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EN
In the article Popper, Tarski and Relativism Jennings argues that according to T-equivalence all ontology (all sort of things in the world) is the derived from the first-order language. So such argumentation leads directly to the relativistic interpretation of Tarski’s semantic theory of truth. This interpretation is very controversial especially given that almost all philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School assert that truth is a nonrelativistic value. It seems that Alfred Tarski shares this view with Kazimierz Twardowski and his students. However there are many incompatible interpretations according to which the semantic theory of truth generates different consequences. Thus we can understand this theory in a relativistic, deflationist or absolutist ways. In this article I am reconstructing the relativistic and nonrelativistic interpretations of the semantic theory of truth and I attempt to provide an answer to the important question about whether or not Alfred Tarski is a relativist?
Studia Semiotyczne
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2019
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vol. 33
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issue 2
EN
This article is polemical. It argues with those philosophers who see, in the semantic theory of knowledge of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, the significant and exclusive influence of Alfred Tarski’s semantic output. Listening to these philosophers, one gets the impression that they have overlooked the fact that the term “semantics” meant one thing in the case of Ajdukiewicz, presenting the semantic theory of knowledge, and something different in the case of Tarski, presenting the semantic theory of truth. There is another difference, related to the abovementioned, and fundamental in the case of both these logicians, namely their different approach to language, which seems to escape the attention of those who write about the semantic theory of knowledge. Ajdukiewicz’s approach was intensional, while Tarski’s approach was extensional: for the first of them, the intensional interpretation of language was basic, as for the second, was the extensional interpretation. The philosophers with whom I argue overlook one more fact, namely the impact, difficult to overestimate, that the intentional theory of language of Edmund Husserl had on the emergence of the semantic theory of knowledge. This article tries to restore Tarski’s real role in the matter referred to in the title, and do justice to Husserl: after all, without his philosophy of the semantic theory of knowledge, as a metaepistemological project, it would not have come to be. It was only in the implementation of this project that some of the achievements of Tarski’s semantics were used.
EN
The subject of this article are three remarks which were not raised in previous publications concerning the semantic theory of knowledge of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. The first one pertains to the contradistinction of two basic questions which are hidden under the name “semantic theory of knowledge”. The second one pertains to the relation, and rather its lack, between Ajdukiewicz’s semantic theory of knowledge and Tarski’s semantic theory of truth. The third one pertains to the relation between Husserl’s intentional theory of language and Ajdukiewicz’s semantic theory of knowledge understood as a metaepistemological project.
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