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1

Elektroniczne instrumenty płatnicze – tendencje rozwojowe

100%

Szpringer W.

e-mentor

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2013

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issue 3 (50)

89-100

EN

In the article, the author points to an interesting aspect of e-business models development – namely „intercepting” the value of new technologies and the ability to „unblock” the hidden (potential) values brought by technology. The paper describes the development of consumer finance services and discusses so called two- or multi-sided markets. In addition, the author presents three areas of innovation in retail payment: innovative payment instruments, canals and manners of payment as well as innovative forms of money.

2

Payment Card Systems as an Example of Two-sided Markets – a Challenge for Antitrust Authorities

100%

Tosza K.

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

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2009

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vol. 2(2)

125-140

EN

This article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems. Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.

3

Mobile Wallets’ Business Models: Refining Strategic Partnerships

88%

Buchinger U., Ranaivoson H. R., Ballon P.

Organizacija

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2015

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vol. 48

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issue 2

88-98

EN

Background and Purpose: Though Mobile Wallets have the potential to entirely substitute their physical predecessor, many Mobile Wallets narrow their operations to one particular feature. This might be because of strategic business- model design choices to position themselves strategically as intermediates between users and business partners (third parties) in more delimited markets. Thus, Mobile Wallet Applications (MWAs) often represent platforms in narrow two-sided market structures. Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper focuses on the economics of such platforms by the means of a business model analysis. It examines how business partners are integrated in four MWAs’ strategies: Key Ring, FidMe, Apple Passbook and Qustomer. Results: The paper shows that MWAs strive to incorporate not only a large quantity of partners but also such with a high brand value (quality of partners) in their organization design. These partners shape their service design since none of the platforms offer products or services themselves. Hence, MWAs are dependent on the third parties’ capacity and willingness to fulfill engagements and meet the customer demands. Conclusion: MWAs - though concerned with the inclusion and management of loyalty points and schemes - do not leverage the possibility to generate revenue via third parties’ loyalty points. Theoretically, MWAs could reward or redeem loyalty points themselves.

4

Competition Mechanisms in the Sharing Economy

88%

Godlewska M.

e-mentor

|

2019

|

issue 3 (80)

51-57

EN

In recent years, the sharing economy has experienced rapid growth across the globe in terms of the number of participants and transactions, as well as profits. Experts claim that the sharing economy offers new possibilities for entrepreneurship, reducing operating costs, creating new jobs, increasing the effectiveness of economic systems, giving better allocation of resources and assets, as well as increasing the competitiveness of numerous sectors and the quality of life for consumers. The purpose of this article is to study the competition mechanisms utilized by online platforms operating in the sharing economy. Case studies were conducted on 20 leading online platforms operating in the main sectors of the sharing economy (e.g. transportation, tourism, finance, catering, education, leisure, animal care), which rendered it possible to identify 5 different competition mechanisms, ranging from aggressive, profit and economic advantage-oriented competitive pricing to pro-social, non-price competition based on non-profit activities, as well as offering social and epistemic advantage. The main actors in the sharing economy apply various price and non-price competition mechanisms. Nevertheless, in practice, users are frequently “forced” by online platforms to compete for customers using pricing. This happens especially in situations where both the prices and the process of matching providers with recipients are regulated top-down by the platform. Online platforms frequently offer service providers no freedom in terms of decision-making. Moreover, online platforms, by using inflated and hardly credible ratings, render users unable to use non-price, reputation-based competition mechanisms, which, experts claim, may lead to the creation of a new form of precariat.

5

Crowdfunding - zjawisko, problemy, regulacja

63%

Lissowska M.

Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics

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2018

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vol. 293

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issue 1

59-86

EN

The objective of this paper is to look into crowdfunding as a new way of providing funding to those in need. The author also evaluates the need for regulating crowdfunding in the European Union. The analysis makes use of the concept of two-sided markets [Rochet and Tirole, 2004], and it also refers to institutional economics for its theoretical framework. When discussing the benefits and risks of crowdfunding, I underline the substantial risk faced by investors. Often, due to the use of a business model in which their decisions are replaced by the platform, they cannot protect themselves against risk. As to small and medium-sized enterprises, besides the benefits of easier and possibly cheaper access to funds, I underline the importance of negative selection and moral hazard, which are detrimental not only to the investors, but also to the fundraisers. Additionally, the features of investors (who often make emotional decisions) and of platforms (liquidity risk and risk of default) amplify the risks for business participants, including SMEs as fundraisers. The substantial asymmetry of the negotiating power of the platform over other participants and the divergence of their interests-considering that the platform is much less exposed to financial risk than the investors-creates a specific institutional situation that prevents spontaneous adjustment of the rules governing the functioning of a platform to the diverging interests of participants. In this context, I reflect on the need for future harmonised regulation of crowdfunding in the European Union. I particularly highlight the need to regulate loan-based crowdfunding, which is the least regulated form of crowdfunding at the national level. Besides the protection of investors, which is already addressed by national regulations in most member countries, the issue of protection of fundraisers should also be given due attention.

PL

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie crowdfundingu, nowej metody dostarczania funduszy tym, którzy ich potrzebują, oraz określenie potrzeby jego regulacji. Analiza wykorzystuje podejście teoretyczne rynków dwustronnych (two sided markets - Rochet i Tirole [2004]) i podejście ekonomii instytucjonalnej. Analizując zalety i ryzyka crowdfundingu podkreślono, że fundatorzy ponoszą znaczne ryzyko, a często, z powodu modelu biznesowego, w którym ich decyzje są całkowicie zastępowane przez platformę, nie są w stanie się przed nim zabezpieczyć. Jeśli chodzi o MSP, nie negując zalet łatwiejszego i prawdopodobnie tańszego dostępu do funduszy, podkreślono jednak znaczenie negatywnej selekcji i nielojalności po zawarciu transakcji, co jest szkodliwe nie tylko dla fundatorów, lecz również dla otrzymujących fundusze. Dodatkowo niektóre cechy fundatorów (często emocjonalne podejmowanie przez nich decyzji) i platform (ryzyko płynności i ryzyko upadłości platformy) zwiększają ryzyko uczestników tego typu biznesu, zarówno MSP jak i fundatorów. Znaczna przewaga siły negocjacyjnej platformy nad pozostałymi uczestnikami i rozbieżność interesów, biorąc pod uwagę, że platforma jest znacznie mniej narażona na ryzyko finansowe niż fundatorzy, tworzy specyficzną sytuację instytucjonalną, która nie pozwala na spontaniczne dostosowanie reguł działania platformy do rozbieżnych interesów uczestników. W tym kontekście rozważono możliwą przyszłą zharmonizowaną regulację crowdfundingu w sytuacji, kiedy obecnie nie podlega on specyficznej legislacji Unii Europejskiej. Podkreślono zwłaszcza potrzebę regulacji crowdfundingu pożyczkowego, która jest najmniej rozwinięta na poziomie poszczególnych państw. Poza ochroną fundatorów, która jest już brana pod uwagę w legislacji krajowej, Autorka artykułu sądzi, że również powinno się zapewnić odpowiednie miejsce ochronie otrzymujących fundusze.

6

Przejęcie Media Regionalne przez Polskapresse okiem ekonomisty

63%

Stryszowska M.

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny

|

2014

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vol. 3

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issue 6

52-60

PL

Niniejszy artykuł omawia decyzję UOKiK dotyczącą przejęcia Media Regionalne przez Polskapresse. Przedstawia krótkie streszczenie tej decyzji oraz wskazuje na możliwe zastosowanie narzędzi analizy ekonomicznej w celu wzbogacenia przyjętej definicji rynku właściwego oraz przeprowadzonej oceny skutków koncentracji

EN

The article discusses the decision of the Polish competition authority (President of UOKiK) concerning the acquisition of Media Regionalne by Polskapresse. It presents a brief overview of the case and suggests what economic analyses could have been used in its market definition stage and for the evaluation of the merger’s effects

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1 Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics

1 Organizacija

1 Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

1 internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny

1 Ballon P.

1 Buchinger U.

1 Godlewska M.

1 Lissowska M.

1 Ranaivoson H. R.

1 Stryszowska M.

1 Szpringer W.

1 Tosza K.

1 2019

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