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EN
As a result of the war – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022 – a huge number of refugees began to flee to the countries bordering with Ukraine in the west – including mainly to Poland. This regarded women, children and the elderly, because due to the ordered mobilization of men aged 18–60–years old, they could not, with some exceptions, leave Ukraine. This is a completely new situation – no such large European nation has been forced to migrate so violently since World War II. The aim of the article is to present and analyze the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland caused by the Russian invasion – the course of this migration and the places where refugees stayed on the territory of Poland. Since Russia’s activities had increased anxiety already before the invasion began, the analysis also covers the earlier period. Therefore, migration has been presented in detail since 1 January 2022, while 31 July 2022 has been adopted as the end date of the analyzed data.
Cybersecurity and Law
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2023
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vol. 9
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issue 1
215-242
EN
The war that Russia has been waging against Ukraine since 2022 is brutal and described as full-scale, i.e. with the use of all forces and means. In the era of dynamically developing media, information has also become a weapon that is consciously used in this conflict. When reviewing the most important information that was the focus of interest of a large part of the media in Poland during the first half of the year after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it can be stated that the media in Poland extensively inform about the war in Ukraine, but they do not limit themselves to reporting the conflict, they also refer to to disinformation and propaganda, and even touch on the sphere of resentment that is still alive between different countries. The summary of information makes it clear how important the media are in the modern world and that care for their development and securing the media infrastructure is a strategic task of the state.
EN
This paper aims to determine whether the war in Ukraine will affect the scope of judicial verification of public administration in Poland. According to new legislation (the socalled Aid Act), which Polish Parliament passed shortly after February 24, 2022, the Polish municipalities (cities) are entitled to provide aid for local foreign communities, especially those within the borders of Ukraine. The basis for such aid will take the form of a proper municipal or city council resolution. The main issue concerning this form of aid is the necessity of applying Ukrainian law, at least in the context of decoding who is entitled to be a beneficiary. Against this background, it is vital to determine whether such circumstances as war and humanitarian reasons should affect the scope of judicial review. In theory, two approaches are available, formalism and judicial relativism which both are inappropriate. The author argues that the doctrine of deference, as understood by justice A. Scalia must be applied to secure both rule of law principle and the legitimacy of administrative courts in Poland. The main subject of the analysis was the content of the law, which was the starting point for analysing the views of the doctrine and jurisprudence. Due to the international nature of the issue, it was necessary to refer to the achievements of Ukrainian law.
EN
Contemporary terrorism is characterised by a complex and networked model of operation. While the main objectives of terrorist acts remain the same, the attack environment, tactics and tools are changing. The international community is taking steps to strengthen counter-terrorism systems, but these are peaceful solutions. These models do not consider the conditions of hybrid armed conflicts in which terrorism is an element of combat tactics. It is a relatively new phenomenon and particularly dangerous for the civilian population. The acts of terror in hybrid warfare are not mechanisms with a simple scheme of action, and, as we try to show in this article, they represent a deliberate and broad spectrum of action. Therefore, there is an urgent need to understand terrorism in the context of the threat of hybrid war (especially when terrorist acts complement hybrid tactics or significantly replace conventional tactics). This type of threat must be recognised before achieving its strategic goals. From the substantive point of view, the article studies the problem of terrorism as one of the threats of an armed conflict in Ukraine, commonly known as hybrid war.
EN
The first Polish Saturday Schools (PSS) in the UK were established in the 1950s. Their didactic and educational aims included the continuation of mother-tongue education for Polish children in exile and the promotion of culture and national heritage among children already born in the UK. Currently, Polish Saturday Schools fulfil the role of ambassadors of Polishness and play an important socio-cultural and identity role. PSS are perceived as a common good and an integral part of the local community of the country of residence, which creates space for a dialogical relationship between pupils, their parents, and teachers, also in the context of global crises. Drawing on a pilot study involving netnography, an attempt will be made to answer the question of what activities are undertaken by PSS members in the UK to support the war refugees from Ukraine and whether these initiatives serve a pro-community education function.
