Search results

1

Między wątpieniem a wiarą. Próba charakterystyki renesansowego sceptycyzmu

100%

Leszczyński D.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

|

2006

|

vol. 1

|

issue 1

115-131

EN

The subject of the article is an interesting form of scepticism which appeared in 15 and 16 centuries. My goal is to describe main features of this unique sceptical current and point out the aspects which distinguish it from the Antique (Phyrronian and Academic) scepticism. In discussing the views of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Charron and Francisco Sanchez, I attempt to demonstrate that specific feature of Renaissance scepticism was some kind of fideism. I also show that this current is not as naive, nor as insignificant, as many of historians have been arguing. On the contrary, I indicate that Renaissance scepticism was very important stream of thought and that it exerted a significant influence on modern thought.

2

Istoty a skeptický problém

80%

Koreň L.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2013

|

vol. 61

|

issue 5

643-680

EN

The aim of the article is to develop the dialectics and potential of a specific philosophical approach to the problem of epistemological scepticism: Wittgenstein’s ideas about the function of fundamental certainties in our epistemic practices. I begin with an excursion into the problematic of sceptical arguments and explain G. E. Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy, which influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty. I then offer a reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian approach that I favour. On this basis I argue that although there is a grain of truth in scepticism, the idea of an indefinitely-iterated doubt and request for reasons (driving the Pyrrhonian-style of scepticism), as well as the idea of a hyperbolic doubt (driving Cartesian-style scepticism), are philosophical illusions from the perspective of the rules and standards of our epistemic operating - the would-be sceptic offers us no compelling alternative.

3

„Hardzi miedzy prostaki, że nic nie umiemy”. Kochanowski w pułapce sceptycyzmu

80%

Sokolski J.

Pamiętnik Literacki

|

2018

|

vol. 109

|

issue 4

87-95

PL

Przedmiotem artykułu jest szczegółowa analiza drugiej części "Trenu XI" Jana Kochanowskiego. Wbrew powszechnie dotąd akceptowanym twierdzeniom dawniejszych badaczy poeta nie kpi tutaj bynajmniej z pychy ludzi, którzy uparcie usiłują wspinać się do nieba i podglądać tajemnice Stwórcy, lecz przeciwnie – za przejaw pychy uważa postawę starożytnych sceptyków nawiązujących do przypisywanego Sokratesowi słynnego powiedzenia „wiem, że nic nie wiem” i za świadectwo mądrości uznających świadomość, iż człowiek nie jest w stanie formułować żadnych prawdziwych sądów na temat otaczającej go rzeczywistości.

EN

The subject of the article is a detailed analysis of the second part of Jan Kochanowski’s “Tren XI (Lament XI)”. Contrary to the so far acceptable opinions expressed by former researchers, the poet in the piece by no means mocks the pride of men who persistently attempt to climb to heaven and spy on the Creator’s secrets, but conversely, he claims the stance of the ancient sceptics referring to the saying “I know that I know nothing” attributed to Socrates to be manifestation of pride and testimony of wisdom of those who credit that a man is unable to pronounce any judgement on the surrounding reality.

4

Założenia ontologiczne i epistemologiczne sceptycyzmu Montaigne’a

80%

Sołtysiak M.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

|

2019

|

vol. 14

|

issue 4

69 - 87

EN

Montaigne is widely regarded as one of the most significant sceptics of the 16th century. His most important work, Essays, had a great impact on the thinkers of the 16th and 17th centuries, in particular on the philosophy of Descartes. The article presents Montaigne’s critique of senses and reason as sources of human knowledge. The elements of his scepticism that went beyond the sceptic arguments of ancient thinkers has been emphasized. The negative role of his ontological variabilism in knowing things has been underlined. As a result of the total criticism of the possibilities of human cognition made by the author of the Essays, attention has been paid to the non-sceptical type of the question posed by him: “What do I know?” (“Que sais-je?”). The answer to this question led him to fideism in cognition. At the end of the article, an attempt has been made to indicate Montaigne’s main epistemological and metaphysical assumptions that contributed to the problem of cognition. It has also been highlighted in what way the understanding of reason, method, and, above all, self became for Descartes, unlike Montaigne, the foundation of certain knowledge.

