ta została podchwycona przez prawicowych publicystów, ponieważ nadawała naukową legitymację konserwatywnej polityce płci oraz komplementaryzmowi – ontologii płci przyjętej przez Kościół katolicki. W prawicowym piśmiennictwie przemilcza się jednak istotny aspekt płci mózgu, mianowicie twierdzenie, że homo- i transseksualność wynikają z wad w rozwoju mózgu, są niezmienne i powinny być akceptowane. Mimo swoich konserwatywnych korzeni płeć mózgu była popularyzowana także w mediach liberalnych. Nimb naukowości, którym otaczany był popularny pogląd, pozwalał naturalizować związane z nim antyfeminizm i heteronormatywność. Zjawisko to omówione jest na podstawie działalności popularyzatorskiej dwojga naukowców, cieszących się popularnością zarówno w prawicowych, jak i liberalnych mediach: Anny Grabowskiej i Jerzego Vetulaniego. Oboje przedstawiali płeć mózgu jako obiektywną, powszechnie uznawaną naukową prawdę, z którą w imię lewicowej ideologii próbują walczyć nieakceptujący ustaleń nauki aktywiści.
3
88%
EN
Economics as a science on economic activity has built an assumption about the nature of economizing man over many decades. Homo oeconomicus model is not “the only right”. It has been a subject to modifications extending between the two approaches of research: psychologism and anti-psychologism. In the last few decades, psychology has expanded its scope of research on economic behavior. The aim of this study is to validate by methods of incomplete induction, if the assumption of rationality of economizing man corresponds to the real states of the human mind and cognitive capabilities. On the basis of these studies the economic psychology and behavioral economics emerged. Researchers in these areas oppose inductive method to hypothetico-deductive research program of mainstream economics on the basis of observations of irrational behavior of economizing man. The purpose of this article is, first, an overview of trends: the psychological and antipsychological in the theoretical development of the economics and, secondly, to show the weaknesses and threats of psychologism in economics and economic psychology. The paper discusses the psychological associations of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, who shaped the standard of classical economics. Then it discusses the shift towards logical empiricism and rationality postulate of Karl Popper. This turn shaped the assumption of rational economizing man, which was used in the theory of general equilibrium of markets. This theory, as static and idealizational, has been criticized in the new branches of economics in which there are lifted idealization assumptions of neoclassical economics to more comprehensive explanation of economic reality. Experiments and other methods of incomplete induction are a complementary tool to raise awareness about the economic reality. The conclusions states that inductive reasoning is unreliable and there should be used the best possible explanation of intentional human actions, such as intentional explanation. In contrast, the search for causes of economic behavior in cognitive limitations poses a risk of reduction of economics as a science of social relations in economy to natural sciences.
EN
“De-Conditioning and Images of the Mind” explores the categories of Stephen Priest as developed in his article, “The Unconditioned Soul.” Through an analysis of historical and contemporary examples of the “conditioned” mode in recent philosophical and scientific discussions of the mind, the article articulates limitations of the proposed methods and advances examples of “de-conditioning” the mind that point in the direction of what Priest calls the “unconditioned.”
EN
The paper distinguishes the debate between reductionism and antireductionism (centered around the question whether sciences such as psychology are in principle reducible to neurosciences and eventually to physics) from a debate between reductivism and antireductivism (centered around the practical question whether we should prefer neuroscientific theories over psychological theories). The first part of the paper surveys various arguments for and against reductionism and ends with a plea for agnosticism. The second part of the paper contains an argument that even if reductionism is true, we should all be antireductivists.
6
75%
EN
A review of: J. Woleński, Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń 2016, ss. 226.
PL
Recenzja książki: J. Woleński, Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń 2016, ss. 226.
EN
Evolutionary aesthetics attempts to explain the human ability to perceive objects, conspecif ics and the surrounding environment in an a es thetic manner - i.e. in an emotional and evaluative way resulting in a positive or negative appraisal - by referring to the evolutionary history of our functional, cognitive make-up. Research has mostly focussed on aesthetic considerat ions made during landscape assessment and on the role of aesthetic elements during mate choice. Criticism has been expressed repeatedly as to the naturalistic, presumed to be reductionist methods and outlook of an evolutionary approach to aesthetics. This paper briefly reviews the outline of evolutionary aesthetics research and discusses three such critiques - functionality in beauty judgement, reductionism, and the recognition of cultural and interindividual differences. It argues that philosophical aesthetics is not in danger of being unjustly reduced to a neurobiological explanation of aesthetic judgement and experience, and that evolutionary and traditional humanities approaches can be complementary in understanding our sense of beauty.
