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EN
This study aims to analyze the interrelation between the opportunism of entities and institutions and the systemic risk growth. The applied research method involves, inter alia, the investigation of the essence and types of opportunism, the analysis of the credit risk transfer, the identification of the moral hazard and systemic risk stimulators. Moreover, ways to reduce opportunism and its negative follow-ups have been presented. It has been indicated that the moral hazard applied by major financial institutions leads to a crisis of trust. It translates into the growth of a systemic risk. The quality of the institutional environment needs to be enhanced. The mechanisms and instruments that should enforce bearing the consequences of their actions and limit excessively-risky behaviours are recommended.
EN
The consequences of last crisis on financial market is the promotion of the macroprudential policy as new approach in regulatory policy on the financial sector. The main ideas of goal, tasks and instruments of macroprudential policy were presented in the article. They were confronted with the goal, tasks and instruments of microprudential supervisory policy. This comparison indicates the existence of general goal of macroprudential policy but there are also some problems concerning the detailed tasks of this policy. This result causes the further problem with identification of many instruments which should be belong to the marcoprudential policy only. Lack of detailed tasks of macroprudential policy and similar instruments used by micro- and macroprudential policy may generate some tension in supervisory policy and diminish the safety of financial sector and the trust its clients. We recommend to implement the new supervisory policy on step by step basis, collecting all the time the necessary experience and to take the decision later if the institutional separation of macroprudential policy is really reasonable or it is better to divide the tasks of this policy between microprudential policy and central bank activity.
PL
Jednym z głównych wniosków wyciągniętych z doświadczeń ostatniego kryzysu na rynkach finansowych na świecie był postulat wprowadzenia polityki makroostrożnościowej. W artykule pzedstawiono najważniejsze cele, zaadania i instrumenty tej polityki oraz skonfrontowano je z dotychczasową polityką mikroostrożnościową. Brak szczegółówego określenia zadań polityki makroostrożnościowej i podobieństwo wielu potencjalnych jej instrumentów do narzędzi polityki mikroostrożnościowej może prowadzić do potencjalnych konfliktów w zakresie stosowania obu polityk. Pojawienie się takich konfliktów może prowadzić do obniżenia bezpieczeństwa sektora finansowego i zaufania jego klientów. Dostrzegając te zagrożenia, rekomendujemy stopniowe wdrażanie nowej polityki, gromadzenie niezbędnych doświadczeń w tym zakresie i odsunięcie w czasie decyzji o ewentualnym instytucjonalnym wyodrębnieniu polityki makroostrożnościowej zamiast jej podziału między kompetencje polityki mikroostrożnościowej i zadania banku centralnego.
EN
Research background: A significant share of Ukrainian enterprises in modern conditions is accompanied by unprofitability of their activity. On the back of Ukrainian enterprises unprofitability, there is a problem of methodical provision of financial risk management, which lies in the fact that a major part of scientistific works in this area focus on the study of internal factors and indicators of financial risk. At the same time, the system risk is levelled out. Purpose of the article: The aim of the study is the improvement of enterprises' financial risk management tools based on the assessment of the company's ability to neutralize financial risk taking into account system risk effects. Methods: The methodological apparatus includes: The "weight center" method; expert appraisal method; multidimensional factor analysis method; neural network apparatus. Findings & Value added: As a result of the study, an approach to assessing the impact of system risk on the ability of an enterprise to neutralize financial risk is developed. The expert evaluation method is based on an integrated model that allows for estimation of the ability of metallurgical enterprises to neutralize financial risks. The system risk factors, namely the factor of commodity markets state, the political and demographic, fiscal, monetary factors as well as the factor of the external balance financial estimates, were determined. By constructing a neural network, elasticity of enterprises' ability to neutralize financial risk in relation to systemic risk factors was calculated. The proposed approach allows for conducting preventive financial risk diagnostics on the basis of assessing the current financial status and the ability to neutralize financial risk in an open economic system - taking into account the system risk impact.
