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EN
Existi ng literature has not yet defi ned a clear-cut relati onship between ownership structure and capital structure. This study aims to contribute to this controversial argument by examining the impact of internal (managerial) ownership and external ownership on fi nancing preferences using the case of non-fi nancial fi rms listed on Karachi stock exchange during the period of 2008-2012. Our results suggest that the external ownership has a signifi cant eff ect on capital structure in accordance with the presence of blockholders. In contrast, the internal ownership has a complicated eff ect; it shows signifi cant positi ve and negati ve relati onship to leverage at lower and certain higher proporti on of managerial shareholding respecti vely. Besides, the combined analyses suggest that the presence of blockholders negates the impact of managerial ownership on capital structure. This implies that the presence of large and dominant shareholders in Pakistani fi rms may have caused a bias for debt fi nancing to protect their voti ng power and returns.
EN
In the shareholder theory of firms, the company's assets are the property of the shareholders, and managers are viewed as agents of the shareholders with all of the enforcement difficulties associated with agency relationships, but without legal obligations to any other stakeholder. An alternative view is the stakeholder theory of firms. The standard principal-agent paradigm can be expanded to the stakeholder agency problem. In this view, managers can be seen as the agents of all stakeholders. From the perspective of social responsibility, enlightened organizations view the internal and external environment as a variety of stakeholders.This paper offers some insights into the characteristics of the corporate governance system in Slovenia. Its focus is on the relationship between governance and management. The authors tried to determine in their research the roles of various groups of stakeholders in Slovenian companies. The paper's conclusions are based on a longitudinal research method. The paper is the result of three consecutive research studies on the characteristics of corporate governance in Slovenia over the period from 1998 to 2006. The paper compares the results from studies conducted in 1998 and 2002 with the latest results in 2006. The most important long-term strategic objective of Slovenian companies is growth. The share of Slovenian companies - excluding equity opportunity costs - has decreased significantly in the last six years due to the consolidation of ownership structures. The controlling owners are more active in setting the required rate of return on their equity investments. There is no conflict of interest between internal and external shareholders in most companies. Obviously, Slovenian companies have changed their strategic behaviour to reflect the interests of their stakeholders. It may be argued that some stakeholders, like customers and employees, are even more important for Slovenian managers than the owners.
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego
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2012
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vol. 21
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issue 2
335-418
EN
The main purpose of this dissertation is the analysis of the provisions contained in Articles 249 -254 and Articles 422-427 of the Commercial Companies Code, as a basis for the appealing against resolutions of shareholders of limited liability company and general meetings of stockholders, and their evaluation in terms of whether they adequately fulfill their function. The legal character of abovementioned resolutions will also be considered. The additional aim of this thesis is the reflection on the concepts of the unnormative category of the defective resolutions ("non-existent" and "negative") that although formed on the background of the previous state law, are still valid. Moreover, the aim of this thesis is to compare the current regulations of the Commercial Companies Code (Art. 249-254 and Art. 422-427) from the previously existing normalization, and draw attention to the solutions included: in other laws, the proposed changes in regulations and in German stock law (Aktiengesetz). The analysis begins with the characterization of the current legal status under the Commercial Code, with the emphasis on the discrepancies between the current and previous legislation. Taking this step backwards is of a great importance, hence the views formed therein are still being reflected not only in the nowadays opinions of legal scholars, but also courts and Supreme Court rulings. Discussion of haw to appeal against defective resolutions – adopted in the Cooperative Law and in the Project of 20 June 2011 amending the Law on Investment Funds – to better capture the characteristics of the institution of challenging resolutions, functioning in the Polish legal system. On the other hand, closer look at the regulations of § 241-249 AktG is especially important that the Polish legislature, creating the Commercial Companies Code, modeled largely on the German law. However, this article does not pretend to the rank of comparative study. A broader perspective on the issues covered by the subject seems to be essential to the formulation of thought postulates de lege ferenda.
EN
The paper discusses legal consequences of violations of law which may occur in the course of passing resolutions by shareholders or when convening the meeting. Such violations take the form of procedural infringements, as opposed to material defects which concern the subject matter of the resolution. Several jurisdictions were taken into account in order to demonstrate that illegality of the procedure does not need to imply nullity of resolutions. There are various instruments which, despite illegality, are intended to preserve the resolution. This is all about the balance of preferences: in company law there are definitely situations where legality should be less valued than stability and certainty.