EN
The difference in the methodology of conducting military operations by Russian and Ukrainian troops during the war ongoing since February 2022 is striking. It does not result only from the adopted convention of conducting these activities but is conditioned on a much deeper mental level resulting from cultural conditions. They determine the perception and understanding of the phenomenon of war. In other words, the operational and tactical methodology can be adapted to changing realities, provided that the essence of such a change is understood in terms of achieving the assumed military and non-military goals. Furthermore, these goals could be achieved by conducting military operations according to a completely different methodology, probably with much greater effectiveness. Why, in such a perspective, did the Russian side choose such a barbaric way of conducting war, characterising the methodology of military actions of the past decades or even centuries? This paper aims to answer the research question: What premises condition the Russian methodology of military action in the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022? Empirical methods were employed to obtain an answer to this question.
EN
This article deals with the role of the Russian Federation’s secret services in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. The author explains the facts and regularities regarding the activity of the Russian secret services in this war. The research was performed from a positivist and post-positivist perspective and takes into consideration the so-called mainstream theories. For its purposes, a system analysis was included as well as references were made to the genesis of the Russian secret services, giving consideration to the space of the post-Soviet states. In addition, an in-depth study of the activity of the Russian special services, bearing in mind the key facts and methods of their operation were conducted. It confirmed the weakness of the Russian secret services. At the same time, the aftermath of this state of affairs is the increase in the importance of military intelligence.
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2023
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vol. LI
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issue 2
11-27
EN
The article attempts to present the Russia’s devastating impact on critical infrastructure during the hybrid war in Ukraine. In order to present a broader context regarding the process, a timeline of the Ukraine-Russia war is presented, starting with the seizure of Crimea, the separation of Donbass, the beginning of the invasion and the Kiev phase, the positional war, and ending with the Kharkiv and Kherson counter-offensives. It goes on to analyse the targets and magnitude of Russian attacks on critical infrastructure, including such as medical and energy infrastructure. Authors point out that many times the overriding aim is to make life difficult for the civilian community, presumably to trigger signs of discontent and opposition to the Ukrainian authorities. The article also identifies the risks in the area of destruction of critical infrastructure in possible future conflicts and points to the need to take measures to strengthen the resilience of societies and states enabling their undisturbed functioning.
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2023
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vol. LII
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issue 3
57-79
EN
The war in Ukraine is the third asymmetric shock that the European Union has experienced in the last two decades, after the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the following Eurozone crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Russia’s and Ukraine’s shares in the global trade and production are relatively small, they are important suppliers of basic products, specifically food and energy. Therefore, the trade consequences of the war for the European Union, Ukraine’s important trading partner, deserve special attention. The war also disrupts trade relations between the EU and Russia. The EU’s direct trade sanctions are limited to specific sectors, such as oil, coal, arms, dual-use goods, as well as the aviation and space industry. However, financial sanctions, particularly the SWIFT ban imposed on seven Russian banks, increase the costs of commercial transactions considerably. This paper aims to present the trade effects of the war in Ukraine from the European Union’s, Member States’ and, in particular, Poland’s perspective. This refers not only to the trade creation and diversion effect, but also to changes in the structure of the EU’s trade regarding the main groups of goods. These effects will vary depending on direct trade links, dependence on Russian energy and susceptibility to rising energy prices. Given an extensive range of parties involved and issues covered by the research, this paper focuses only on the main aspects of the problem.
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2023
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vol. LII
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issue 3
29-40
EN
The aim of the article is to analyse and evaluate Poland’s attitude towards Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership. The main research problem is the question whether the authorities of sovereign Poland unambiguously supported the idea of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and whether they took measurable actions to implement it. The Polish authorities, regardless of political provenance, have invariably been in favour of NATO’s ‘open door’ policy since the end of the Cold War. They have supported the idea of including the post-Soviet republics, including Ukraine, in the Alliance. Ukraine’s entry into NATO is in Poland’s strategic interest, as it would almost cease to play the role of the Alliance’s flank state, which would significantly increase its security. The Polish authorities failed to convince NATO allies, mainly Western European countries, to include Ukraine in NATO, which was due to Russia’s strong opposition. However, new circumstances appeared with the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022. During the research, the method of content analysis of text sources was used.