EN
The complex connections, spillovers and feedbacks of the global financial crisis remind how important it is to improve the analysis of risk modeling. This article introduces a new framework for mitigating systemic risk by using a risk-adjusted balance sheet approach. In this regard, the analysis of individual banks in Poland shows potential risk which could threaten all the financial system. Traditional banking models do not adequately measure risk position of financial institutions and cannot be used to understand risk within and between balance sheets in the financial sector. A fundamental subject is that accounting balance sheets do not indicate risk exposures, which are forward-looking. The paper concludes new directions for measuring systemic risk by using Merton’s model. It shows how risk management tools can be applied in new ways to measure and analyze systemic risk in the Polish banking system.
XX
Purpose: The paper aims at identifying the major information gaps related to the financial sector that have emerged during the last years, including the explanation of the reasons and consequences of these gaps. Methodology: The analysis is conducted using the descriptive methodology based on real developments in the financial sector. This analysis identifies substantial institutional changes within the financial sector combined with the introduction of new financial instruments that significantly increased information gaps related to financial developments. Findings: We found that one of the main reasons for the breakdown in the financial liquidity market was the sudden buildup of a systemic risk caused, among other things, by substantial information gaps and limitations in the transparency of financial markets. The low transparency of the financial markets has been caused by institutional changes and new financial instruments introduced within the financial sector. They were introduced by the financial institutions themselves to facilitate very risky financial activities that were very profitable for them in the short term, but – as it occurred – very disruptive for the whole financial system and the whole economy in the longer term. Research limitations: The analysis is limited only to the consideration of the causes and consequences of statistical gaps substantially reducing the transparency of the financial sector. A more comprehensive project should also explore and provide an appropriate proposal for remedy data and – even more important – a proposal to set up a macroprudential policy framework. Originality: The original contribution of the paper is the link between specific institutional changes within the financial sector as well as new financial instruments and the emergence of particular information gaps.
EN
This work is a response to the EIOPA paper entitled 'Systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance', which asserts that in order to evaluate the potential systemic risk (SR), the build-up of risk, especially risk arising over time, should be taken into account, as well as the interlinkages occurring in the financial sector and the whole economy. The topological indices of minimum spanning trees (MST) and the deltaCoVaR measure are the main tools used to analyse the systemic risk dynamics in the European insurance sector in the years 2005-2019. The article analyses the contribution of each of the 28 largest European insurance companies, including those appearing on the G-SIIs list, to systemic risk. Moreover, the paper aims to determine whether the most important contribution to systemic risk is made by companies with the highest betweenness centrality or the highest degree in the obtained MST.
EN
The aim of this paper is to determine to which extent systemic risk is a cause and an effect of the 2008 financial crisis. In the context of Spanish bailouts, we study the transmission of risk in the Spanish banking system. We make use of data from Google Trends on all Spanish financial institutions, which are selected as examples of one of the countries most affected in the last financial crisis. This analysis is one of the first attempts to use this kind of data for purposes of financial analysis. We compute the impact of each bailout in the banking system and we show how it affects the activity of the bailed-out bank and other institutions according to their status both before and after the announcement of the bailouts. We then show that it is possible to quantify the subjective systemic risk, an elusive concept that is difficult to measure with data from standard sources.
EN
The purpose of the article: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate relevance of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) in the context of Polish financial sector. This aspect is often overlooked, as there are no G-SIBs based in Poland. Methodology: Abovementioned aim is fulfilled by aims of providing an overview of the international characteristics and regulation of G-SIBs, describing the interrelations between these entities and institutions operating in the Polish market, and by showing how these connections can change the financial sector in Poland both directly and indirectly. The analysis is based on international standards on G-SIBs published by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as well as on EU legal acts implementing these documents. Additional sources on the „indirect” functioning of G-SIBs in Poland encompass annual reports of the entities linked to them, management reports on their activities, as well as articles and Internet data. Results of the research: G-SIBs influence Polish financial sector in several different ways. First, G-SIB-oriented regulation and supervision has an impact on Polish entities that are linked to them. Second, even indirect presence of G-SIBs is economically significant.
