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Untangling the Knot of Intentionality: Between Directedness, Reference, and Content

100%
Steiner P.
Studia Semiotyczne
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2019
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vol. 33
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issue 1
PL
The notion of “intentionality” is much invoked in various foundational theories of meaning, being very often equated with “meaning”, “content” and “reference”. In this paper, I propose and develop a basic distinction between two concepts and, more fundamentally, properties of intentionality: intentionality-T (the fact that a state is directed to some object) and intentionality-C (the fact that a state is contentful). Representationalism is then defined as the position according to which intentionality-T can be reduced to intentionality-C, in the form of representational (i.e. contentful) states. Nonrepresentationalism is rejecting this reduction, and argues that intentionality-T is more fundamental than intentionality-C. Non-representationalism allows for a new layered view of the relations between cognitive intentionality and linguistic intentionality; this view is presented at the end of the paper.
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Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

100%
Gładziejewski P.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 40
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issue 1
63-90
EN
Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.
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Mají zvířata vědomí?

100%
Hříbek T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2016
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vol. 64
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issue 1
3-22
EN
The study analyses the arguments of contemporary philosophers of mind concerning the subject of animal consciousness. The first part reminds the reader of the Cartesian starting point of the contemporary discussion and points to the concept of phenomenal consciousness as the main point of contention concerning the instantiation of consciousness in non-human animals. The second part of the study analyses various forms of representationalism which make up the mainstream of contemporary debate. In the third part the philosophy of mind of Daniel Dennett is discussed, together with its implications for the question of animal consciousness. In contrast with critics who treat Dennett’s theory as the result of conceptual confusions, the author argues that we should look upon the theory as the rejection of the assumptions of the mainstream and an attempt to think anew the question of consciousness, including animal consciousness.
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Karteziánský reprezentacionalismus, nebo kognitivní realismus?

100%
Heider D.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 1
101-123
EN
This review study looks at David Clemenson’s book Descartes’ Theory of Ideas from both the historical and systematic points of view. From the historical point of view, the theme of the (late) scholastic influences on Descartes’ theory of ideas is tackled, while from the systematic point of view Descartes’ theory is interpreted dealing with the question of Cartesian representationalism or direct (cognitive) realism. An analysis of the immediate Scholastic texts, written by Jesuits (and taught at the Jesuit college La Flèche, where the young Descartes studied) is used by Clemenson to support his argument for a so-called weak version of direct realism, actually identical with a weak version of representationalism. The author of this review study, despite appreciating the connection of these two levels, making possible a consistent interpretation of some of Descartes’ ostensibly contradictory statements, draws attention to certain deficiencies and obscurities concerning, primarily, the scholastic dimension of the subject-matter.
5
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Thomasa Reida interpretacja „teorii idei”. Pytanie o bezpośredni przedmiot poznania

84%
Kucharski D.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2022
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vol. 58
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issue 2
53-74
EN
Thomas Reid, founder of the Scottish school of common sense, held the thesis that all previous philosophical systems were tainted by the same “original sin” – the adoption (in various forms) of a representationalist theory of sense perception. He called it the “theory of ideas,” the consequence of which was to separate the subject and object of perception by an irremovable “veil of ideas.” Before formulating his own account Reid considered this issue from a historical perspective, attempting to demonstrate the validity of his position. The purpose of this article is to answer the question of the relevance of Reid’s views to the theory that perception is direct or immediate. It is primarily concerned with the view characteristic of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, traditionally interpreted as presentationalism, and Descartes’ views on the status of “ideas” in the process of knowing the so-called external world. At the same time, the analysis carried out points to simplifications in the Reidian interpretation of his predecessors’ views on the nature of perception and to features of the theories criticized that justify it to some extent.
PL
Thomas Reid, twórca szkockiej szkoły zdrowego rozsądku, głosił tezę, że wszystkie wcześniejsze systemy filozoficzne obciążone są tym samym „grzechem pierworodnym” – przyjęciem (w różnych formach) reprezentacjonistycznej teorii spostrzeżenia zmysłowego. Nazywał ją „teorią idei”, której konsekwencją miało być oddzielenie podmiotu i przedmiotu poznania nieusuwalną „zasłoną idei”. Konstruowanie własnej filozofii poprzedził analizą historii tego zagadnienia od starożytności do czasów sobie współczesnych, usiłując wykazać zasadność swego stanowiska. Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie o trafność poglądów Reida, wyrażonych w przyjmowanej teorii spostrzeżenia. Chodzi więc przede wszystkim o pogląd charakterystyczny dla tradycji arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej, tradycyjnie interpretowany jako prezentacjonizm, oraz poglądy Kartezjusza dotyczące statusu „idei” w procesie poznawania tzw. świata zewnętrznego. Przeprowadzone analizy wskazują jednocześnie na uproszczenia w Reidowskiej interpretacji poglądów jego poprzedników na naturę spostrzeżenia oraz na cechy krytykowanych teorii, które w pewnym stopniu usprawiedliwiają tę krytykę.
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Luka eksplanacyjna a pojęcia własności fenomenalnych stanowisko Josepha Levine’a

84%
Schetz A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2012
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issue nr 17
125-148
EN
The explanatory gap problem arises in the context of the mind-body relation, and especially the phenomenal concepts-physical concepts relation. It is posed as a question about the method which is appropriate for the reduction of consciousness to physical or neural states of the brain. Therefore it concerns – as the paper suggests – theoretical incapability of naturalistic attempts to explain what phenomenal concepts are about in terms of what physical or natural concepts are about. The paper discusses the argument of Joseph Levine, one of the best-known critics of the reductive attempts to close the explanatory gap. The bottom line of the argument is that since phenomenal concepts are theoretically thick, and physical concepts are theoretically thin, there is no way to reduce the former to the latter.
7
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Epistemologiczny antropocentryzm Locke’a

59%
Misztal D.
Diametros
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2013
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issue 37
107-126
PL
Odczytywanie filozoficznego przedsięwzięcia Locke’a przede wszystkim jako krytyki kartezjańskiego natywizmu przysłania zwykle napięcia, jakimi obciążona jest myśl Anglika oraz skutkuje przemilczeniem sporej części stojących za nią motywów. Choć nie zamierzam w prezentowanym tekście całkowicie zerwać z tą popularną wykładnią, chciałbym zaproponować ujęcie wolne od właściwych jej uproszczeń. Dzięki temu możliwe będzie ukazanie złożoności stosunku filozofii Locke’a do podstawowych idei natywizmu, wydobycie sprzecznych interesów, które Locke chciałby dzięki swojej refleksji pogodzić, oraz zasygnalizowanie w zakończeniu znaczenia wypracowanych przez niego rozwiązań dla późniejszych form antropologicznego dyskursu.
EN
Reading Locke’s philosophy mainly as criticism of the Cartesian innatism results in disguising its tensions and motives. Although the article is not completely free of this popular strategy of interpretation, it aims at avoiding its simplifications. This allows to show the complexity of the relation of Locke’s philosophy to the fundamental ideas of innatism and to bring out contradictory interests he hopes to reconcile.
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