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PL
Badanie przeprowadzono na danych panelowych dla 22 krajów europejskich w latach 2006–2012. W szacowanym modelu uwzględniono trzy pokrewne składniki kapitału społecznego: zaufanie, skłonność do pomocy oraz uczciwość. Zmienną zagregowaną zawierającą te trzy składniki nazywano kapitałem współpracy. Wyniki wskazują, że w badanych krajach około 1/6 wzrostu gospodarczego może być przypisana przyrostom kapitału współpracy. Ponad 80% tego efektu występuje jednak z opóźnieniami od jednego roku do trzech lat. Trzyskładnikowy kapitał współpracy znacznie lepiej wyjaśnia wzrost gospodarczy niż tradycyjny, jednoelementowy wskaźnik zaufania. Z oszacowanego modelu wynika, że dla wzrostu gospodarczego największe znaczenie ma przyrost gotowości do pomocy. Wskazuje to na kluczowe znaczenie pomocy i współpracy w stymulowaniu działalności gospodarczej.
EN
The article an attempt to assess the impact of three components of social capital: trust, helpfulness, and fairness on economic growth in Europe. The first part of the paper discusses the concepts of social capital and the related concept of trust. The second part gives an overview of the selected research hitherto conducted on the subject. The next parts present the econometric model employed by the authors in order to estimate the impact of the cooperation capital and its three components on economic growth (based on a modified and augmented Cobb-Douglas function). The empirical analysis was made on a sample including panel data for 22 European countries in the period 2006–2012. The tested model includes three interrelated components of social capital: trust, helpfulness, and fairness, which can be combined into an aggregated variable called, ‘cooperation capital’. The results suggest that ca. 1/6 of the economic growth (measured by the GDP growth rate) may be ascribed to the effect of the increase in cooperation capital, but 80% of this effect occurs with 1–3 years lag. The three-component cooperation capital better explains economic growth than the traditional, one-component trust indicator. The estimated model suggests that most important for economic growth is the increase in the helpfulness. This indicates the key importance of helpfulness and cooperation in boosting economic activity.
RU
Исследование проведено на базе панельных данных 22-х европейских стран за 2006– 2012 гг. При построении модели были приняты во внимание три близкие составные части общественного капитала: доверие, желание оказывать помощь и честность. Агре- гированная переменная, содержащая эти три элемента, была названа капиталом сотруд- ничества. Результаты указывают, что в исследованных странах около 1/6 экономического роста было получено благодаря приросту капитала сотрудничества. Однако более чем 80% этого эффекта проявляется с опозданием от одного года до трех лет. Капитал сотрудничества, учитывающий три составляющих, значительно лучше объ- ясняет экономический рост, чем традиционный показатель доверия, состоящий из одно- го элемента. Из модели вытекает, что для экономического роста самое большое значение имеет прирост готовности оказывать помощь. Это указывает на ключевое значение по- мощи и сотрудничества для стимулирования экономической деятельности.
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State Capitalism in Poland

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EN
Theoretical background: The article is devoted to the knowledge gap in understanding processes of growing state interventionism in a number of post-communist countries, Poland being one of the most notable examples. This evolution is still understudied in the literature, both in terms of evidence and proper theoretical framework. Existing theoretical perspectives have been created for studying other types of economies an do not fully fit the transition ones. Among these perspectives, the state capitalism (SC) one seems to be the most promising.Purpose of the article: The task of this paper is to study the growing state interventionism in Poland using the state capitalism approach which had to be refined by the authors in order to be more applicable for analyzing transition economies. Using this framework, the history of SC formation and its present state in Poland are studied, including specific features of Polish state capitalism, e.g. the importance of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector as the source of rents, as well as the varieties of the state control over the enterprise sector.Research methods: The article makes use of mostly qualitative methods, quantitative ones playing an auxiliary role by systematizing evidence used in qualitative research. The study was based on analysis of the existing literature and evidence of interventionist practices of the Polish government. The authors attempted to fine-tune the SC approach both through refining its definition and including areas previously mostly neglected by SC studies such as relationships between the state and the enterprise sector. They created a typology of SC phenomena in transition economies which made it possible to study the Polish case in a comprehensive way.Main findings: At this stage, the authors think that no strict definition of state capitalism is possible because of its highly contextual character. Thus, the outcome of the study may not be universal, but the authors believe that their concept of six basic features of state capitalism may be applicable not only to Poland, but to other transition economies as well. Besides, the article raises awareness of the importance of state-controlled enterprises in studies on state capitalism. The article also identifies challenges for further research and the still existing knowledge gaps. Among others, the questions remain, whether the statist trends in Poland and other countries lead to a system change and what are the roots of these trends.