EN
This essay vindicates two major aspects of the science-based philosophy of Michael Polanyi: 1. His concept of tacit knowing, and 2. His concept of the multi-levelled character of reality. These two notions relate closely with one another, and together support the thesis to be argued here, that when it comes to understanding human beings, and most especially the human mind, science and religion have to meet on the common ground of the transcendent capacities of human beings, which are pointers to the transcendent character of the universe. The mind is an emergent of the universe, as are all of its other amazing characteristics, but mind is also, therefore, a clue to the character of the universe and its encompassing reality. Mind reflects reality; reality invites mind.
PL
The article begins with a short presentation of an interesting semantics concerning the notion of sense from Jean Grondin’s book Du sens de la vie. Essai philosophique. The author singles out four aspects of sense: directional, semantic (the issue of lingual meaning and values), sensous/ sensory (connected with taste, sensus communis) and reflective (connected with the wisdom to judge rightly). Grondin suggests considering the issue of the sense of life not as something added, imposed to life (the constructivist perspective) but rather as something to be discovered, or read from within our experience. In the context the most important question about the sense of education has been posed. The main conclusions of the text are as follows. Contemporary education seems to be reduced to different forms: techno-instrumental, moralizing or ideological, aesthetic “French-polished” and bureaucratically statistical. However, hermeneutics can still provide a crucial inspiration for modern education. The hermeneutic rehabilitation of taste in its sense of (re)cognition, savoring (relishing) and understanding of things needs to be (re)discovered within education. It seems that the modern tendency to reduce human reality and human experience to a narrow area of specialisation, might be overcome by a hermeneutic invitation to see things in a wider, non-generalised, horizon. Reducing the sense of education to one of the aspects mentioned by Grondin means to make education something perhaps useful, effective, attractive because of the ‘ends and means’ technology, but at the same time senseless and lacking life, spirit, inspiration and taste. The sense of education is to be uncovered/ discovered and not merely imposed and then assimilated. However, education needs – paradoxically – a kind of repetition and imitation comparable to the experience full of listening to the sounds and words in the process of uttering something. It is not the same as the reproduction or duplication of content. That is why in education the interpreter’s fine inner ear is needed. It is needed not in order to replace the content with something elusive, but rather to regain – thanks to this sensual elusiveness – a sense of the content and its voice. The importance of the voice is that in listening out for it an encounter with something different from our own particularity is possible.
PL
The aim of this article was to present one of the methods of reconciling of epistemological antireductionism and ontological physicalism, which explains differences between sciences, through an ontological picture of the most general structure of reality. The main thesis held that accepting this perspective allows us to achieve the above-mentioned reconcilement. First, the main arguments for and against physical reductionism, were described before the ontological assumptions were presented; then the assumptions was analysed in the light of this ontological construction as well as some facts from the fields of methodology and the history of natural sciences. Finally, some conclusions were drawn from the presented vision. They were connected with the epistemological status of analogy and methodological postulate of simplicity.
EN
The article begins with a short presentation of an interesting semantics concerning the notion of sense from Jean Grondin’s book Du sens de la vie. Essai philosophique. The author singles out four aspects of sense: directional, semantic (the issue of lingual meaning and values), sensous/sensory (connected with taste, sensus communis) and reflective (connected with the wisdom to judge rightly). Grondin suggests considering the issue of the sense of life not as something added, imposed to life (the constructivist perspective) but rather as something to be discovered, or read from within our experience. In the context the most important question about the sense of education has been posed. The main conclusions of the text are as follows. Contemporary education seems to be reduced to different forms: techno-instrumental, moralizing or ideological, aesthetic “French-polished” and bureaucratically statistical. However, hermeneutics can still provide a crucial inspiration for modern education. The hermeneutic rehabilitation of taste in its sense of (re)cognition, savoring (relishing) and understanding of things needs to be (re)discovered within education. It seems that the modern tendency to reduce human reality and human experience to a narrow area of specialisation, might be overcome by a hermeneutic invitation to see things in a wider, non-generalised, horizon. Reducing the sense of education to one of the aspects mentioned by Grondin means to make education something perhaps useful, effective, attractive because of the ‘ends and means’ technology, but at the same time senseless and lacking life, spirit, inspiration and taste. The sense of education is to be uncovered/discovered and not merely imposed and then assimilated. However, education needs – paradoxically – a kind of repetition and imitation comparable to the experience full of listening to the sounds and words in the process of uttering something. It is not the same as the reproduction or duplication of content. That is why in education the interpreter’s fine inner ear is needed. It is needed not in order to replace the content with something elusive, but rather to regain – thanks to this sensual elusiveness – a sense of the content and its voice. The importance of the voice is that in listening out for it an encounter with something different from our own particularity is possible.