5

Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

70%

Greif A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 5

743-759

XX

The aim of this article is to determine how useful to us are the notes from the late work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, in dealing with one of the modern sceptical problems. By determining the usefulness I have in mind whether or not his thoughts and descriptions of everyday linguistic practice help solve the sceptical problem and, if so, in what way. The sceptical problem in question is the Cartesian argument about the external world – the argument of ignorance. We will endeavour to show that if we accept Wittgenstein’s remarks as adequate descriptions of epistemic practice, they will help to make it possible to block the argument in question. However, there arise questions of whether Wittgenstein’s descriptions of epistemic practice are adequate, on the one hand, and whether the sceptical claims about the external world really spring from this practice, on the other hand. I hold the view that these questions are basically empirical. This has the relatively unusual consequence that the worth of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as well as the cogency of the problem of the external world, cannot be judged in a purely philosophical way.

6

Zaproszenie do mitu. Filozofia wychowania z pism Leszka Kołakowskiego wywiedziona

70%

Gałkowski S.

Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny

|

2018

|

vol. 63(2 (248))

9-23

PL

This article is an attempt to reconstruct Leszek Kołakowski’s vision of education based on the study of his own notions and ideas. According to Kołakowski, any meaning which can be attributed to human life and activities is not a feature inherent in human beings but can only be granted by themselves. The process of sense creation is irremovable from culture. Kołakowski calls this process myth creation, which is one of the key concepts he employs. He considers education as an introduction to myth while the lack of an external frame of reference renders education “identical with indoctrination”. Therefore the only way to preserve the apprentice’s autonomy is to refer to another category of Kołakowski’s, which is inconsistency. Placing hope for the apprentice’s autonomy in the teacher’s inconsistency and, in consequence, in the ineffectiveness of education, is not very reassuring. Kołakowski’s vision of education demonstrates that scepticism is not capable (or even willing) of offering us anything more than that.

7

Skepticismus a fideismus. Montaigne a Hume

70%

Parusniková Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2014

|

vol. 62

|

issue 1

39-60

EN

The revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism in European thought of the seventeenth century had a significant influence not only on the further development of epistemology, but also on the sphere of theology. Sceptical denial of the legitimacy of rational judgement affected even the legitimacy of traditional arguments for God’s existence. The attempt to “save God” led to fideism in which faith is transferred to the sphere of inner experience, and is fraught with mystery. One of the main propagators of Pyrrhonism, and representatives of the fideistic turn, was Montaigne. What about Hume? Do we not find a similar strategy here too? After all, Hume accepted the irresolvability of epistemological scepticism by rational means, and he founded the positive structure of knowledge on human nature instead. Analogically, he might be inclined to go for the opposite pole of religious scepticism by endorsing the private faith of the heart, and he might perhaps even recognise this as a natural need in human life. The author, in her investigation of these questions, treats above all of Hume’s Dialogues and she arrives at the conclusion that Hume - in contrast to his predecessor Bayle - is perfectly devoted to an enlightened world where religion, especially in its fideistic form, belongs to the old times of “darkness”. It may be replaced, though, by the almost secular true religion practiced in an enlightened community.