EN
The paper deals with entry barriers induced by public aid and actual monopoly in a given market segment. The EU law on competition constitutes the subject, being seen, however, from economic perspective, which is the method of law and economics. The focus are universal services which seem to be extremely vulnerable to the monopolization of public procurement and to unfair state aid, and to rent seeking as well. The overview of legal foundations reveals the EU regulations are too soft to bring a solution to these problems. Additionally, the soft stance of EU institutions by no means makes the situation sounder. As far as universal services are concerned, the member states are free to choose agents, with constraints imposed by the EU being of definitely general nature and the rationale for this saying that these services need to be delivered even on non-profit basis if necessary. Here, we see the EU aiming at two trade-offs that is liberalization on the one hand and mission of the efficiently performed universal service on the other hand. On the EU level common rules of providing universal services are made which are to be implemented on the national level. According to the European Commission, such “division of labour” allows an action which is suitable to peculiarities of every member state. In practice, such elasticity provokes national public bodies to moral hazard. This constitutes an actual challenge for common policies in the sake of gradual and controlled liberalization. There is a prolonged conflict between member states and the EU institutions concerning the issue in which direction rules in this field should be developed. The market segment under scrutiny, precisely market for universal services, reveals how controversial role in single-European-market building may be played by big companies. Most member states are prone to prefer agents vested in their countries. This peculiar alliance is supported with administrative devices that make the preferred group relatively narrow. Thus the state conserves actual monopoly and encourages rent seeking, and demonstrates its own weakness in promoting competitive order. Under such circumstances, by contrast to the EU endeavors to promote and to control economic liberalization in the member states, both the payer (public institution) and the provider (economic agent) may present an open aversion to competition. Obviously, this status quo is in contradiction to a general trend in the EU to guarantee equal access to public procurement, also in transnational dimension. Other conflicts arise on the ground that countries differ concerning a bare need for liberalization of universal services or with respect to advancement of the reforms. In some countries liberalization is advanced which means relatively open and equal access to public procurement, including foreign agents. Other countries discriminate agents, both foreign and non-privileged home operators.
PL
Powszechnie uważa się, że interwencjonizm rolny jest wypłacaniem rent politycznych na rzecz rolników. Autorzy próbują pokazać, że koncepcja renty politycznej znana z teorii rent-seeking nie jest adekwatna do oceny polityki rolnej. Kwalifikacja całości subsydiów dla rolnictwa jako rent politycznych jest nieuzasadniona, ponieważ część z nich stanowi płatność za dobra publiczne lub kompensację niedoskonałości rynku. Autorzy proponują metodologię pomiaru tych wielkości, wypełniając lukę w literaturze ekonomii politycznej. Następnie przeprowadzono komparatywną analizę alokacji „czystych” rent politycznych we wspólnej polityce rolnej, wykorzystując macierze input-output dla gospodarstw reprezentatywnych według EUFADN oraz indeksy produktywności całkowitej Hicks-Moorsteena w układzie wszystkich krajów UE–27 w latach 2005–2012. Sformułowano hipotezę badawczą, że renty zrealizowane w rolnictwie UE są funkcją cyklu politycznego, jak również niedoskonałości rynku. Oszacowana „czysta renta polityczna” dla UE–27 ogółem jest o ponad 40% niższa niż wsparcie według powszechnie stosowanego wskaźnika PSE.
