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EN
The study analyses some aspects of the dynamic development of the end of the First World War, which led to the declaration of an independent Czechoslovakia. In particular, it concentrates on the planting of the republican character of this state as not a matter-of-course, only a gradually adopted part of the political plan and the programme of foreign resistance, headed by the later president T. G. Masaryk. In connection with the controversy over the character of the future state during the world war the text also contemplates the earlier considerations of the Czech political thought of the 19th century on the issue of the republic and the republican form of government.
EN
The name the Irish Republican Army (IRA) first appeared in the news on August the 30th, 1919. This is when the sworn armed groups fighting in the Irish War of Independence 1919-1921, first, with the British police forces, and then with the regular army, were given that name. The organisation of the IRA of that time can be described, as seen from the perspective of the experiences of the 20th century, as an armed partisan structure, and oriented towards the national independence aspect, practically the first such organization in 20th century Europe. However, a considerable number of British, but also Irish, academics, journalists, and especially politicians, considered the IRA as a terrorist organisation. This statement, however, practically ends any discussion. It means disregarding the individual motivations of the armed Republicans, but, especially, ignoring the political-legal context of the acts of violence. Indeed, it is very difficult to distinguish terror, based on the ideological and political criteria, from the struggle for national liberation par excellence. This distinction has no chance of receiving a fully objective interpretation, especially by the politicians. However, the supporters, and/or performers of these actions, always use the ideological arguments, overusing them intentionally. The substantive coverage of the considerations presented here is characterized by two deliberately selected approaches, namely the chronological and the factual ones. Thus the last one hundred years’ epoch remains a background for the proposed narration regarding the facts and events which remain the objects for reflections put forward in the article. The narration focuses on research issues which refer to the analysis of, successively: 1/ interdependencies of Nationalism and Republicanism in the Irish tradition, 2/ the violence perceived as partisan or terrorist activeness in historical, contemporary, and spatial contexts, 3/ the Irish nation’s alterations in chronological perspective, 4/ the author’s typology of premises for military resistance and its exemplification.
EN
This article puts forward a proposal for the broadening of the research agenda on corruption through a twofold change in perspectives, namely concentrating on the “corruption talk” in place of essentialist views, and addressing anti-corruption in place of corruption. An evaluation is undertaken of the role of anti-corruption discourse in times of political change on the basis of the Dutch Republic in the midseventeenth century. Analyzing the exemplary speech by Adriaen Veth against corruption, given to the Great Assembly in 1651, and the role of the figure of Cornelis Musch, this article depicts the anti-corruption discourse as an important tool of argumentation for the newly established regime to gain legitimacy with regards to both its theoretical foundation and for the process of coming to terms with the previous regime.
EN
The age of intellectual debates in France between the Revolution in 1789 and the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the centuries is one of the key sources that enable the understanding of the modern political culture. It concerns, in particular, the modern concept of liberty that became one of the defining values shaping the European political discourse. Thus, the post-revolutionary France remains an extremely valuable source of inspiration when revisiting the essence of many contemporary debates in political philosophy and public discourse. Most of the ideas and arguments in circulation today echo the debates over the liberty, reason, and society that dominated the intellectual climate of that period in the French political history or, at least, heavily depend on the foundational ideas formulated then and there. Thus, they are worth reconsidering.
EN
Referring to the Proteus myth, the author analyses the causes of changes taking place in the image and reception of political ideas and doctrines. He points to the current Polish ideological dis­pute between the advocates of liberal democracy and concepts of republicanism. Another question concerns the problem of interpretation and its various levels, where metamorphosis usually occurs. Finally, the author points to the problem of choosing tradition as a factor supporting the transform­ation of ideas and their impact on the current political set-up in Poland.
