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EN
Among all the different types of penalties that exist in the various juridical systems around the world, capital punishment, also known as the death penalty, is one of the most controversial ones. The discussion about its legitimacy and legality crosses social, philosophical, cultural, religious and historical fields. The present article aims to first analyze how capital punishment is treated in different parts of the world, whether it is present or not, and to later on focus on the attempts to justify such a harsh punishment, by both the retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment.
EN
All around the world many people suffer from the lack of sufficient income, well-being or good health. Who among the poor should we help first? Some of the most influential research on poverty has been developed by a famous economist and philosopher Amartya K. Sen. This article is concerned with the problem of reciprocal relations between various concepts and theories of poverty, kinds of ethics and taking decisions about helping poor people. According to Sen, while taking decisions to help the poor we should base our arguments on the capability approach rather than on the basic needs approach, on the entitlement approach rather than the food availability decline, and on the capability rights system rather than utilitarianism.
EN
Utilitarianism as an innovative and original stream of ethical and political thought has enriched the philosophical discourse of the last three centuries. Utilitarian thinkers claim that maximization of pleasure correlated with minimization of pain is the correct way to create an objective catalog of rules or behaviors that result in the formation of the highest utility for a society and its individuals. From a methodological perspective, there are differences among the utilitarian philosophers on issues such as: happiness, pleasure or utility guide to diametrical disaccord on an ethical or institutional area. The present analysis of the utilitarian thought represents some of the interesting differences in interpretation of this doctrine. However, utilitarianism does not include logical or intellectually strong arguments for the protection of an individual’s rights against the interest of people at large. Thus, this doctrine during the 18th and the 19th centuries postulated the political egalitarianism. Nowadays, utilitarianism has lost its strong ethical position. In the past, utilitarianism was a political instrument to protect most of the people in a society from an arbitrary reigning of small elite groups. In recent times, this thought legitimizes the coercion of the majority will regardless of the fact that other smaller groups may have different political views. Such thinking allows to objectify the individual man which is only identified with instrumentality to maximization of utility. The author analyzes the writings of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, and compares their doctrines with the scientific literature and forwards a basic thesis on the universal principles of utilitarianism. The author argues that the actual rules of political ethics under conditions of limitation theory of utility append the law of inviolability of the natural rights of an individual.
EN
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and member institutions' presentation of major college basketball in the United States as an endeavor of amateurism is contradictory to the realities of college basketball. Discussed are the following amateurism related hypocrisies: a) requiring players to fully engage in formally structured basketball activities as a priority over education, b) expansion of the post season March Madness tournament regardless of the fact that players will miss more classes, c) compensating basketball coaches with salaries contingent on success defined by winning, and d) the athletic scholarship. Literature supports amateurism hypocrisies in major college basketball (Bermuda 2010, Colombo 2010, Sundram 2010). Understanding the effect of NCAA and member institution hypocritical behavior on determining the moral standing of major college basketball is discussed in the context of claims by Grant (1997), that Machiavelli recognized the necessity of political hypocrisy. A utilitarian analysis using Jeremy Bentham's holistic utilitarian approach calling for the agent to "sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other" (p. 39) to determine the degree of morality, indicates a presence of morality in major college basketball. Under the premise that major college basketball is an extension of core values held by higher education, Aristotle's Golden Mean (Aristotle, 1941) is used to help identify a point of balanced moral perspective concerning sentiments of the sporting community held for the sport. The end goal is to maintain major college basketball's strong level of satisfaction among members of the sporting community, while controlling the false representation of amateurism surrounding it to preserve the moral and structural integrity of major college basketball.
EN
Most people, especially in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, suffer and die from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, whereas other people in rich countries are extremely well-off. Because of the globalization process neither individuals nor governments can claim to be unaware of what is happening in the Third World. In this paper I defend the claim that, since we are living in a “global village”, we have greater moral responsibility for poverty. Thus, our moral responsibility is less limited than it usually seems to be. However, we do not have to be extremely impartial, which is recommended by utilitarianism (Garrett Hardin, Peter Singer), concentrating only on the consequences of action and its utility (agent-neutral evaluation). Yet, what we can include in our moral evaluation of poverty are human rights and an individual point of view, which are defended by Amartya Sen’s capability approach and Thomist framework (agent-relative evaluation).