EN
Research background: The globalization trend has inevitably enhanced the connectivity of global financial markets, making the cyclicality of financial activities and the spread of market imbalances have received widespread attention, especially after the global financial crisis. Purpose of the article: To reduce the negative effects of the contagiousness of the financial cycles, it is necessary to study the persistence of financial cycles and carve out the total connectedness, spillover paths, and sources of risks on a global scale. In addition, understanding the relationship between the financial cycle and economic development is an important way to prevent financial crises. Methods: This paper adopts the nonlinear smoothing transition autoregressive (STAR) model to extract cyclical and phase characteristics of financial cycles based on 24 countries during 1971Q1?2015Q4, covering developed and developing countries, the Americas, Europe, and Asia regions. In addition, the frequency connectedness approach is used to measure the connectedness of financial cycles and the relationship between the global financial cycle and the global economy. Findings & value added: The analysis reveals that aggregate financial cycles persist for 13.3 years for smoothed and 8.7 years for unsmoothed on average. The national financial cycles are asynchronous and exhibit more prolonged expansions and faster contractions. The connectedness of financial cycles is highly correlated with systemic crises and contributes to the persistence and harmfulness of shocks. It is mainly driven by short-term components and exhibits more pronounced interconnectedness within regions than across regions. During the financial crisis, the global financial cycle movements precede and are longer than the business fluctuations. Based on the study, some policy implications are presented. This paper emphasizes the impact of systemic crises on the persistence of financial cycles and their connectedness, which contributes to refining research related to the coping mechanisms of financial crises.
EN
In this index study, the relationships between Stoxx Europe 600 and sector indices are analyzed. This research uses DCoVar and MES as analytical tools developed as a measure of systemic risk and applied to financial institutions, to sectoral subindexes. For the sake of systemic risk assessment we calculate the dynamic correlation model with bivariate t copula distribution. We focus on the impact of sectors on the market. Despite the similarity between the time series plots of both measures, with maximum values on similar days, the compatibility of daily rankings, measured as a percentage of concordant pairs, is equal to about 50%. The rankings of the most and least risky sectors are different and depend on the choice of measure, but in the case of both we observe poor stability. When sectors are ranked in terms of the highest and lowest mean values at specific intervals (designated by the structural break estimation method, which surpisingly detects very similar dates of structural changes) we draw the same conclusions. For both measures we note huge percentage changes in mean values of risk, especially in the period from February 24, 2020 till August 20, 2020 with respect to the previous period. The percentage changes for both intervals indicate the same most risky sectors, but the indications of both measures are not consistent.
EN
The macroprudential regulatory framework of Basel III imposes the same minimum capital and liquidity requirements on all banks around the world to ensure global competitiveness of banks. Using an agent-based model of the financial system, we find that this is not a robust framework to achieve (inter)national financial stability, because efficient regulation has to embrace the economic structure and behaviour of financial market participants, which differ from country to country. Market-based financial systems do not profit from capital and liquidity regulations, but from a ban on proprietary trading (Volcker rule). In homogeneous or bank-based financial systems, the most effective regulatory policy to ensure financial stability depends on the stability measure used. Irrespective of financial system architecture, direct restrictions of banks’ investment portfolios are more effective than indirect restrictions through capital, leverage and liquidity regulations. Applying the model to the Swiss financial system, we find that increasing regulatory complexity excessively has destabilizing effects.These results highlight for the first time a necessary change in the regulatory paradigm to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of financial regulations with regards to fostering the resilience of the financial system.