EN
Berlin’s dichotomy of positive and negative freedom is, in academic quarters, such a well-discussed problem that any kind of attempt at a fresh interpretation confronts the real risk of developing what has already been said and, in that way, of losing argumentational strength. The aim of this article does not, however, consist in contributing to the debate about the viability of Berlin’s distinction, but in calling into question the stereotypical reception of the intellectual sources that Berlin was inspired by. In the framework of the line of traditions of liberal thinking, which, among others, Berlin himself identifies, is his distinction between two concepts of freedom, usually identified with the principles and intellectual meaning of the classification by the French enlightenment thinker Benjamin Constant. The mixing up of Berlin’s polarity positive–negative with Constant’s scheme of ancient–modern is probably a consequence of the numerous common points in the two conceptions. These, however, lead to the automatic perception of agreement even in those principles for which the level of coherence is questionable. The main aim of this study is, therefore, to indicate, firstly, the proven fact that for a consistent comparison of Berlin’s and Constant’s dichotomy one must examine, in addition to the commonly analysed relationship of negative freedom with modern freedom, the connectedness of the opposite poles in the two cases. Secondly, and more importantly, the thesis is advanced that, in its fundamental properties, Constant’s thinking goes beyond the liberal tradition and points towards Pettit’s republican principles of freedom as non-dominance. This conclusion ultimately leads to the recognition that Berlin’s and Constant’s division cannot be seen as homogenous.
EN
Modern reading of political thought of the American Revolution is very diverse. The aim of the article is twofold. Firstly, it is to present interpretations which form the canon of modern political thought. Secondly, I intend to confront these perspectives. The authors who represent the republican view (B. Bailyn, G.S. Wood, J.G.A. Pocock) aim to present pre‑revolutionary era as a time deeply rooted in classic republican pattern. An ideological end of republican vision fall during the boost of commercial relations, which in the meantime had changed the hierarchy of values. The liberal myth, which had one of its most important propagators in Louis Hartz, has aimed to prove the strength and continuity, which was called “possessive individualism”. The paper attempts to disprove the idea of domination of liberal values during the beginnings of the United States.
PL
This article is an attempt at comparative analysis of works of two representatives of the republican tradition, that is Immanuel Kant and Andrzej FryczModrzewski. This analysis is based on the following works: Perpetual peace, Doctrine of Right and On the Reform of the Republic. I will compare how both of the authors understand the notion of the republic and other notions such as law, freedom and general will. At the end of this paper I will show how the two republican traditions influenced today’s political reality.
EN
The paper discusses some fundamental differences between Aristotelian and modern conceptions of the state. It focuses its attention on the early liberal thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and contrasts the theory of state developed by them with the classical republican ideal described by Aristotle. As I will demonstrate main differences come down to (1) distinct ideas concerning the state’s origins (and especially human motivations behind establishing the state), (2) divergent convictions about the role of the state and its ethical dimension; and finally (3) different beliefs concerning basic feelings and passions which sustain existence of political community. I argue that on the basis of Stagirite’s philosophy it is possible to question whether civic association described by the precursors of liberal political thought is actually the state. In conclusion, I signalize the problem of serious limitations of contemporary liberal democracies (or even their internal contradictions) resulting from their attempt to follow an ideal of an ideologically neutral state.
Zapiski Historyczne
|
2023
|
vol. 88
|
issue 3
59-86
EN
In 1605, Sebastian Petrycy of Pilzno published a translation of Aristotle’s Politics into Polish, accompanied by his own original commentary. In this work, Petrycy presented an image of an idealized state that served as a model to address the issues within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The article deals with the political thought of Sebastian Petrycy, whom older historiography regarded as a monarchist or even a supporter of absolutism. Contrary to this categorisation, the article analyses the philosopher’s oeuvre through the lens of early modern republican theory. Central to the analysis are the fundamental elements of early modern republicanism such as virtue, freedom, law, and a mixed system. Petrycy critiques the implementation of these principles within the noblemen’s republicanism and proposes modifications to move towards what is defined for the purposes of this article as ‘burghers’ republicanism’. Utilizing Quentin Skinner’s methodology, Petrycy’s work has been set against the political crisis of Zebrzydowski’s rebellion, and its political significance has been demonstrated, despite its academic nature. Additionally, an attempt has been made to highlight Petrycy’s commitment to the royal camp, alongside the hypothesis that the author was expressing the intentions of senators-regalists while simultaneously seeking to improve the situation of non-noble citizens in the country.