EN
In the 21st century, the USA has been perceived in Poland as the main external guarantor of security. For this reason, Poland’s security policy is clearly pro-American, and the Polish authorities strive for the closest possible allied relations with the USA, both in the multilateral and bilateral dimension. These activities are in line with the concept of an offensive bandwagon, the more so that Poland rarely benefits from its strong support for the USA, going beyond traditional allied commitments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The aim of the article is to present and analyze the activities of the Polish authorities to strengthen the alliance with the USA in the context of their perception by scientists and experts from the USA. Experts and scientists believe that Polish authorities are legitimately striving to tighten the alliance with the USA, given its role in Europe and the world. However, the Polish-American alliance is clearly asymmetric, and Poland should not count on special treatment from the USA. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine offers a chance to raise Poland’s importance in the European policy of the USA.
EN
The study attempts to analyze the implications of the war in Ukraine for the issues of development and inequalities in the BRICS block. The so-called “emerging economies” play an essential role in the global system, both in economic and political terms. The article compares the political and economic backgrounds of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, their development, the “status quo” and their future aspirations, and analyses how the war in Ukraine may change the global development scenario. It is essential after the BRICS summit in South Africa invited six new members to the group. The article is rooted in complexity theory, supported by a mixed methodology approach. We show how the given research methodology, informed by complexity theory, can furnish new insights into global sustainability. The statistical method was used to gauge the correlation-regression impact of inequalities in BRICS countries on their sustainable development. The analysis allows several conclusions to be ventured: sustainable development is closely linked to inequalities and vice versa; the war has had a significant, multidimensional impact on the development paths and inequalities in the BRICS countries, which potentially could worsen, and the war is a major shocking event that can lead to global system changes and implications which are broader than merely for the subregion.
EN
The aim of this article is to present the forms of assistance (institutional and social) received by Ukrainian citizens in Poland due to the ongoing hostilities on the territory of their country. The author illustrates the outline of relations between Poland and Ukraine and refers to previous research on the attitude of Poles towards Ukrainians (e.g. CBOS reports). Next, the adopted conceptual apparatus is described on the basis of the literature on the subject, including the ambiguity of the legal aspect of refugees and the definition of social support adopted for the purposes of the research from a functional approach. A case study was chosen as the research method, and the material for the analysis consisted of non-reactive data (analysis of the content of the Act of 12 March 2022 on assistance to citizens of Ukraine in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of that country; posts and comments posted by Polish citizens on Facebook groups, including, among others, the „Help for Ukraine” group, which has over 580,000 members) and the results from the field pilot study - the study involved 9 women who crossed the Ukrainian-Polish border in the period from 24 February 2022. The field research was exploratory in nature and its main objective was to verify the assessment of institutions and received social support by Ukrainian refugees residing in Poland. The analysis of the data made it possible to outline the main areas of institutional support, to distinguish four types of social support (emotional, informational, instrumental and material), which indicates solidarity and willingness of Polish society to help Ukrainians. The results of the field research show a positive assessment of the activities carried out by state institutions and Polish society in the opinion of female respondents, who unanimously indicated Poland as a country providing special assistance to Ukraine (the following countries were placed in order: UK, Lithuania, Czech Republic, USA). The author indicates, however, that the problems and issues raised in the article are not exhaustive and further stages of field research are planned.