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1

Filozoficzna analiza doświadczenia woli i jej słabości.

100%

Wiśniewski R.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

|

2013

|

vol. 10

7-21

EN

The starting point of the analysis of the will and its weaknesses is the experience of the will, which the author brings first to experiencing morning awakening and undertaking daily activities. He does this in order to capture the different forms of manifestation of the will and the ways of its operation, especially weakening. Such forms are: (1) automated, habitual, enslaved will; (2) weak, sluggish, lazy will, (3) autonomous, bossy will, implementing the provisions in a certain distance from their adoption; (4) strong will, persistently focused on overcoming weaknesses, putting out a challenge to them; (5) willfulness, will undergoing desires unacceptable by reason, the extreme lack of self-control. The author notices that the first and fifth form of the participation of the will in the management of human behavior show certain resemblance because in fact they are weakening as we are giving in to habits and addictions. The second form of the will is discussed in the context of the theory of sloth. The third one is treated as the power responding to tasks and duties assigned by the mind, but also motivated by the awareness of evil hurting the subject as a result of not--undergoing orders of reason. The strong will is associated with the need to protect values as well as with the need to strive after perfection and to overcome barriers. The author is comparing the above interpretations of experiencing the will with the classical and contemporary analysis of it, with the discovery of its relationship to the intellect and with identifying the causes of the inability of implementing its precepts. It results from these analyses that the weakness of the will is an indication of the axiological disintegration of man and that overcoming the axiological chaos is the way to improve the will.

PL

The starting point of the analysis of the will and its weaknesses is the experience of the will, which the author brings first to experiencing morning awakening and undertaking daily activities. He does this in order to capture the different forms of manifestation of the will and the ways of its operation, especially weakening. Such forms are: (1) automated, habitual, enslaved will; (2) weak, sluggish, lazy will, (3) autonomous, bossy will, implementing the provisions in a certain distance from their adoption; (4) strong will, persistently focused on overcoming weaknesses, putting out a challenge to them; (5) willfulness, will undergoing desires unacceptable by reason, the extreme lack of self-control. The author notices that the first and fifth form of the participation of the will in the management of human behavior show certain resemblance because in fact they are weakening as we are giving in to habits and addictions. The second form of the will is discussed in the context of the theory of sloth. The third one is treated as the power responding to tasks and duties assigned by the mind, but also motivated by the awareness of evil hurting the subject as a result of not-undergoing orders of reason. The strong will is associated with the need to protect values as well as with the need to strive after perfection and to overcome barriers. The author is comparing the above interpretations of experiencing the will with the classical and contemporary analysis of it, with the discovery of its relationship to the intellect and with identifying the causes of the inability of implementing its precepts. It results from these analyses that the weakness of the will is an indication of the axiological disintegration of man and that overcoming the axiological chaos is the way to improve the will.

2

Słaba wola – w stronę eksternalizmu motywacyjnego

84%

Milczarek K.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

|

2022

|

issue 73

145-162

PL

Jedną z fundamentalnych kwestii podnoszonych w dyskusji nad problemem słabej woli jest spór o zasadę internalizmu motywacyjnego. Zgodnie z jej treścią osąd sprawcy, że lepiej wykonać pewne działanie, pociąga chęć wykonania tego działania. W artykule omawiam argumenty wysuwane w obronie tej zasady, aby dowieść, że nie dostarczają one wystarczająco dobrych racji na rzecz jej wiarygodności. Na podstawie tych argumentów formułuję warunki działania akratycznego, które składają się na eksternalistyczną analizę słabej woli. Zaproponowana koncepcja ma pogodzić dwa twierdzenia: po pierwsze, że praktyczny osąd nie jest tożsamy z pragnieniem, oraz po drugie, że w przypadku zwyczajnych działań istnieje związek logiczny między przyczynami działania a samym działaniem. W tym celu wskazana zostaje norma racjonalności, która jest naruszana przy działaniu akratycznym.

EN

One of the fundamental issues raised in the discussion of the problem of weak will is the dispute over the principle of motivational internalism. According to the principle, an agent’s judgment that it is better to perform a certain action entails a desire to perform that action. In this paper, I discuss the arguments for the principle in order to show that they do not provide sufficient reasons for its plausibility. On the basis of these arguments, I formulate the conditions for acratic action in order to provide an externalist analysis of weak will. The aim is to reconcile two claims: that practical judgment is not equivalent to desire, and that in the case of ordinary actions there is a logical connection between the causes of the action and the action itself. For this purpose, the norm of rationality that is violated in acratic action is identified.

3

Akrasia as dysfunction of will. Critical analysis of D. Davidson’s conception of weakness of will and an outline of alternative solution

59%

Machcewicz-Grad A., Machcewicz-Grad A.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

|

2020

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issue 1

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1 Machcewicz-Grad A.

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1 Wiśniewski R.

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Filozoficzna analiza doświadczenia woli i jej słabości.

Słaba wola – w stronę eksternalizmu motywacyjnego

Akrasia as dysfunction of will. Critical analysis of D. Davidson’s conception of weakness of will and an outline of alternative solution