Praktyka Teoretyczna
|
2017
|
vol. 24
|
issue 2
167-178
EN
A review of Guy Standing's book "Basic Income: And How Can We Make It Happen". Author reconstructs two general lines of Standing's argumentation for introducing basic income: the analysis of the "corruption of capitalism" in the context of the eponymical publication from year 2016 on the one hand, and the presentation of UBI as a universal law providing the freedom from domination.
PL
Tekst jest recenzją książki Guya Standinga, stanowiącej przystępne i kompleksowe wprowadzenie do problematyki bezwarunkowego dochodu podstawowego (BDP). Autor przygląda się, w kontekście niedawnych publikacji Standinga, dwóm najważniejszym liniom argumentacyjnym za wprowadzeniem BDP: z jednej strony analizy „korupcji” współczesnego kapitalizmu, a z drugiej - przedstawienia BDP jako obywatelskiego prawa do bycia wolnym od dominacji.
EN
According to Philip Pettit „a republican state promoting freedom as non-domination must promote socioeconomic independence”. The article is an attempt to answer the question if introducing unconditional basic income should be perceived as a policy promoting freedom as non-domination. The author argues that one can justify it by means of two arguments, proposed by Philip Pettit: the first argument allows the state to secure people who are economically and socially dependent from forms of domination they would have to endure otherwise; the second one allows for a more undominated choice on the part of people who are economically and socially dominated. Republican justification differs significantly from arguments in favour of unconditional basic income formulated by Philippe Van Parijs on the grounds of so-called „real libertarianism”. The author argues that by treating unconditional basic income as promotion of non-domination, instead of providing individuals with means to pursue their conceptions of good life, we do not have to finance it only with incomes independent from individual talents and limit its introduction to affluent countries.
PL
Według Philipa Pettita „republikańskie państwo promujące wolność jako nie-dominację musi działać na rzecz niezależności socjoekonomicznej”. W artykule rozważono pytanie, czy wprowadzenie powszechnego dochodu podstawowego jest działaniem promującym wolność jako nie-dominację. Autor dowodzi, że to rozwiązanie może być umotywowane dwoma argumentami, zaproponowanymi przez Pettita jako republikańskie uzasadnienie zabezpieczenia przez państwo niezależności socjoekonomicznej: 1) pozwala państwu zabezpieczyć osoby zależne ekonomicznie i społecznie przed formami dominacji, którym byłyby poddane, gdyby nie wprowadzono gwarancji dochodu podstawowego i 2) zwiększa możliwość podejmowania nieskrępowanych, wolnych wyborów przez osoby zależne ekonomicznie i społecznie. Republikańskie uzasadnienie różni się znacząco od argumentów na rzecz powszechnego dochodu podstawowego, sformułowanych przez Philippe’a Van Parijsa na gruncie tak zwanego „rzeczywistego libertarianizmu”. Autor artykułu dowodzi, że uznając bezwarunkowy dochód podstawowy za zwiększenie nie-dominacji, a nie za zapewnienie jednostkom środków do realizacji swoich koncepcji dobrego życia, nie musimy finansować go jedynie z zysków powstających niezależnie od jednostkowych talentów i ograniczać jego wprowadzenia jedynie do krajów zamożnych.