EN
Sidgwick’s defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams’s condemnation of it as a ‘Government House utilitarianism’. It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications.
EN
Utilitarianism as innovatory and original stream of ethical and political thought enrich philosophical discourse of last three centuries. Utilitarian thinkers pointed out that maximization of pleasure correlated with minimization of pain is correct way to create objective catalog of rules or behaviors which application resulted in formation of the highest utility, good for an individual and good for a society. From methodological point of view there are differences between utilitarian philosophers thought, such as: happiness, pleasure or utility guide to diametrical disaccord on ethical or institutional area. The present scientific analyzes of utilitarian thought represent attractive differences in interpretation of this doctrine. Despite of this utilitarianism does not include logical and intellectual strong arguments of protection individual man rights in the case of conflict with interest people at large. Thus this doctrine in eighteen and nineteen centuries match to postulate political egalitarianism, but in nowadays utilitarianism lost its strong ethical position. In the past utilitarianism was a political instrument attended to protect a majority of society from arbitrary reigning of small elite group of people. Modernly this thought legitimize coercion a will of majority even though other smaller group of citizens have different political point of view. This kind of thinking allow to objectify individual man which is only identified with instrumentality to maximization of utility. The author analyzed thought of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. Afterwards he compared their doctrines with science literature and presented a thesis that is basic and universal principles of utilitarianism and it could be actual rules of political ethics under condition of limitation theory of utility by appending law of inviolability natural rights of man.
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Utilitarismus, nacismus a eutanazie

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EN
The article is an answer to prof. Munzarová who criticised my defence of physician‑assisted suicide. The article points to shortcomings in the reply of prof. Munzarová which flow from the author’s underestimation of normative theory. Among these shortcomings are the ignoring of the arguments of her opponent; her calling into question the moral credit of the proponents of the competing theory (utilitarianism) rather than a critical analysis; unclear theoretical principles (a switching between paternalism and autonomy, the presentation of the “principle of double-effect” as the standpoint of common sense); an unconvincing version of the “argument of the slippery slope” (ignoring the diametrical differences between the contemporary demand of some patients for assisted death and the Nazi programme of involuntary euthanasia).
CS
Článek je odpovědí prof. Munzarové, jež kritizovala mou obhajobu sebevraždy za asistence lékaře. Článek upozorňuje na nedostatky v replice prof. Munzarové, jež plynou z autorčina podceňování normativní teorie. Mezi tyto nedostatky patří: přehlížení argumentů oponenta; zpochybňování morálního kreditu nositelů konkurenční teorie (utilitarismu) namísto její kritické analýzy; nevyjasněná vlastní teoretická východiska (lavírování mezi paternalismem a autonomií, vydávání „principu dvojího účinku“ za stanovisko zdravého rozumu); nepřesvědčivá verze „argumentu kluzkého svahu“ (ignorování diametrálních rozdílů mezi současnými požadavky některých pacientů na asistovanou smrt a nacistickým programem nedobrovolné eutanazie).
EN
Jeremy Bentham is one of the most important Anglo‑Saxon political thinkers, jurists, social reformers and founders of utilitarianism. He also deserves a prominent position in the history of democratic ideas. Bentham not only perceived popular rule as a vehicle for the materialisation of his vision of utilitarian society, but he also gave us a detailed picture of the basic institutions of that form of democracy. In this article the Author suggests that Benthamiam political concept is not liberal but radical and also rooted in continental radical philosophy of French Enlightenment. By rejecting classical liberal ideas such as natural rights, law of nature, social contract and limited government he opened the door for the democratic tyranny of mediocrity justified by the victory of equality over liberty.