EN
Research background: Increased regulations reducing systemic risk are essentially underpinned by the understanding of the global nature and sources of instability of the financial system. In the economic literature, there are many arguments presented by critical supporters and opponents of measuring and reporting global systemically important entities. Purpose of the article: In response to the requirements of regulators, the article seeks to identify systematically important regulated stock markets for selected global stock exchanges by developing a composite ratio. Additionally, it provides empirical evidence concerning their risk exploration. Methods: The proposed method uses weighted average values of indicators grouped in four categories: (1) market size, (2) cross-jurisdictional activity and interconnectedness, (3) substitutability, (4) complexity. The research covers stock exchanges, reported to WFE, spanning the period 2008?2017. Findings & Value added: The study finds that the problem of systemic risk on global stock exchanges is growing despite numerous prudential regulations. In order to obtain a more complete assessment of market systemic sensitivity, regulators should take into account a wider range of indicators and calculations such as cross-jurisdictional activity and market complexity.
EN
The article discusses the issues of paradigm of finance and a rise of the so-called new risks as drivers of systemic risk. The aim of the paper is to highlight observed changes in finance paradigm that in the classical approach involved a “servient role” of financial institutions towards the client with a view to economic growth. At the time before the crisis, the paradigm evolved towards “greed” of financial institutions. According to the authors, a shift of finance paradigm and a rise of the so-called new risks may affect the level of systemic risk.
PL
W artykule poruszono kwestie zmiany paradygmatu finansów oraz wzrost znaczenia tzw. nowych rodzajów ryzyka jako nośników ryzyka systemowego. Celem artykułu jest zasygnalizowanie zmian, jakie obserwuje się w paradygmacie finansów, który w klasycznym ujęciu polegał na „służebności” instytucji finansowych wobec klienta, mając na uwadze potrzeby klientów oraz wzrost gospodarczy. W okresie poprzedzającym kryzys można było zaobserwować ewolucję tak rozumianego paradygmatu finansów. Instytucje finansowe zaczęły działać w roli mocodawcy własnych interesów, co sprawiło, że zamiast „służebności” zaczęła dominować „chciwość” instytucji finansowych. Według autorów artykułu zmiana paradygmatu finansów oraz dodatkowo wzrost znaczenia tzw. nowych rodzajów ryzyka mogą wpłynąć na poziom ryzyka systemowego.
EN
Systemic liquidity risk is the risk that an adverse event will result in simultaneous liquidity problems in a  substantial portion of the financial system. The paper describes several aspects of this risk in the Polish banking environment: decreasing share of liquid assets in the balance sheet, growing maturity mismatch, risks related to foreign currency denominated loans financed through złoty deposits accompanied by FX and currency swaps or through external liabilities. Dependence on currency derivatives and foreign financing contributed to increased liquidity tensions in the financial crisis, including relative increase in customer deposit interest rates. The paper also presents the scale of liquidity support granted during the crisis by the central bank to banks operating in Poland.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
EN
This article contains an analysis of the impact channels through which credit rating agencies may affect systemic risk, while raising the research question of whether reputational risk is a sufficient mechanism for disciplining credit rating agencies and motivating them to care for the high quality of ratings. Research into reputational risk for rating agencies has led to the conclusion that credit rating agencies manage reputational risk. During a boom period, they perceive this risk as low and hence they tend to offer overestimated ratings. It is difficult then to show errors in rating decisions, and both issuers and investors benefit from high ratings. It is only during a bearish period that assessments become more diverse and better reflect the actual credit risk, sometimes overestimating it. During such a period, the likelihood of insolvency and therefore the need for a gradual reduction in ratings are higher. This proves the existence of reputation cycles and puts into question the claim that agency ratings are through-the-cycle ratings. Due to the possibility of an independent credit risk assessment of single-name securities, ratings are not usually overestimated for these securities, while the reputation of rating agencies built on the single-name instruments market is transferred to the structured instruments market where risk is underestimated. In order to reduce systemic risk, in both the United States and the European Union, decisions have been made to subject rating agencies to civil liability. There was also a need to define a regulatory framework for rating agencies and to intensify supervision.