PL
Mimo tendencji do prezentowania koncepcji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w ramach spójnej narracji opartej na założonych podobieństwach, można odnotować kilka radykalnych zmian jego znaczenia, dokonanych przez łatwo identyfikowalnych autorów. Wspólna dla całej Europy tradycja, która od czasów klasycznych rozumiała cycerońskie societas civilis jako rodzaj politycznej wspólnoty, została zmieniona przez Hegla na początku XIX w. Adaptowana zarówno przez liberalną myśl Tocqueville’a jak i socjalistyczną krytykę Marksa, koncepcja „społeczeństwa cywilnego” rozumiana była w ramach refleksji nowoczesnej jako sfera cywilnej ekonomii w opozycji do świata polityki, czyli społeczeństwa politycznego. Komunistyczni intelektualiści w Polsce dokonali znaczącej zmiany tej koncepcji, zastępując ją po II wojnie światowej terminem „społeczeństwo obywatelskie”, w celu zmylenia czytelników polskich tłumaczeń Marksa i Engelsa. W takiej formie koncepcja ta została połączona pod koniec lat siedemdziesiątych z fenomenem polskiej opozycji antykomunistycznej – przez Smolara, który przebywał wówczas na emigracji we Francji. Na początku lat osiemdziesiątych inny emigrant z bloku wschodniego, Arato użył koncepcji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego do opisu zjawiska trzeciego sektora. Ta forma, pochodząca z francuskiego dyskursu politycznego, może być uznana za rzeczywisty początek ponowoczesnego dyskursu o społeczeństwie obywatelskim, dyskursu zmonopolizowanego w latach dziewięćdziesiątych przez organizacje pozarządowe na skalę globalną.
EN
Although there is a strong tendency towards interpreting a history of a “civil society” idea as a coherent narration founded on the presupposed similarities, there can be noticed few radical changes applied in the past to the concept by easy to identify authors. Common to whole Europe republican tradition that since the classical times drew on the idea of civil society as a political community was replaced in German milieu by Hegel at the beginning of nineteenth century. Employed both by a liberal appraisal of Tocqueville and a socialist critique of Marx the idea was understood in a modern reflection as a sphere of civilian economy in opposition to a world of politics, i.e. political society. However communist thinkers in Poland made a significant change to the idea replacing it after Second World War with a term “civic society” in aim to confuse readers of polish translations of Marx and Engels. In such a form idea was connected at the end of 1970s to a phenomenon of prodemocratic opposition in Poland by Smolar who was staying then as an exile in France. At the beginning of 1980s, another exile from Soviet block Arato picked up idea of civil society, applying it to a “third sector” issue, which was burgeoning since middle of 1970s in France. This manifestation stemming from a French political discourse may be assumed as a true beginning of a postmodern discourse on the civil society that was monopolized in 1990s by the NGOs on a global scale.
Facta Simonidis
|
2008
|
vol. 1
|
issue 1
121-139
EN
The paper is concerned with the problems of international aspects in the Irish republican political thought. The author presented the international allies and enemies of Irish Republican Movement. The article is divided in four parts devoted to particular issues. In the fi rst part basic concepts and conditioning of the problem were discussed. In the second part of the text, the author concentrated on analysis of Irish relations with Great Britain, regarded by the Irish republicans as the strategic enemy of independent Ireland. The third part of the paper was devoted for discussing over the question of the Irish allies on the international arena, however in the fourth – a fi nal part – recapitulation of made findings were outlined. It is worthwhile emphasizing that the author of the article in the course of research proceedings reached a conclusion, that Irish republican conceptions of foreign policy were based mainly on the one fundamental assumption, that is: providing with the perpetual neutrality and the full sovereignty of the independent Irish state from entire territory of the island.
PL
Prezentowany artykuł dotyczy kwestii międzynarodowego aspektu myśli politycznej irlandzkiego ruchu republikańskiego. Autor zanalizował zagadnienie republikańskiego sposobu identyfikacji sojuszników i wrogów Irlandii na arenie międzynarodowej. Artykuł podzielony jest na cztery części poświęcone poszczególnej problematyce. W pierwszej części omówiono podstawowe pojęcia i uwarunkowania problemu. W drugiej części tekstu skupiono się na analizie irlandzkich relacji z Wielką Brytanią, uznawaną w obrębie ruchu za strategicznego wroga niepodległościowych dążności Irlandczyków. Trzecią część publikacji poświęcono na omówienie sojuszników „sprawy irlandzkiej” na arenie międzynarodowej, natomiast w czwartej – ostatniej – dokonano rekapitulacji poczynionych ustaleń. Warto zaznaczyć, iż autor artykułu w toku postępowania badawczego doszedł do wniosku, że republikańskie koncepcje polityki zagranicznej oparte głównie były na jednym podstawowym założeniu, a mianowicie: zapewnieniu wieczystej neutralności i pełnej suwerenności niepodległego państwa irlandzkiego składającego się z całego terytorium wyspy.