PL
W artykule został poruszony problem tunelowania spółek. Tunelowanie spółek to szeroko rozumiany konflikt akcjonariuszy dominujących i mniejszościowych. Zapewnienie ochrony interesów akcjonariuszy mniejszościowych nadal jest głównym i nierozwikłanym zagadnieniem ekonomistów. Interesy każdego członka powinny być chronione, dlatego zasadne jest pytanie: jak efektywnie chronić interesy takich akcjonariuszy? Dominanci w spółkach często stosują techniki prowadzące do nielegalnego czerpania korzyści, a wszystko to odbywa się kosztem akcjonariuszy mniejszościowych. Właśnie jedną z takich technik jest wspomniane tunelowanie spółek, które może przyjmować różną formę. Na zakończenie prezentowanych rozważań podano polskie przypadki tunelowania spółek.
EN
The article has been raised on a problem of tunneling the companies. Tunneling in a widely understood is a conflict between controlling and minority shareholders in a company. The main aim of the article is to describe main aspects of tunneling. The first part contains characteristics of forms of tunneling. Ensure the protection of the interests of minority shareholders still is a major and unsolved mystery for specialists in the economy. The interests of each member should be protected, and therefore we can ask: How to effectively protect the interests of these shareholders? Dominants in companies often progressing to the use of illegal techniques to get benefit. Everything is done at the expense of “small” shareholders. Tunneling companies is one of these techniques. Tunneling companies can take different forms depending on what it refers to. The second part contains mathematical model of tunneling of the company. At the end of the article are shown Polish companies in which discover the tunneling.
EN
In people’s search for the best way to enrich and protect wealth there appeared collective investment institutions. This is a good alternative for investors who are not satisfied with bank deposit’s interest rates. Сollective investment institutions (СІІs) are the new opportunity for Ukrainian investors to invest their savings so as to ensure their growth. The Ukrainian history of mutual funds began with the adoption of the appropriate law in 2001. Still, besides the real advantages of this kind of investing there are numerous disadvantages, especially in conditions of transition economy of Ukraine.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł stanowi wstępną analizę relacji, jakie zachodzą między wewnętrznymi i zewnętrznymi stosunkami cywilnoprawnymi spółek kapitałowych. Ustalenie zakresu pojęciowego stosunków cywilnoprawnych spółek kapitałowych wzbudza liczne kontrowersje w doktrynie i praktyce prawa. Dokonanie podziału na wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne stosunki tychże spółek jest niezwykle istotne dla przeprowadzenia kompleksowej kwalifikacji norm prawa spółek, jako imperatywnych bądź dyspozytywnych oraz do określania granic wolności umów w obu tych obszarach. Stosunki zewnętrzne dotyczące relacji spółki z osobami trzecimi, poddane są głębszej ingerencji ustawodawczej przy pomocy norm imperatywnych. Z kolei stosunki wewnętrzne między spółką a wspólnikami lub akcjonariuszami są regulowane normami dyspozytywnymi. Należy stwierdzić, iż stosunki wewnętrzne i zewnętrze spółek cechują się dużym zakresem autonomii woli stron stosunków spółki, które to strony mają decydujący wpływ na ich wzajemne relacje.
EN
This article includes a preliminary analysis of relation between internal and external civil relations of companies. The controversy over conceptual range of civil relations of companies arouse not only in the doctrine but also in case law. The division of relations of companies into internal and external is crucial in order to provide a detailed classification of legal norms of commercial law as imperative or dispositive, and to determine limits of freedom of contract in both of these areas. External relations concerning a relation of a company with third parties are subject to deeper legislative interference by means of imperative norms. On the other hand, internal relations of a company with members or shareholders are regulated by dispositive norms. It should be stated that internal and external relations of companies are characterized by huge autonomy of will of parties of company relations, which parties have a profound influence on their mutual relations.
EN
The Supreme Court acknowledge that shareholders whose voices were casted during the elections of supervisory board chosen by vote with separate groups are deprived of the right to vote from other shares at the election of supervisory board by the general meeting of shareholders. Such an approach to the issue presented by the Supreme Court is objectionable as well as the argumentation presented in the resolution. In this regard article 411[3] of the Commercial Code gives the shareholder the right to vote differently with each of his actions, and those voices do not even have to be casted by different persons. This article implemented the unknown rule to the Polish legal system, according to which the shareholder can vote differently with each of share he held. This is the opposite of previously existing rule consisting in the fact that shareholders had voted their shares not shares excluding shareholders.The current legal status therefore allows the shareholder to create or participate in the group to elect members of the supervisory board, as well as to participate in filling the remaining mandates by way of a resolution passed by the general meeting. After entry into force article 411[3] of the Commercial Code forced to revise views of the regulations contained in article 385 of the Commercial Code. Furthermore the regulations included in article 385 § 3–9 of the Commercial Code should be interpreted through the prism of the introduction to the Commercial Code institution of so-called split voting. The regulation of the article 411[3] of the Commercial Code creates a significant breakthrough within the meaning of the essence of the regulations contained in the article 385 of the Commercial Code as rules that previously provided for the protection of the rights of minority shareholders. 
PL
Sąd Najwyższy uznał, iż akcjonariusze, których głosy z części posiadanych akcji zostały oddane przy wyborze członków rady nadzorczej, wybieranych w drodze głosowania oddzielnymi grupami, są pozbawieni prawa wykonywania głosu z pozostałych akcji w głosowaniu przy wyborze członków rady nadzorczej przez walne zgromadzenie. Takie ujęcie problemu przez Sąd Najwyższy budzi sprzeciw, podobnie jak argumentacja przedstawiona w uzasadnieniu glosowanej uchwały. W tym zakresie k.s.h., na mocy art. 411[3], daje akcjonariuszowi prawo do odmiennego głosowania z każdej posiadanej akcji, przy czym głosów tych nie muszą wykonywać nawet różne osoby. Powyższy przepis wprowadził regułę nieznaną dotychczas polskiemu porządkowi prawnemu, zgodnie z którą akcjonariusz może głosować odmiennie z każdej z posiadanych akcji. Jest to przeciwieństwo dotychczas obowiązującej zasady polegającej na tym, iż akcjonariusze głosowali akcjami, a nie akcje bez uwzględnienia osób.Aktualny stan prawny pozwala zatem akcjonariuszowi na utworzenie lub udział w grupie w celu wyboru członków do rady nadzorczej, a także na udział w obsadzaniu pozostałych mandatów w drodze uchwały podejmowanej przez walne zgromadzenie. Wejście w życie art. 411[3] k.s.h. zmusiło do rewizji podglądów odnośnie do istoty regulacji zawartych w art. 385 k.s.h. Jednocześnie należy zwrócić uwagę, że treść regulacji zawartych w art. 385 § 3–9 k.s.h. należy interpretować przez pryzmat wprowadzenia do k.s.h. instytucji tzw. split voting. Regulacja zawarta w art. 411[3] k.s.h. tworzy istotny wyłom w rozumieniu istoty regulacji zawartych w art. 385 k.s.h. jako unormowań, które uprzednio służyły tylko i wyłącznie ochronie praw mniejszości.     
PL
Celem pracy stało się zbadanie wpływu determinant finansowych, w tym wpływu credit ratingu inwestorów, na credit ratingi banków. Dokonano przeglądu literaturowego i na jego podstawie postawiono następującą hipotezę: credit rating banków uzależniony jest od kondycji finansowej ocenianego podmiotu oraz credit ratingu głównych inwestorów. Do zweryfikowania postawionej hipotezy badawczej wykorzystano uporządkowane logitowe modele panelowe. Badanie przeprowadzono na bankach europejskich, które miały nadany rating długoterminowy przez trzy największe agencje, tj. Fitch, Moody i S&P. Do analizy wykorzystano dane kwartalne dla lat 1998–2016. Okazało się, że credit rating banku determinowany jest przede wszystkim wskaźnikami adekwatności kapitałowej i jakości aktywów. Istotny statystycznie wpływ wywiera credit rating kraju, w jakim dany bank funkcjonuje. Credit rating banku determinowany jest obecnością rządu jako jednego z inwestorów (rating Moody ulega obniżce, podczas gdy S&P się poprawia) oraz ratingiem akcjonariuszy.
EN
The aim of the study is to examine the impact of financial determinants, including the impact of the investors credit ratings, on banks credit ratings. Having made a literature review and the following hypothesis has been put: The bank’s credit rating depends on the financial condition of the rated entity and the credit ratings of the major investors. The logit panel data models were used to verify the hypothesis. The study was conducted at European banks, which have received the long-term ratings by the three largest agencies, Fitch, Moody, and S&P. The analysis used the quarterly data for the years 1998–2016. It turned out that the bank’s credit rating was determined by capital adequacy ratios and asset quality. The credit rating of the country, where the bank operates, is significant. The bank’s credit rating is determined by the presence of the government as one of investors (Moody’s rating downgrades while S&P is improving) and shareholder.
EN
This article is devoted to the issue of the admissibility of distinguishing negative resolutions and non-existent resolutions adopted by bodies in capital companies. The current legal provisions do not contain explicit regulations that allow or prohibit the existence of these legal structures. However, the fact whether it is possible to separate them is not only doctrinal, but also above all practical. This work considers the legal nature of the resolution as a legal act and also presents the most important problems regarding the admissibility of negative and non-existent resolutions. The aim of the article is to assess the admissibility of these structures on the basis of regulations and general principles of company law. The arguments adopted both by the representatives of the commercial law doctrine, as well as the analysis of the thesis from the case-law, which have the most significant impact on the solution to the problem, were presented. Critical analysis of the concept of non-applicable regulations and non-compliant with the rules of economic turnover were also made.
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