Results found: 2

Search results

Search:
in the keywords: subjective probability

Sort By:

Limit search:

Decision-making under risk and “statistical thinking” in the 20th century (selected models and persons)

100%

Rybicki W.

Mathematical Economics

2018

issue 14(21)

71-94

The paper is the second part of the series of articles surveying chosen models of decision-making under “risky circumstances”. The first segment concerned the earlier period of development of so-called “statistical thinking” (up to the times of J. Neyman and E. Pearson) and has been published elsewhere. These “twins” of papers as a whole, are intended as essays (consciously avoiding any formalization) to introduce the subsequent parts of the cycle – conducted in a more formal style. Several problems were discussed in the first part of the series. The leitmotifs, i.e. Bayesian vs. “orthodox” approaches, and the subjective vs. objective probability meaning are continued in this article, and developed towards the “modern needs and directions”. The role of some outstanding scientists is stressed. The possibility of the unification of the different philosophies on the grounds of statistical decision theory (thanks to A. Wald and L.J. Savage) is noted. “Dynamic” or multistage statistical decision procedures will be also indicated (in contrast to “static, “one-shot” problems). The primary role in developing these ideas played by mathematicians A. Wald, L. Shapley, R. Bellman, D. Blackwell and H. Robbins (plus many others) is stressed. The outline is conducted in a “historical perspective” beginning with F. Ramsey’s work and finishing at H. Robbins achievements – as being very influential in the further development of the stochastic methodology. The list of models, to be discussed in the subsequent (“formal-mode”) article/s, is added at the end of the paper. The central role in the notes is played by the “procession” of the prominent representatives of the field. The first “series” of them was presented in the previous part of the cycle. The subsequent (nine) are placed here. These scientists built the milestones of statistical science, “created its spirit,” exquisitely embedding the subject in the “general stochastic world”. The presentation is supplemented with their portraits. The author hopes that some keystones determining the line-up can be recognized in the course of reading. It is not possible to talk about mathematics without mathematics (formulas, calculations, formal reasoning). On the other hand − such beings as probability, uncertainty, risk can be, first of all, regarded as philosophic and logic in their heart of hearts (as well as being somewhat “mysterious”). So, it can turn out illuminating (sometimes) to reveal and to show merely the ideas and “their” heroes (even at the expense of losing the precision!). The role of the bibliography should also be stressed – it is purposely made so large, and significantly completes the presentation.

THE INFLUENCE OF IMPROBABLE OPTIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE OF CHOICE

80%

Móra L. X.

Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)

2010

vol. 65

issue 2

295-320

We need to make a choice between alternatives on numerous occasions in our everyday life. However, we are not always confident that we have made the right decision. The subjective sense of certainty that accompanies our decisions made in uncertain situations is usually expressed in labels or in percentages: “dead sure”, “it may be right”, 90%, etc. Calibration research focuses on what these verbal labels and percentages express and how they are related to the final outcome. For example, whether out of a 100 situations where we make decisions with 90% confidence, the number of decisions that afterwards can be considered correct decisions/judgments is truly around 90. The current research examines how the options that are ruled out easily by decision makers influence the confidence of choice for the remaining options. The general decision making process appears to start with ruling out unrealistic options and then contemplating the choice between the remaining realistic ones. On the basis of the study, it can be stated that unrealistic options do not make the decision more difficult and do not add to the uncertainty of decision making, on the contrary, they make the decision maker more confident. These results contradict the normative decision theory, the support theory of probability calibration, the theory of ecological validity and probabilistic mental models and are in accordance with the theory of optimistic overconfidence.

Refine search results

1 Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)

1 Mathematical Economics

1 Móra L. X.

1 Rybicki W.

1 2018

1 2010

Search results

Decision-making under risk and “statistical thinking” in the 20th century (selected models and persons)

THE INFLUENCE OF IMPROBABLE OPTIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE OF CHOICE