8

Skepticizmus – rôzne podoby, rôzne problémy

70%

Démuth A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 5

705-723

EN

This article focuses on the presentation of the basic forms of scepticism and sceptical argumentation denying the possibility of gaining knowledge in the sense of its tripartite definition (justified true belief). The author presents a selection of historical objections to the attainability and knowability of truth and the possibility of gaining complete or adequate true justification of knowledge, but also objections concentrating on the understanding of knowledge as conscious and fully-reflected true belief. In the second part of the article the author attempts to argue against advocates of the unjustifiability of knowledge (holding that there do not exist any sufficient or partly good reasons for knowledge) by pointing to the existence of various levels of persuasiveness of particular opinions and beliefs and by showing the meaninglessness of the distinction between knowledge and supposition in conceptions that deny knowledge any kind of good reasons. In conclusion there is an attempt to demonstrate that falsification of a certain piece of knowledge is itself a piece of knowledge that is grounded on the adequate reasons of its soundness.

9

Wittgenstein a problem reguł

70%

Gomułka J., Sajdek Z.

Racjonalia. Z punktu widzenia humanistyki

|

2015

|

vol. 5

PL

The problem of rules and the private language argument are among the most renowned and disputable themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Presumably today’s best known interpretation of the themes was presented in Saul Kripke’s famous and often commented book Wittgenstein on Rules and the Private Language, published in 1982. The interpretation, nicknamed “Kripkenstein”, became the target of numerous attacks of authors convinced that it did justice neither to Wittgenstein nor to the real way our language worked.This article begins with the examination of Wittgenstein’s problem of identification of action which may be counted as justified by the rule, that is, the problem of criteria of correctness. This is Kripke’s starting point in his binding the problem of rules with the private language argument. He believes that Wittgenstein did not question the mere possibility of such a language but the possibility of any language at all. Further, we survey the rejected solutions to the problem of criteria: the mentalistic and the dispositional. This leads us toKripke’s sceptical solution: there are no reasons of actions which occur before these actions. There are certain trained ways of doing things which “tell” us what to do in typical situations but they are not criteria of correctness. Such criteria may only be public and therefore social.In conclusion it’s argued that Kripkenstein’s view is really Wittgenstein’s view: contrary to the popular opinion Kripke did not put forward a new solution, he just gave us a different way of presenting it.

10

Percepce souvislostí pandemie covid-19 a klimatické změny v české blogosféře

70%

Čermák D., Stachová J., Pilnáček M.

Sociologický časopis. Czech Sociological Review

|

2023

|

vol. 59

|

issue 5

513-534

EN

The article is dedicated to reflecting the links between the climate crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic crisis in the context of Czech social media, specifically on several blogging platforms. The processes leading to the climate and pandemic crises are highly intertwined, based in the way humans interact with the environment on a global scale. However, the circumstances and consequences of both crises, as well as the ways they are dealt with, also share common features. The authors identify such contexts as reflected on blogging platforms by undertaking a qualitative analysis of texts from an interpretative phenomenological perspective. Climate scepticism is connected to pandemic scepticism, on the one hand, and to acceptance of the pandemic as a real threat, on the other hand. Conversely, acceptance of the climate crisis can be associated with both acceptance of the pandemic and pandemic scepticism.

11

Od skepticizmu k objektívnemu poznaniu

70%

Taliga M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 5

691-704

XX

The critical arguments of scepticism lead to the conclusion that no proposition can be justified as true. The attempts to define knowledge as justified true belief therefore fail, even within externalism. If we attribute knowledge to someone else, we can never justifiably know that we have done it correctly. Attributing knowledge is a hypothetical activity. Moreover, knowledge itself is hypothetical as well. There are no justifiably identifiable good reasons telling us that an investigated proposition is true. Scepticism thus leads an optimist, who holds that knowledge exists, to objectivism, i.e. to the view that knowledge is objective because its truth can be reduced neither to good reasons nor to the beliefs of investigators. Keywords: scepticism, objective knowledge, internalism, externalism, objectivism