EN
The main subject of the article is the ideology of the European universalism, which is interpreted by the author as the ideology of democracy and human rights. In the first part of the paper the inner function of this ideology is interpreted. This function consists on the legitimisation of western socio-political system. According to the author this ideology directly legitimizes western socio-political system, and only indirectly capitalism as an economical system which coexists with the democratic state. In the second part of the paper the external function of the European universalism – that is the legitimization of the western imperialism. The author of the article differentiates the inner form of the ideology (that is the ideas embedded in the consciousness/subconsciousness of people), the political doctrine of the ideology (that is what is spoken by the politicians) and its academic discourse.
17
63%
PL
Art. 1 Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 r. deklaruje, że Rzeczpospolita Polska stanowi dobro wspólne wszystkich obywateli. Pojęcie dobra wspólnego sięga swoimi korzeniami idei republikańskiej oraz myśli chrześcijańskiej. Co więcej, można wyróżnić dwie różne tradycje myślenia o dobru wspólnym: klasyczną, skupiającą się na dobru wspólnym rozumianym jako warunkach niezbędnych obywatelom do rozwoju oraz etatystyczną, która koncentruje się na interesie państwowym i racji stanu. Te dwie tradycje myślenia o dobru wspólnym mają także swoje normatywne odzwierciedlenie w polskim konstytucjonalizmie. Już w Konstytucji 3 Maja widać pewne nawiązania do klasycznego pojmowania dobra wspólnego. Natomiast tradycja racji stanu wpłynęła przede wszystkim na kształt Konstytucji kwietniowej. Tradycja ta została jednak świadomie porzucona przez ustrojodawcę w Konstytucji z 2 kwietnia 1997 r. na rzecz powrotu do koncepcji klasycznej. Mimo to, konstytucyjna zasada dobra wspólnego nie zawsze jest rozumiana w orzecznictwie w sposób spójny z zamysłem ustrojodawcy. Zrozumienie różnych tradycji ideowych stojących za pojęciem dobra wspólnego wydaje się być istotne dla właściwej praktyki stosowania i stanowienia prawa.
EN
The first article of the Polish Constitution of April 2, 1997, declares that the Republic of Poland is common good to all its citizens. The term - common good is built on two pillars: republicanism and Christian social thought. What is more, two different traditions of thought concerning the common good could be distinguished: the classical one which focuses on the conditions that are necessary for the development of citizens, and the statist one which focuses on the state, its prosperity and the interest of it. Those two traditions have their normative resemblance also in the Polish constitutionalism. Some influence of the first tradition can be noticed in the Constitution of May 3, 1791. The second tradition of the common good is primarily embodied in the April Constitution of Poland, but remains rather abandoned in the current one in favor of the classical view. Nevertheless, the constitutional principle of common good is not always perceived coherently with the will of the constitutional legislator. The understanding of different traditions of thoughts that formulated the category of common weal remains crucial for the practice of law, as well as for the proper legislation.
PL
Artykuł koncentruje się na aktywności publicystycznej polskich środowisk republikańskich w odniesieniu do zagadnień powiązanych z szeroko pojętą obronnością państwa. Analizie poddane zostały artykuły ukazujące się na łamach pism „Rzeczy Wspólne” i „Nowa Konfederacja”. Ich autorzy koncentrowali się na sprawach takich jak powszechny pobór, obrona terytorialna, reformy armii, zewnętrzne zagrożenia dla Polski. W enuncjacjach tych bardzo wyraźny jest wątek służby wspólnocie, co wyrażać się musi także w zapewnieniu jej bezpieczeństwa. Wielu z autorów stanowi zaplecze Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, stąd można domniemywać, że tworzona w tych środowiskach myśl ma wpływ na posunięcia rządu sformowanego przez tę partię, w odniesieniu do spraw obronnych.