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Uncertainty and Probability within Utilitarian Theory

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Diametros
|
2017
|
issue 53
6-25
EN
Probability is a central concept in utilitarian moral theory, almost impossible to do without. I attempt to clarify the role of probability, so that we can be clear about what we are aiming for when we apply utilitarian theory to real cases. I point out the close relationship between utilitarianism and expected-utility theory, a normative standard for individual decision-making. I then argue that the distinction between “ambiguity” and risk is a matter of perception. We do not need this distinction in the theory itself. In order to make this argument I rely on the personalist theory of probability, and I try to show that, within this theory, we do not need to give up completely on the idea that a “true probability” (other than 0 or 1) exists. Finally, I discuss several examples of applied utilitarianism, emphasizing the role of probability in each example: reasonable doubt (in law), the precautionary principle in risk regulation, charity, climate change, and voting.
EN
The paper presents ecclesial spirituality in opposition to anthropological threats brought about by utilitarianism and consumerism. It shows ecclesial spirituality from the angle of its (paradoxically) vertical fundament, derived from the “faith in the event” (Jean Daniélou) of the eternity plunging into the earthly sphere. It provokes the contemporary culture, contesting some of its canons. It also protects man against the expansion of those social trends which, reducing the status of a human person, answer its “desire for happiness” with offers such as: purchase, use and “letting off steam.” Utilitarianism and consumerism are animated by a spirit directed horizontally, leading man towards goods that are material, financial, ludic or prestige-oriented, characterized by short-term, “seasonal” usefulness. They do not bring the purchasers long-lasting satisfaction (of possessing and consuming), instead they raise “self-digesting passion,” which enforces a style of constant purchasing “something new” (fashionable today) and getting rid of “the old” (the previous season).Spirituality open to transcendence, based on evangelical vision of man and humanity faces the necessity of preserving its own identity from being contaminated by the “spirit of the times,” and of promoting anthropology in which man, multiplying goods (work, creativity, economics) uses them decently and honestly (ethical norms), preserving the ability to delay (“not now”) the experience of happiness and persistent (with faith) reaching for eternal perspectives.
EN
According to the utilitarian reasoning, people should always choose the least bad option of action. For example, they should sacrifice one person to save more people. The act of demanding from anybody such a decision is named „an unrestricted demand”. The justification of the belief that we should not address unrestricted demands to anybody usually takes form of deontological argumentation (deontological strategy), which points to deontological principles (e. g. „do not kill”) or rights (e. g. the right to live), leaving apart the consequences of the actions. In the following article we defend the thesis that the equally successful justification of the interdiction of addressing unrestricted demands can be formulated on the basis of the modified calculus of consequences (consequential strategy). Of course, modifying consequentialism by taking into account rights or egoistic motives is not sufficient. We can obtain the successful defence from unrestricted demands within the consequentialist frame by resigning from the impartiality condition on behalf of the evaluator relativity concept.
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Morálka jako věda?

88%
EN
Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Va­lues (2010) argues that the question of moral values is none other than the question of the happiness of conscious beings. In his account Harris sets himself three tasks: to establish ethics as a fully rational and purely scientific discipline, to reinforce and defend naturalism, and to rest the meaning of human life on a non-religious grounding. Harris’ book has met with a negative reaction in journal reviews, but not all the criticisms are justified and the real problem with Harris’ approach, in my view, is different to what his critics suppose. There are at least three reasons why we should reject Harris’ conception of morality as a science. The first is his confused conception of science which brings with it the absence of any scientific (on Harris’ understanding) ethical problems and of their solution. The second reason is an incoherent approach in his account of the origin of values. And finally, the last reason for rejecting Harris’ vision is the form of life which he offers us as the result of accepting ethics founded on science.