EN
It is generally believed that the agricultural interventionism represents the payment of political rents to farmers. Authors attempt to show that the concept of political rent known as the rent-seeking theory is not valid for agricultural policy. Identification of the whole of the subsidies paid to agriculture as a “political rent”, is unjustified since political rents cannot be taken to include payments for the supply of public goods or those transfers which compensate for market imperfections. A novel methodology is proposed for valuing these items filling the gap in the literature of political economy. Author perform comparative analyses, with the aim of calculating the “pure political rent”, based on input-output matrices for representative farms according to EUFADN typology and on a decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index for the period 2005–2012 and all EU–27 countries. The research hypothesis is proposed that the size of subsidies retained in agriculture is a function of political cycle, but also of market imperfections. Calculated “pure political rent” for EU–27 agriculture is about 40% lower that the estimation of producer support according to the commonly used PSE indicator.
RU
Существует общее мнение, что аграрный интервенционизм – это рента, которую крестья- не получают от политиков. Авторы пытаются показать, что концепция политической рен- ты, известная в теории rent-seeking, не является адекватной для оценки всей аграрной по- литики. Квалификация всех субсидий для сельского хозяйства как политической ренты не является оправданной, так как часть из них представляет собой плату за публичные блага или компенсацию за несовершенство рынка. Авторы предлагают методологию замера этих величин, заполняя брешь в литературе. Ими был проведен компаративный анализ размещения „чистых” политических рент в совместной сельскохозяйственной политике ЕС. Для этого были использованы матрицы input-output для репрезентативных хозяйств согласно EUFADN, а также индексы полной продуктивности Хикс-Мурстина для всех стран ЕС–27 за 2005–2012 гг. Была сформулирована гипотеза, что ренты, реализованные в сельском хозяйстве ЕС, являются функцией политического цикла, а также несовершен- ства рынка. Оценочная „чистая” политическая рента для ЕС–27 в целом более чем на 40% ниже, чем помощь, рассчитанная по повсеместно применяемому показателю PSE.
PL
Na wstępie artykułu wykazano, że liberalizacyjna misja Unii Europejskiej jest złożona. Jednym z problemów zastanych jest przyzwolenie przez państwa członkowskie na koncentrację siły ekonomicznej lub wręcz ochrona grup dominujących w gospodarce. W części drugiej nawiązano do opinii Waltera Euckena, zgodnie z którą ta skłonność państwa kapitalistycznego stanowiła fundamentalny problem budowy ustroju opartego na konkurencji, który jednak mogło rozwiązać tylko państwo. Owo zapętlenie nazywano euckenowskim dylematem i postawiono pytanie, czy nadzór ponadnarodowych organów Unii Europejskiej współcześnie tworzy szanse na rozbijanie układu między państwem narodowym a rodzimymi monopolami. Część trzecią oparto na praktycznych doświadczeniach krajów członkowskich Unii Europejskiej i dotyczy ona sfery usług użyteczności publicznej, której specyfika sprzyja tego typu związkom między państwem a biznesem, odnosząc się do zasad unijnych. Ów przegląd zakończono wnioskiem, że Unia, występująca w roli orędownika wspólnego jednolitego rynku, nie wydaje się gotowa na konfrontację z wielkimi firmami z sektorów sieciowych ani wspierającymi „swoje” firmy państwami. Tak długo, jak będzie na to za słaba lub nie dość zdeterminowana, głoszona przez nią zasada konkurencji w sensie euckenowskim będzie w dalszym ciągu należeć do przyszłości.
EN
The paper begins with a discussion of the complexity of EU's liberalisation mission. Among the problems faced is the fact that member-states have long tolerated the concentration of economic power, or even protected the interests of the dominant economic entities. In the second section, the author refers to Walter Eucken's observation that this feature of the capitalist state constituted a major barrier to a competitive market, which could be eradicated exclusively by the state itself. This trade off has been referred to as Eucken's dilemma. The central question is whether the supervision of supra-national institutions of the EU is capable of severing the ties between the national state and the domestic monopolies. Section three examines the evidence from the field of services of general economic interest, where these ties are extremely strong. The review concludes that, in spite of its programme for the promotion of a common unified market, the European Union is not in a position to confront large businesses from the network industries, or the states which provide support for them. As long as the EU is too weak or too hesitant, the idea of the competitive order, the Eucken' s heritage, is unlikely to become a reality.
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