12

Biografia intelektualna Emila Ciorana

70%

Piechaczek S.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2011

|

issue 14

101 – 122

EN

On the formation of Cioran’s vision of the world and man, influenced largely his belonging to precisely this and no other nation. Romanian fatalism, inability to illusions, seeing the inevitable, the Romanian people’s faith in the fact that sin and creation are the same and constant accusations against this creation are the constitutive elements of Cioran’s thought. Carrying the baggage of experiences of the nation thrown out of history and time, Cioran, as a Romanian emigrant in France, found the best model for his own writing in rhetorical and satirical tradition of the French moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who were a combination of “lyrical sublimity and cynicism”, gentleness and hell. They showed him not only what is uncompromising in pursuing the motives of human action, looking at everything from many different perspectives, or suspicion of any kind of doctrine, but they also became for him a model of style. Of all literary forms cultivated by moralists, Cioran appreciated most the fragment, that is to say a closed form, often paradoxical and witty that having nothing in common with the characteristic for large systems long strings of argument – that was a form of recording experience, and like this experience, assumed discontinuity. Being a spokesperson for the “philosophy of the only moments”, Cioran advocated not only against the system, but also against academic philosophy – grown with indifference, regardless of the state of mind, it seemed to him the result of reduction of vitality and a kind of escape into the impersonal world of unrest. State, which fully made Cioran realize the futility resorting to this kind of philosophy, was insomnia, from which the Romanian philosopher had suffered more or less since he was seventeen. According to the author of the Fall in the Time insomnia and boredom are the “minimum imbalance”, which we have to experience, when we want to get closer to some essential truths about man. However, the price that we pay for it, is to get overly heightened awareness and inability to re-engage in life. The “extreme sobriety of look” leads to skepticism, which in the twentiethcentury in the works of Romanian thinker has its most perfect expression.

13

Ksenofanes z Kolofonu i greckie źródła problemu poznania

70%

Kubok D.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2013

|

issue nr 23

5-24

EN

Criticism is nowadays broadly defined firstly, as a cognitive attitude consisting in investigation of rightness of one’s beliefs and considering true only those statements which are substantiated. Secondly, it is a cognitive attitude opposed to dogmatism (e.g. skepticism understood not as negative dogmatism but as zeteticism and ephecticism), which allows the possibility of changing one’s opinion as a result of occurrence of new facts or theories. Cosmological-ontological interpretation of early Greek philosophy, which is currently dominant, may be complemented (or even overcome) by a critical one. The article presents elements of Xenophanes’ philosophy (especially Xenophanes’ theological fragments) in the light of the problem concerning the historical origins of philosophical criticism. In this paper I try to recognize Xenophanes’ theological fragments not as a positive theology, but rather as an attempt to construct a dialectical metaphor (like in case of Gadamer’s interpretations of Plato’s polis), which has emphasized the epistemological assumptions of his philosophy.

14

Wittgenstein o istote: praktické rozriešenie skeptických pochybností

61%

Szapuová M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 5

725-741

XX

The aim of this article is to investigate Wittgenstein’s views on doubt and certainty as they are expressed in his work On Certainty in the context of discussions about scepticism. I begin with a critical analysis of the interpretational framework according to which Wittgenstein’s notes amount to the kind of anti-sceptical strategy which demonstrates the meaninglessness of sceptical assertions as flowing from an abuse of language. I note the context of Wittgenstein’s notes and I evaluate the strong and weak sides of the linguistic interpretation. Then I adumbrate the possibility of an alternative interpretation of these notes. Firstly, I offer a characterisation of the “sceptical problem” and I defend the thesis that Wittgenstein’s notes can be read as a reaction to the sceptical problem understood as a challenge which calls for the justification of claims to knowledge as defined by the tripartite definition. In the second part of the article I distinguish several types of reaction to the sceptical problem, and I argue in favour of the view that Wittgenstein’s stance on the question can be best characterised as a reaction to the sceptical challenge which provides a “practical solution” to sceptical doubts. scepticism, anti-sceptical strategy, knowledge, Wittgenstein, certainty, action