PL
Artykuł zawiera analizę kanałów oddziaływania agencji ratingowych na ryzyko systemowe, jednocześnie stawiając pytanie badawcze, czy ryzyko reputacyjne jest wystarczającym mechanizmem dyscyplinującym agencje ratingowe i motywującym je do dbałości o wysoką jakość nadawanych ocen. Badania nad ryzykiem reputacyjnym w działalności agencji ratingowych pozwoliły na wyciągnięcie wniosku, iż agencje ratingowe zarządzają ryzykiem reputacyjnym. W okresie hossy postrzegają to ryzyko jako niskie i stąd ratingi są przeszacowywane. Trudno jest wówczas wykazać błędy w decyzjach dotyczących ratingów, a korzyści z wysokich ocen uzyskują zarówno emitenci, jak i inwestorzy. Dopiero w okresie bessy oceny stają się bardziej zróżnicowane i lepiej oddają poziom faktycznego ryzyka kredytowego, niekiedy go przeszacowując. W tym okresie prawdopodobieństwo niewypłacalności i tym samym konieczności skokowej redukcji oceny jest wyższe. Dowodzi to istnienia cykli reputacyjnych i poddaje pod wątpliwość tezę forsowaną przez agencje ratingi, iż ich ratingi są ocenami „through the cycle”. Ze względu na możliwość dokonania niezależnej oceny ryzyka kredytowego papierów typu single name, w przypadku tych walorów ratingi najczęściej nie są przeszacowywane, natomiast reputacja agencji ratingowych zbudowana na rynku instrumentów single name transferowana jest na rynek instrumentów strukturyzowanych, na którym ryzyko jest niedoszacowane. Samoregulacja, w przypadku której wystarczającym argumentem za poprawą jakości procesów oraz oferowanych produktów dla instytucji kreującej informację, wykorzystywaną następnie w procesie decyzyjnym, powinno być ryzyko reputacyjne, nie zdaje zatem egzaminu. Dlatego w celu redukcji ryzyka systemowego, zarówno w Stanach Zjednoczonych, jak i w Unii Europejskiej, zdecydowano się na objęcie agencji ratingowych odpowiedzialnością cywilną. Powstała również potrzeba zdefiniowania ram regulacyjnych dla agencji ratingowych oraz intensyfikacji nadzoru nad nimi.
PL
Celem opracowania jest analiza ekspozycji oraz identyfikacja determinantów i kanałów transmisji ryzyka systemowego sektora ubezpieczeń w krajach Unii Europejskiej. Zakres czasowy badań obejmuje lata 2005–2012. Badania wykazały, że można mówić o wzroście poziomu ryzyka systemowego w europejskim sektorze ubezpieczeń, ponieważ: (1) wzrasta znaczenie działalności inwestycyjnej zakładów ubezpieczeń, o czym świadczy znacząca dynamika wzrostu wartości portfela inwestycji zakładów przy jednoczesnym spadku dynamiki przypisu składki, (2) w sektorze ubezpieczeń na życie, gdzie istotną rolę odgrywa aktywność inwestycyjna zakładów, wystąpił znaczący wzrost koncentracji operatorów rynkowych w krajach z dojrzałym, wysoko rozwiniętym rynkiem, tj. Austria, Irlandia, Wielka Brytania.
XX
The aim of the paper is to identify the key determinants of the systemic risk of insurance sector and to analyze the potential of insurance sector in the countries of the European Union to create systemic risk. The research time range covers the period of 2005–2012. The main generators of the systemic risk in the insurance sector are: size and non-insurance activity of insurance companies. The level of the systemic risk in the European insurance sector has been growing, because: (1) the importance of investment activities of insurance companies increases (there was a significant growth of the investment portfolio value with a simultaneous decrease in written premium growth, (2) in the life insurance sector, which plays an important role in investment activity facilities, there was a significant increase in the concentration of market operators in countries with a mature, highly developed market, i.e.: Austria, Ireland and United Kingdom.