EN
In the introduction we explain why the relation between the Object and the Subject is a crucial problem of philosophy. The key point in understanding the Object-Subject relation is the vision on Reality that humans shared in different periods of the historical time. We next describe some historical aspects concerning the transdisciplinary concept of “level of Reality”, namely in relation with the work of John of the Ladder (c. 525-606), Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) and especially Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976). We finally analyze a unified theory of levels of Reality - the transdisciplinary approach, with its three axioms: levels of Reality, logic of included middle and complexity. We describe an important consequence of the transdisciplinary approach: the existence of a zone of non-resistance, which plays the role of a third between the Subject and the Object. This Hidden Third is an interaction term which allows the unification of the transdisciplinary Subject and the transdisciplinary Object while preserving their difference.
EN
The essay I am presenting to the readers is a contribution to the methodology of scientific research, especially in the economic sciences. I wonder who scientists are and what broadly comprehended science means. Discussing these ideas I move to defining basic structures of science and next to characterizing the incorrect conceptions of scientific methods. It is a very important issue, especially as with the multiplicity of universities in Poland, in “closed” circles, pseudo-scientific groups are created, especially in the field of the so-called financial engineering or computational finance. That is why I mention F. Bacon’s theory of Idols and inductive reasoning. Finally, I recall Isaac Newton’s position on hypotheses and reductionism. I dedicate Karl Popper’s falsification, i.e. a kind of reasoning called verification, especially to young scientists. The above-mentioned reflections lead me to an issue of knowledge and truth. This way I come to a conclusion that the essence of truth is conformity of thoughts and believes with reality. I hope that my reflections will motivate the generation of young scientists to carry out competent and diligent research in the new century of omnipresent globalization.
EN
Wilhelm Roux (1850–1924) was the follower of mechanical philosophy in biologicalrecognition. His research strategy focusing exclusively on the physicaland chemical rights should be considered as strictly scientific. Reductionistperspective of organisms by Roux as closed complexes and physiological activitiesoccuring in their range are in the completely new light of modern biologywhere the experimental method was introduced. In spite of the faultymethodological assumptions and the failed experimental attempt, the researchattempt of Roux was the inspiration for vitalist Hans Driesch.
15
63%
EN
I approach the question of how we are to understand the relation between philosophy and theology by focusing upon a recent trend in contemporary philosophy of value. The position in question is a form of naturalism, but it stands opposed to scientism and presupposes an atheistic framework. We arrive at a conception of nature and of philosophy which is much broader than that assumed by the scientific naturalist, and I consider whether this underlying expansive approach can be exploited in a theological direction. I argue that there are good reasons for taking seriously this possibility, and that these reasons do not violate the conditions imposed by our protagonists. On this approach then, we are led to take seriously the idea that nature is God-involving and that theology is significant to philosophy, and we arrive at this position by exploiting arguments which are advanced from within an atheistic framework. The only constraint is that we stand prepared to reject scientific naturalism. It remains to be seen whether this theistic defence can be further developed and justified, but I suggest some bad reasons for resisting this line of thought, and end on a note of philosophical and theological optimism.
EN
The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.
EN
There is a variety of concepts of man in philosophy. Thus, it becomes essential to reflect on their assumptions. It seems particularly important to focus on the personalist as well as on the reduced vision of man which promote contradictory values. The research conducted for the purpose of this work concentrated mainly on the integral and reduced vision of man and on their cultural and educational value. The research indicates an anthropological error which lies at the root of the reduced vision of man. It also shows the importance of the integral vision of man based on the assumptions of personalism which John Paul II frequently referred to. Integral and personalist pedagogy has a positive impact not only on the development of young generation but also on the cultural dimension of social life.