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie reakcji władz polskich oraz społeczeństwa polskiego na eskalację konfliktu zbrojnego na terytorium Ukrainy wywołanego przez inwazję Federacji Rosyjskiej 24.02.2022 r. przy uwzględnieniu kontekstu relacji Polski i Ukrainy oraz Polaków i Ukraińców. Autor na podstawie literatury przedmiotu przedstawia zarys współczesnych relacji dyplomatycznych Polski i Ukrainy. Kolejno weryfikuje stosunek społeczeństwa polskiego do kilku aspektów za pośrednictwem danych niereaktywnych, opracowań analitycznych, w tym raportów i komunikatów z badań: narodu ukraińskiego, opinii na temat przyjmowania uchodźców wojennych z Ukrainy, formy zaangażowania obywateli Polski na rzecz uchodźców z Ukrainy. W pracy powołano się także na doniesienia medialne, oficjalne stanowiska polityków udostępniane za pośrednictwem mediów społecznościowych oraz komunikaty rządowe, co umożliwiło przeprowadzenie analizy reakcji władz polskich na inwazję Rosji na Ukrainę. Z kolei w ramach obszaru działań legislacyjnych została krótko scharakteryzowana tzw. specustawa o pomocy uchodźcom z Ukrainy. Główne wnioski z badań: Polska jest ważnym partnerem Ukrainy na arenie międzynarodowej; od samego początku inwazji Rosji na Ukrainę władze Polski podejmują konkretne działania, których celem jest pomoc uchodźcom wojennym; wojna na Ukrainie oraz napływ uchodźców z Ukrainy to w opinii społeczeństwa polskiego najważniejsze wydarzenia roku 2022; Polacy są za przyjmowaniem uchodźców z Ukrainy, a wielu z nich aktywnie uczestniczyło w pomocy Ukrainie i Ukraińcom; w dyskursie politycznym i społecznym udostępniane są także przekazy dezinformujące na temat uchodźców i pomocy oferowanej im przez Polskę; wizerunek Ukraińców ukształtowany w wyniku doświadczeń historycznych nie miał większego przełożenia na postawę i zaangażowanie społeczeństwa polskiego w pomoc na rzecz uchodźców i Ukrainy.
PL
Czy termin metahistoria jest powtórzeniem arystotelesowskiego gestu nazwania metafizyki? W 2023 roku mija pół wieku od pierwszego wydania słynnej książki Haydena White’a pt. Metahistory. The Historical Imagination In Nineteenth-Century Europe. Jednakże to klasyczne, dość powszechnie znane dzieło – a także jego krytyka – nie dały terminowi metahistoria życia, którym w horyzoncie terminów badawczych cieszy się choćby metafizyka.  W niniejszych rozważaniach nie chodzi mi o sentymentalne upominanie się o termin, który miałby być dziś cenny z samego tylko powodu, że niegdyś zaistniał. Raczej o próbę myślenia o ścieżce wzbogacania (prze)myślenia o wyobraźni historycznej – ta ostatnia, jak sądzę, jest kluczem dla oporu wobec współczesnych kryzysów i impasów dzisiejszej humanistyki.
EN
Is the term metahistory a repetition of the Aristotelian gesture of naming metaphysics? In 2023, half a century passes since the first publication of Hayden White’s famous book Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. However, this classic, fairly well-known work – as well as its criticism – did not give life to the term metahistory, which in the horizon of research terms is enjoyed, for example, by metaphysics. In these considerations, I do not mean sentimental reminding about a term that would be valuable today for the sole reason that it once existed. Rather, it is an attempt to think about the path of enriching (re)thinking of the historical imagination – the latter, I believe, is the key to resisting the contemporary crises and impasses of today’s humanities.
EN
Typical challenges facing teachers educating Ukrainian students affected by the Russian military aggression are identified in the article. The didactic tools and methods most often used by teachers to work with temporarily displaced children due to the war in Ukraine have been determined. The results of an empirical study are presented, teachers of various types of educational institutions (secondary schools, colleges, universities) who are located on the territories temporarily occupied by Russia, are in the status of temporarily displaced persons in Ukraine or abroad, were involved. The ways of preparing future teachers for educational activities with children who suffered war trauma are outlined. The issues of successful adaptation of schoolchildren to the new conditions of the educational environment, mastering methods and techniques for overcoming stress, techniques for providing psychological assistance, as well as the development of infomedia culture, critical thinking to combat misinformation, cyberbullying and cybergrooming are emphasized.