EN
The aim of this article is to identify systemically important banks on a European scale, in accordance with the criteria proposed by the supervisory authorities. In this study we discuss the analytical framework for identifying and benchmarking systemically important financial institutions. An attempt to define systemically important institutions is specified their characteristics under the existing and proposed regulations. In a selected group of the largest banks in Europe the following indicators ie.: leverage, liquidity, capital ratio, asset quality and profitability are analyzed as a source of systemic risk. These figures will be confronted with the average value obtained in the whole group of commercial banks in Europe. It should help finding the answer to the question, whether the size of the institution generates higher systemic risk? The survey will be conducted on the basis of the financial statements of commercial banks in 2007 and 2010 with the available statistical tools, which should reveal the variability of risk indicators over time. We find that the largest European banks were characterized by relative safety and without excessive risk in their activities. Therefore, a fundamental feature of increased regulatory limiting systemic risk should understand the nature and sources of instability, and mobilizing financial institutions (large and small) to change their risk profile and business models in a way that reduces the instability of the financial system globally.
EN
The study characterizes the initiative providing for the special supervision mode over the insurance firms creating systemic risk – G-SIIs and the selected aspects of this initiative potential impact on the insurance market. The discussed potential impact was presented in the system of positive and negative influence on supervision institutions and insurance firms. The conclusion emphasizes that the solutions dedicated to a small number of insurance companies can have an indirect impact on the global insurance market functioning.
PL
W opracowaniu została dokonana ogólna charakterystyka założeń inicjatywy przewidującej specjalny tryb nadzoru nad zakładami ubezpieczeń kreującymi ryzyko systemowe – G-SIIs oraz wybrane aspekty potencjalnego wpływu tej inicjatywy na rynek ubezpieczeniowy. Potencjalny wpływ został przedstawiony w układzie pozytywnego i negatywnego oddziaływania na instytucje nadzorujące i zakłady ubezpieczeń. W konkluzji należy podkreślić, że rozwiązania przewidziane dla niewielkiej liczby zakładów ubezpieczeń mogą pośrednio wpłynąć na funkcjonowanie globalnego rynku ubezpieczeniowego.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2021
|
vol. 83
|
issue 2
8-31
EN
This article presents the results of an empirical study on the contribution to systemic risk of financial institutions included in the WIG-BANKI index. Daily data from the beginning of 2013 to the end of March 2021 and the “Component Expected Shortfall” method are used. The results of the calculations indicate an increase in the contribution to systemic risk of the largest financial institutions with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. At the same time, periods of increased contribution are compared to ESPI’s announcements regarding the bank’s situation. The results of the analysis show that the appearance of negative information about a given institution and the interweaving of optimistic and pessimistic messages resulted in the increase in the bank’s contribution to systemic risk.
PL
W niniejszym artykule prezentowane są wyniki badania empirycznego poświęconego kontrybucji do ryzyka systemowego instytucji finansowych wchodzących w skład indeksu WIG-BANKI. Wykorzystywane są dane dzienne od początku 2013 roku do końca marca 2021 roku oraz metoda „Component Expected Shortfall”. Wyniki obliczeń wskazują na wzrost kontrybucji do ryzyka systemowego największych instytucji finansowych wraz z wybuchem pandemii koronawirusa. Jednocześnie okresy podwyższonej kontrybucji zestawiane są z komunikatami ESPI dotyczącymi sytuacji banku. Wyniki przeprowadzonej analizy wskazują, że pojawianie się negatywnych informacji dotyczących danej instytucji oraz przeplatanie się komunikatów optymistycznych i pesymistycznych przyczyniało się do wzrostu kontrybucji banku do ryzyka systemowego.
EN
The articles presents a  mechanism of naked short selling as a  new source of systemic risk quoting the example of silver market. For starters, financial instability of banks is discussed and presented as a  source of systemic risk. Attention is also paid to theoretical consequences following from naked short selling. The last section of the paper is the analysis of a  specific case, namely the concentration of short positions in silver owned by JP Morgan bank. In conclusion the author highlights the fact that naked short selling may pose systemic risk due to the insolvency of investors who are not capable of supplying the silver they have sold.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
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