PL
Artykuł ten analizuje za pomocą metody równowagi refleksyjnej warunki tła naszych rozważnych sądów na temat sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, wygenerowanych przez eksperyment myślowy określany mianem „Trójki dzieci i fletu”. Eksperyment ten został zaproponowany i w interesujący sposób skomentowany przez Amartya Sena w jego książce pod tytułem The Idea of Justice. W swym artykule stawiam tezę, że – w przeciwieństwie do konkluzji, które Sen wywiódł z tego eksperymentu myślowego – aby utylitarna i egalitarna wizja sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej mogła pozostać w mocy, szereg innych twierdzeń dotyczących życia społecznego oraz dystrybucji zasobów, których nie jesteśmy chętni zaakceptować, musi być prawdziwych. Argumentuję również, że nie jest prawdą twierdzenie Sena, iż zdecydowanie o tym, który ze wzorców dystrybucji powinien przeważyć w tym eksperymencie myślowym, nie jest wcale „trudne”. Co więcej, twierdzę też, że tzw. naturalny czy libertariański model dystrybucji nie zakłada tych samych warunków tła, co utylitarny i egalitarny model dystrybucji, a których to warunków nie jesteśmy skłonni zaakceptować. W artykule swym dochodzę do wniosku, że biorąc pod uwagę cały szereg niespójności, nieintuicyjnych konsekwencji oraz sprzecznych z doniesieniami nauk szczegółowych implikacji rozwiązań utylitarystycznych i egalitarystycznych, to naturalny model dystrybucji stanowi jedyne rozwiązanie dylematu fletu.
EN
In this paper, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium to analyse background conditions of our considered judgements about distributive justice generated by a thought experiment called “Three Children and a Flute”, proposed and interestingly commented upon by Amartya Sen in his book The Idea of Justice. I claim that, contrary to Sen’s conclusions drawn from the thought experiment, for the utilitarian and egalitarian visions of distributive justice to hold other things about distribution of resources and social life that we are not willing to accept must be true and that it is not the case then that it is a ‘difficult decision’ to make what pattern of distribution should prevail in the thought experiment. To boot, I hold that libertarian or natural pattern of distribution does not presuppose these background conditions that we are not willing to accept and which are presupposed by egalitarian and utilitarian distributive patterns. I conclude that taking into consideration the fact that there is a plethora of inconsistencies, counter-intuitive consequences and anti-scientific implications of the utilitarian and egalitarian solutions to the thought experiment, it is a natural pattern of distribution that prevails in the ‘flute dilemma’.
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Inocent-Mária V. Szaniszló o Peteru Singerovi

88%
EN
The Slovak theologian Inocent-Mária V. Szaniszló, in his article Does man have a special status in the world in relation to other animals?, attempts to subject the ethical thought of Peter Singer to a philosophical critique. In this polemical reaction I show that the author interprets Singer in a very misleading, and often quite mistaken, way. I attribute the reason for this to a relatively serious fact: the Slovak theologian has probably not read the main works of the criticised author. I attempt to set forth the most serious mistakes and, in the context of this discussion, to describe in detail how Singer really understands speciesism and his own preference utilitarianism.
CS
Slovenský teolog Inocent-Mária V. Szaniszló se ve svém článku Má človek vo vesmíre zvláštne postavenie medzi inými živočíchmi? pokouší podrobit filosofické kritice etické myšlení Petera Singera. Ve své polemické reakci ukazuji, že autor interpretuje Singera velmi zavádějícím, často zcela chybným způsobem. Určuji, že příčinou je poměrně závažný fakt: slovenský teolog pravděpodobně nečetl hlavní díla kritizovaného autora. Pokouším se některé nejvážnější omyly uvést na správnou míru a v rámci diskuze přiblížit, jak Singer skutečně smýšlí o speciesismu a o svém preferenčním utilitarismu.