15

Biografia intelektualna Emila Ciorana

61%

Piechaczek S.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2011

|

issue 14

101–122

EN

On the formation of Cioran’s vision of the world and man, influenced largely his belonging to precisely this and no other nation. Romanian fatalism, inability to illusions, seeing the inevitable, the Romanian people’s faith in the fact that sin and creation are the same and constant accusations against this creation are the constitutive elements of Cioran’s thought. Carrying the baggage of experiences of the nation thrown out of history and time, Cioran, as a Romanian emigrant in France, found the best model for his own writing in rhetorical and satirical tradition of the French moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who were a combination of “lyrical sublimity and cynicism”, gentleness and hell. They showed him not only what is uncompromising in pursuing the motives of human action, looking at everything from many different perspectives, or suspicion of any kind of doctrine, but they also became for him a model of style. Of all literary forms cultivated by moralists, Cioran appreciated most the fragment, that is to say a closed form, often paradoxical and witty that having nothing in common with the characteristic for large systems long strings of argument – that was a form of recording experience, and like this experience, assumed discontinuity. Being a spokesperson for the “philosophy of the only moments”, Cioran advocated not only against the system, but also against academic philosophy – grown with indifference, regardless of the state of mind, it seemed to him the result of reduction of vitality and a kind of escape into the impersonal world of unrest. State, which fully made Cioran realize the futility resorting to this kind of philosophy, was insomnia, from which the Romanian philosopher had suffered more or less since he was seventeen. According to the author of the Fall in the Time insomnia and boredom are the “minimum imbalance”, which we have to experience, when we want to get closer to some essential truths about man. However, the price that we pay for it, is to get overly heightened awareness and inability to re-engage in life. The “extreme sobriety of look” leads to skepticism, which in the twentieth century in the works of Romanian thinker has its most perfect expression.

16

„Humovství“

61%

Strawson G.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue 2

199-206

EN

The epithet “Humean” is used in metaphysics to describe positions which deny that there is, in concrete reality, necessary connection or necessary action. This use was significantly reinforced by David Lewis, who applied the adjective “Humean” in the phrase “Humean supervenience”. It is not at all clear, however, whether this use of the term is in fact appropriate. Lewis himself was not fully convinced that it was.

17

Elements of Greek Scepticism in Richard Feynman’s Views on Science

61%

Dembiński B.

Folia Philosophica

|

2015

|

vol. 34

EN

The article considers some aspects of Richard Feynman’s philosophy of science. The basic assumptions of Feynman’s views on science refer back to the tradition of Greek scepticism. Interestingly, Feynman was probably unaware of this relation, still he became an outstanding modern continuator of this tradition. The analysis is based on Feynman’s lectures included in The Character of Physical Law.

18

O typach kawy. Kontekstualizm DeRose’a jako strategia antysceptycka (On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)

51%

Szubart T.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2018

|

vol. 44

61-81

EN

Semantic contextualism is often used in order to offer solutions for problems in other branches of philosophy, including epistemology. One of such attempts is epistemic contextualism, according to which the semantic value of the word “knows” changes with the context of its utterance. The aim of this paper is to critically investigate Keith DeRose’s contextualism to see up to what extent does it provide a valid anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that while it can be seen as a good rival for global and Ungerian scepticism, it does not lead to the refutation of other variants of classical scepticism.

PL

Teoria kontekstualizmu semantycznego, chociaż pierwotnie jest to teoria z dziedziny filozofii języka, bywa często wykorzystywana jako element strategii rozwiązywania problemów w pozostałych dziedzinach filozofii, w tym epistemologii. Wedle kontekstualizmu epistemologicznego, znaczenie słowa „wiem” zmienia się wraz z kontekstem jego wypowiedzenia. Celem tego artykułu jest krytyczna analiza kontekstualizmu Keitha DeRose’a w celu sprawdzenia do jakiego stopnia dostarcza on dobrej strategii antysceptyckiej. Argumentuję, że pomimo, iż teoria ta jest dobrym rywalem dla sceptycyzmu globalnego i Ungerowskiego, przyjęcie jej nie prowadzi jednak do odrzucenia innych wariantów klasycznego sceptycyzmu.