EN
The article focuses on the journalistic activity of the Polish republican milieus on the issues related to broadly defined defense of the state. The articles which were analyzed were published in the magazines "Common Things" and "New Confederacy". Their authors focused on the issues such as general conscription, territorial defense, army reform, external threats to Poland. In these enunciations the theme of the service to the community which must also be expressed in the security of a community is very clear. Many of the authors are the backbone of the Law and Justice party, so it can be presumed that the thought created in these environments influences the government's moves in defense matters.
EN
The idea of republicanism derived from antiquity, inter alia, from Aristotle and Cicero, was developed in the modern political philosophy of such great thinkers as Machiavelli and Rousseau, and it proceeds contemporary thanks to, inter alia, Arendt, Skinner and Pettit, but without chances to become a dominant stream; republicanism is sometimes also treated only as a specific adjustment of liberalism. The most significant elements of the Republican tradition are: an aspiration to create a powerful state, emphasis on the importance of common good and the responsibility of citizens for shaping their republic. The implementation of the idea of republicanism provides an opportunity for functioning not merely the procedural democracy but also the substantive one, and in such a way it appreciates civil society. Therefore, the great importance is ascribed to civic education which is mostly focused on a formation of so-called “Republican virtues” such as respect for the law, social commitment, debate skills, courage to proclaim own opinions, honour, diligence and the like. The civic education might best be implemented in an informal way, through participation in the various institutions typical for civil society.
PL
Idea republikanizmu, wywodząca się ze starożytności (m.in. Arystoteles, Cycero), rozwinęła się w nowożytnej filozofii politycznej (m.in. Machiavelli, Rousseau) i jest kontynuowana współcześnie (m.in. Arendt, Skinner, Pettit), nigdy jednak nie stała się dominującym nurtem. Republikanizm bywa również traktowany jedynie jako swoista korekta liberalizmu. Najważniejsze składniki tradycji republikańskiej to dążenie do zbudowania silnego państwa, podkreślanie znaczenia dobra wspólnego oraz odpowiedzialność obywateli za kształt republiki. Realizacja idei republikańskich daje szansę funkcjonowaniu demokracji substancjalnej, a nie tylko proceduralnej, tym samym dowartościowując społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Duże znaczenie ma edukacja obywatelska, głównie nastawiona na kształtowanie tzw. cnót republikańskich, jak m.in. poszanowanie prawa, zaangażowanie społeczne, umiejętność debatowania, odwaga głoszenia opinii, honor, pracowitość itp. Edukacja obywatelska najpełniej może być realizowana w sposób nieformalny, przez uczestnictwo w różnych instytucjach społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.
Diametros
|
2012
|
issue 32
190-214
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest krytyka Arystotelesowskiego republikanizmu, którą przeprowadza Kymlicka, oraz jego alternatywna propozycja tzw. republikanizmu instrumentalnego. Podejmę dyskusję ze stanowiskiem Kymlicki, która skoncentruje się wokół dwóch kwestii. Po pierwsze, czy celem życia ludzkiego jest uczestnictwo w polityce? Po drugie, czy cnoty powinny być traktowane przez państwo jako coś więcej niż środki konieczne do utrzymania i dobrego funkcjonowania jego instytucji, to znaczy jako konieczny (autoteliczny) element dobrego życia, który winien stać się przedmiotem zabiegów państwa?
EN
In considering Will Kymlicka’s critique of Aristotelian republicanism and his own version of instrumental republicanism, I pay special attention to two questions that divide the liberal and republican perspectives. First of all, should we take political participation as an essential form of human life? Secondly, can we admit that virtues should be treated by the state as autotelic elements of the good life? I reach the following conclusions: First, accepting a broad understanding of the political, we need to recognize the necessity of political engagement. Paradoxically, both liberals and republicans agree on this matter. The differences between them are to a large extent a result of different definitions of the terms political, social and private. Secondly, the state’s treating some virtues as intrinsic goods may be desirable and does not have to be in conflict with liberal justice.
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