PL
Wielość filozoficznych koncepcji osoby ludzkiej powoduje, że niezbędna jest refleksja nad ich założeniami. Szczególnie ważne wydaje się zwrócenie uwagi na personalistyczną koncepcję osoby i jej zredukowane ujęcie, które promują właściwe sobie, przeciwstawne wartości. Zagadnienie integralnego i zredukowanego ujęcia osoby oraz jego kulturowego i wychowawczego znaczenia stało się zasadniczym obszarem badań podjętych na rzecz tego artykułu. Ich efektem jest zwrócenie uwagi na błąd antropologiczny tkwiący u podstaw redukcjonistycznych koncepcji osoby oraz podkreślenie znaczenia, jakiego w tym kontekście nabiera integralna wizja człowieka. Jest ona osadzona na założeniach personalizmu, do którego wielokrotnie nawiązuje Jan Paweł II. Integralna pedagogika personalistyczna wpływa pozytywnie nie tylko rozwój młodego pokolenia, ale także na kulturowy wymiar życia społecznego.
PL
Tezę umysłu rozszerzonego Andy’ego Clarka i Davida Chalmersa wykorzystuje się często w uzasadnianiu istnienia podmiotowości grupowej. Zwolennicy wyjaśniania zachowań niektórych grup w odwołaniu do ich stanów intencjonalnych argumentują, że system złożony z wielu jednostek może być podmiotem poznającym pod wieloma względami analogicznym do podmiotu indywidualnego. W artykule argumentuję, że wybór perspektywy indywidualistycznej lub holistycznej w wyjaśnianiu zachowań poznawczych grup jest zdeterminowany wyborem konkretnych problemów badawczych. Omawiając wybrane stanowiska wobec tak zwanych grupowych stanów intencjonalnych, oceniam na ile zasadne jest przeprowadzanie analogii pomiędzy podmiotem indywidualnym a grupowym.
EN
The extended mind thesis is sometimes used in the argumentation for the group agency. Those who are ready to explain the behavior of some groups in terms of their intentional states argue that the system composed of many individuals can constitute an agent which is in many respects analogous to the individual cognitive subject. In the paper I argue that the choice between the individualistic and holistic perspectives with regard to the explanation of group behavior is determined by the chosen research problems. By indicating selected positions towards group intentional states I evaluate how far we can draw an analogy between individual and group agency.
EN
This paper presents the way in which Hans Driesch’s experiments in embryology led him to the metaphysical concept of entelechy. The author shows the way of considerations of Driesch from his early reductionism standpoint until to reception, by him, metaphysical concept of entelechy.
EN
“Dialectic” has been a matter of growing interest in contemporary philosophy. The present article analyzes dialectical methods and positions them by reference to two paradigmatic texts of German idealism and analytic philosophy, i.e. J.G. Fichte’s Science of Knowing (1804) and J. McDowell’s Mind and World. Both dialectical approaches will be interpreted with regard to their contribution in the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism: both Fichte and McDowell claim that philosophical positions and logical terms stand in a dualistic relationship to one another, on the one hand, but are separated by a gulf, on the other. I will argue that for McDowell dialectic seems to be an alternative to one-sided reductionisms as well as to normal anti-reductionistic holism. Furthermore, for Fichte dialectic is an adequate method for describing the relationship of reductionism and anti-reductionism itself. Both see in dialectic a technique for bridging the gulf between binary opposite terms of logic as well as mutually exclusive positions, such as mind and world, subject and object, or idealism and realism.
PL
We współczesnej filozofii „dialektyka” cieszy się rosnącym zainteresowaniem. Artykuł ten analizuje metody dialektyczne i rozważa je w odniesieniu do dwóch paradygmatycznych tekstów z obszarów idealizmu niemieckiego i filozofii analitycznej, tj. Teorii wiedzy J.G. Fichtego (1804) oraz Umysłu i świata J. McDowella. Przedstawione w nich ujęcia dialektyczne zostaną zinterpretowane w kontekście ich wkładu do debaty na temat redukcjonizmu i antyredukcjonizmu. Zarówno Fichte, jak i McDowell uważają, że stanowiska filozoficzne oraz terminy logiczne: z jednej strony są ze sobą powiązane, z drugiej zaś – oddzielone są od siebie przepaścią. Pokażę, że dla McDowella dialektyka wydaje się alternatywą zarówno dla jednostronnego redukcjonizmu, jak i dla normalnego antyredukcjonistycznego holizmu. Ponadto zaś – że dla Fichtego dialektyka jest adekwatną metodą opisywania relacji między redukcjonizmem i antyredukcjonizmem. Obaj myśliciele widzą w dialektyce technikę budowania mostu nad przepaścią rozciągającą się pomiędzy binarnie przeciwnymi terminami logicznymi, a także pomiędzy tym, co zdaje się wzajemnie wykluczać, jak umysł i świat, podmiot i przedmiot czy idealizm i realizm.
first rewind previous Page / 3 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.