19

Corsino: z wczesnych szkiców powieściowych Honoriusza Balzaka

51%

Kaznowski J.

Przegląd Humanistyczny

|

2020

|

vol. 64(4 (471))

7-20

PL

Around 1820–1821, a young and not quite experienced Balzac writes a short story in prose, a draft which will remain unfinished and which we know as Corsino. It is one of Balzac’s experimental texts in prose (Sténie ou les Erreurs philosophiques; Une heure de ma vie; Agathise; Falthurne) revealing his artistic quest and announcing some important traits to be found in his later official works. Corsino is influenced by Balzac’s philosophical lectures and reflections present in his notes known as Discours sur l’immortalité de l’âme from 1818, where the topics such as religion, God, morality, science, epistemology, materialism, or scepticism are discussed.

20

O skepticismu a filosofii u Davida Huma:

51%

Janoušek H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2020

|

vol. 68

|

issue 4

623-633

EN

The study examines Zuzana Parusniková’s book David Hume, Sceptic. It first examines how the book situates Hume’s philosophy in between radical scepticism resulting from the scrutiny of human knowledge and natural belief that cannot be shaken by sceptical doubts. Hume accepts radical scepticism and the limits it sets for human understanding. However, a practicable philosophy must submit itself to belief in the common world and offer a useful examination into the principles of moral and social behavior and common life. This finally results in philosophy becoming a guide for a happy life. In the second part, the study employs Hume’s concept of the love of truth to show a deeper link between several functions of philosophy, and, by interpreting Hume’s view of the relation between abstruse and easy philosophy, it criticizes Parusnikova’s interpretation of abstruse philosophy.

CS

Text studie analyzuje knihu Zuzany Parsunikové David Hume, Sceptic, jež klade filosofii Davida Huma do rozporu mezi radikální skepsí plynoucí z reflexe lidského poznání a přirozenou vírou, jejíž genezi nedokáží skeptické pochybnosti narušit. Hume přijímá radikální skepsi i meze, které stanovuje lidskému rozumu. Praktikovatelná filosofie se však musí podřídit víře ve společný svět a prospěšně zkoumat principy lidského jednání a soužití ve společensko-morální oblasti. Vposledu se filosofie stává návodem ke šťastnému životu. Ve své druhé části zde předkládaná studie využívá Humovu koncepci lásky k pravdě, aby ukázala hlubší souvislost mezi funkcemi filosofie u Huma, a na základě výkladu Humova pojetí vztahu obtížné a snadné filosofie kritizuje autorčin výklad epistemologické funkce obtížné filosofie.

Refine search results

Między wątpieniem a wiarą. Próba charakterystyki renesansowego sceptycyzmu

Istoty a skeptický problém

„Hardzi miedzy prostaki, że nic nie umiemy”. Kochanowski w pułapce sceptycyzmu

Założenia ontologiczne i epistemologiczne sceptycyzmu Montaigne’a

Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

Zaproszenie do mitu. Filozofia wychowania z pism Leszka Kołakowskiego wywiedziona

Skepticismus a fideismus. Montaigne a Hume

Skepticizmus – rôzne podoby, rôzne problémy

Wittgenstein a problem reguł

Percepce souvislostí pandemie covid-19 a klimatické změny v české blogosféře

Od skepticizmu k objektívnemu poznaniu

Biografia intelektualna Emila Ciorana

Ksenofanes z Kolofonu i greckie źródła problemu poznania

Wittgenstein o istote: praktické rozriešenie skeptických pochybností

Biografia intelektualna Emila Ciorana

„Humovství“

Elements of Greek Scepticism in Richard Feynman’s Views on Science

O typach kawy. Kontekstualizm DeRose’a jako strategia antysceptycka (On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)

Corsino: z wczesnych szkiców powieściowych Honoriusza Balzaka

O skepticismu a filosofii u Davida Huma: