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Czy termin „osoba” jest niekompletny semantycznie? Krytyka stanowiska Christiana Kanziana

100%
Ziemowit G.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
|
2017
|
issue 63
59-74
XX
In my paper I aim to show that Christian Kanzian’s conception of the semantic character of a term “person” is false. According to Kanzian, the term “person” is an incomplete general term which needs to be combined with another general term, namely “Homo sapiens” or “human being”. Unlike the former, the latter terms give us clear criteria for identification of the entities they denote. Given that, we can comprehend how the term “person” is used for both synchronic and diachronic identification. After presenting the Kanzian’s proposal, I move on to my critique. In a nutshell, I show that his conception rules out non-human persons a priori and that the term “person” is: (i) general, (ii) semantically incomplete, (iii) non-sortal and (iv) phasic.
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Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej

58%
Grygianiec M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2016
|
vol. 34
5-28
EN
In the debate on personal identity many different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. Criteria of identity are usually taken to state necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are viewed, in their metaphysical interpretation, as providing truth conditions of relevant identity statements. In my paper I argue that this view is misconceived and I present some arguments for the simple view of personal identity, according to which there are no noncircular and informative criteria of identity for persons. In particular, I argue that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which would serve as truth conditions of statements concerning numerical identity. I also try to justify the view that in most cases criteria of identity should be interpreted either epistemically as a means for finding out whether identity holds or not or metaphysically as criteria of genidentity, which provide appropriate persistence conditions for objects of a given kind.
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