EN
The article discusses the arguments against poetry that were used in Piotr Chmielowski’s Zarys literatury polskiej z ostatnich lat szesnastu [An outline of the literature of the last sixteen years] by its author. The critic’s intention was to diminish the significance of poetry and, in effect, to push poetry to the margin of literary life. To achieve that, Chmielowski presented a number of examples where modern poetry was not capable of grappling with the problems and challenges of the modern world. Chmielowski also instilled a vision in which writing poems itself appeared to be atavistic and as a relic of an earlier stage of evolution. Since lyric poetry made a particular core of literature, to challenge its position in literature in the name of progress made it possible to question all traditional “authorities”. The author of Zarys indicated examples testifying to the vitality of the novel and future possibilities in the development of this particular genre, whereas his formulated accusations against poetry and poets included their general bad condition (physical, mental and psychical). In addition, Chmielowski accused poetry of insincerity and untruthfulness. With regard to the poetics of the discussed poems, Chmielowski just limited himself to briefly formulated allegations and objections of their rhetoricality and epigonic character.
EN
The formation of the human conscience is a controverted question in both philosophical ethics and moral philosophy. Conscience refers to one’s conception and understanding of the moral good. An especially significant manifestation of the problem of conscience in the 20th and 21st centuries is the impact of ideology on the individual person’s moral sense. This article considers the impact of two 19th century philosophies―Mill’s utilitarianism and Marxism―on contemporary moral thought insofar as the interaction of these two produce a powerful materialist ideology to determine the modern European and American conscience. We then turn to the thought of Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), who in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor and in his earlier philosophical writings developed an account of moral truth by which the dangers of materialistic ideology can be overcome. It is argued, with John Paul II, that only in the context of truth can a coherent account of freedom of conscience under the moral law be developed.
EN
Hedonism, driven by mass culture and widespread consumerism, is a salient factor in the modus vivendi of contemporary Western civilization. This general psychological and behavioral backdrop is exploited in the article as an opportunity to both reinvigorate and re-appraise the theoretical underpinnings of modern hedonism as developed by John Stuart Mill in his Utilitarianism. The article proceeds in two steps: Firstly, a detailed exposition of Mill’s arguments for the principle of utility is undertaken, with an accompanying elucidation of the core notions of utility, expediency, happiness, and pleasure. Secondly, five points of criticism (logical, phenomenological, and analytical in method) are raised to challenge what the author thinks are the weakest links in Mill’s syllogistic chain.
19
75%
EN
During the post-Conciliar renewal of Catholic moral theology, some theologians worked out a method of moral reasoning called ‘proportionalism’. According to this method, an acting person is obliged to choose the option likely to yield the best proportion between pre-moral good and evil. Proportionalism seems attractive, but it contains some serious flaws. Although its adherents insist that proportionalism is distinct from utilitarianism because of its theory of the good, the two methods share a consequentialist approach from which proportionalists were never able to separate their system. In other words, proportionalists borrowed from utilitarians the principle of utility and tried to combine it with a certain understanding of the objective good. This effort proved fruitless because there is no single universal standard against which one can measure basic human goods in their specific existential realizations. Although proportionalists reject traditional Catholic teaching on intrinsically evil acts, they claim that their understanding of so-called ‘proportionate reason’ is rooted in tradition. Yet a traditional condition of proportionate reason, which is one of the elements of the principle of double effect, requires not that the good effect outweigh the evil one, but that a person aiming for an intended good end should choose a good means that causes as little non-intended evil as possible. Proportionalism was rejected by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical letter Veritatis splendor, 74-75.
EN
In this essay I scrutinize importance of Principles of Double Effect and MoralSymmetry in regard to the question of moral acceptance of euthanasia legalization.My conclusion is that although there is no substantially moral difference betweenpassive and active euthanasia, the problem of morally justifiable legalization ofeuthanasia is still not resolved. That is because some reasons suggest the possibilityof special discrepancy between moral acceptability of euthanasia in certain cases andmoral demand to preserve legal prohibition of euthanasia in general. In the paperI criticize the popular opinion that utilitarianism cannot account of why we giveweight to the question of moral permissibility of intentions. I claim that contraryto this false platitude utilitarianism can even accommodate practical relevance ofPrinciple of Double Effect, but not as a valid per se principle.
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