EN
Extreme situations, such as military conflicts, generate interest in how they are perceived by the public, which must process a broad array of media stimuli in a certain way. In this study, we discuss how the basic aspects of the current military conflict (the war in Ukraine) were perceived by young people (Generation Z) in Slovakia, with a focus on the initial part of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We argue that the digital resistance of Slovakia’s citizens is currently low, which – in conjunction with the extremely focused activity of the disinformation scene – creates a risky environment. We use the Semantic Selection Test as a psychosemantic method on a sample of Slovak university students. One of our basic findings is the associative closeness of the concept of “Self” in Generation Z and Instagram, popular Internet memes and educational videos in connection with expertise. We also found that the recipients were subject to positive media manipulation (the Ghost of Kyiv) and were able to identify standard linguistic propaganda (negative associations of terms “war in Ukraine” and “special military operation”). The results can help us understand the perception of emergency situations by Generation Z.
EN
The aim of the article is to analyze and evaluate Germany’s policy toward the 2022 war in Ukraine from the standpoint of the United States, anti-Russian coalition leader. The main research problem is the question: Does Germany’s policy of supporting Ukraine and sanctioning Russia meet US expectations? The main hypothesis is that after Germany’s disgrace in the first months of the war, its reputation as a reliable ally of the United States in Europe was gradually restored as a result of its successively increasing support for Ukraine and breaking off cooperation with Russia. Germany saw significant revaluations in consequence of the war in Ukraine, especially in the military and energy sectors. Regardless of the outcome of the war, a return to „business as usual” in terms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia is very unlikely. In turn, the military improvements that have been announced, including a major boost in the combat potential of the Bundeswehr, will probably only partially be carried out. Germany will continue to be one of US key allies in Europe during the coming years, but it is likely that Washington will tighten cooperation with the countries of NATO’s eastern flank, to some extent at Germany’s expense. Interviews with American scientists and analysts specializing in international politics were conducted as part of the research.
EN
The war initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022 can be seen as a drastic shock event with unpredictable long-term socio-political consequences at the national, regional and global levels. This study aims to identify the impact of war-related disturbances on the dynamics of social cleavages in Ukraine, in particular the possibility of deepening or diminishing such cleavages or promoting the occurrence of new ones. For decades, the internal partition of Ukraine into East and West has been attributed to national self-identification, linguistic and religious peculiarities and the geopolitical preferences of residents of different regions. Shortly before and after the outbreak of the Russian invasion, fundamental changes in Ukrainian society and domestic politics became evident, some of which can be interpreted as signs of the mitigation of social cleavages. Our findings revealed at least two significant shifts in these ‘old’, traditional cleavages: one occurred after the Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the second one is emerging now, due to the full-scale war on Ukrainian territory against the Ukrainian people. More broadly, this research aims to assess the resilience of social cleavages in the face of a shock event.
EN
The article focuses on the analysis of the attitude of Germany towards Russia as an example of political adaptation. The paper's aim is to verify the hypothesis that Germany’s attitude towards Russia is characterized by a political adaptation process, which means that Germany strives to adjust to the changes in the regional environment as well as influence it. The author attempts to answer the following question: What strategies of political adaptation were adopted between 2005 and 2021? The article is divided into several parts. In the first one (apart from the introduction), the author discusses the concept of political adaptation. The second part focuses on describing German-Russian relations before 2005. Subsequent parts analyse the period between 2005 and 2021. The author emphasizes the turning points of 2008 and 2014. The last section is a summary and forecast for the coming years. The article was prepared on the basis of official documents, speeches and actions of politicians, press materials and analyses.
EN
The study that was conducted from September 2022 to April 2023 demonstrates how perceptions of seemingly stable times change in times of crisis (war in Ukraine, repressions, dictatorship, political censorship, etc.). The methodology used in the study allows us to record the reinterpretation of memorable dates and the emergence of new events significant for social media users. The data analysis allows us to form a post facto order of significant events of the end of August 2022 – April 2023. I have conditionally called this order of events a “mental calendar”. The research was aimed at a certain social group of Russian society – intellectuals, who play an important role in the public and media space. The ability to generate narratives, descriptive strategies and interpretive frameworks suggests that the research will allow for a cross-sectional analysis of the perceptions of the entire Russian society. It was fundamental to observe the Russian segment of social networks, those who did not leave and remained in Russia, because this reaction from within demonstrates the plurality of opinions, different survival strategies, etc. This approach yielded important results for understanding what was happening inside the aggressor country, but at the same time had a number of limitations, primarily in the disclosure of the respondents' personal data.
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