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PL
W prawie unijnym zagadnienie wyboru prawa właściwego dla umowy przewozu osób, w tym w trans¬porcie kolejowym i lotniczym, regulowane jest przez rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 593/2008 z dnia 17 czerwca 2008 r. w sprawie prawa właściwego dla zobowiązań umownych (Rzym I). W odniesieniu do wskazanej kategorii umów art. 5 ust. 2 zd. 2 rozporządzenia Rzym I wprowadza nieznane konwencji rzymskiej z 1980 r. obostrzenie autonomii kolizyjnoprawnej stron w postaci ograniczonego wyboru prawa. W założeniu prawodawcy zawężenie dopuszczalno¬ści wyboru prawa do jednego z pięciu wskazanych w rozporządzeniu porządków prawnych służyć ma kolizyjnej ochronie pasażerów. Zamierzenia ustawodawcy nie zostały jednak zrealizowane, gdyż w realiach rynku międzynarodowych przewozów pasażerskich konstrukcja ograniczonego wyboru prawa nie stanowi adekwatnego narzędzia dla ochrony interesów podróżnych.
EN
After the judgment of 11 March 2016 no. I CSK 64/15 given by the Polish Supreme Court it seems to be impossible to define in Polish legal space the proper law applicable to the succession case. In a very short succession judgment (in which the deceased Polish citizen died in Sweden in 2008) Supreme Court has done at least three fundamental mistakes concerning the intertemporal application of legal rules. The Supreme Court has not recognized that Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession) is applied only to the succession of persons who die on or after 17 August 2015. It mistook also the rules of 1965 Polish statute on private international law with a new one (2011). Conclusions drawn from this particular case by court are too broad and can be applied also to cases much more different that case on which the judgment was based. Court decision analyzed in this article is an example of the comic solution of the problems arising in the Polish succession law. This is why the criticism on this order seems to be important because of its possible influence on future Polish court's practice.
Rejent
|
2020
|
issue 7 (351)
11-24
EN
Republic of Poland is not bound by the Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. Our country has not accepted enhanced cooperation concerning matrimonial or divorce matters. However some rules derived from the mentioned Regulation, as part of legal order of other European Union countries may be applied in Poland. Such a situation may also occur in the case of proceedings before a Polish civil law notary. Considering the risk of such application it is worth introducing choice of Polish law made in favour of Polish citizens in their matrimonial property contracts. This article analyses the possibilities of such a choice of law and its impact on the spouse’ property relationship.
PL
Law applicable to the protection of the rights of personality rights is regulated by a method of alternative indication with two equivalent connecting factors. The legislator has not specify who and how should determine which one will apply. Both the linguistic formulation and functional arguments support the conclusion that it is the right of the claimant. In case of lack of such indication the court should apply the law which is most closely connected to the situation.
PL
Artykuł zawiera analizę skutków wyboru prawa dokonanego przez strony w umowach o charakterze międzynarodowym oraz w umowach, które zamykają się w obszarze jednego państwa i nie zawierają elementu obcego, który uzasadniałby stosowanie norm kolizyjnych. Podstawą do dokonanej analizy jest wyrok TSUE z 8 czerwca 2017 r. w sprawie C-54/16, Vinyls Italia SpA w upadłości a Mediterranea di Navigazione SpA, w którym Trybunał uznał, że przepisy rozporządzenia upadłościowego są przepisami lex specialis wobec rozporządzenia Rzym I o prawie właściwym dla zobowiązań umownych. Daje to zdaniem Trybunału kompetencje stronom do dokonania wyboru prawa – prawa państwa trzeciego (członkowskiego) w tym przypadku prawa angielskiego – ze skutkami wyboru kolizyjnego w umowach, w których nie występuje element obcy – w tej sprawie umowy czarteru morskiego statku włoskiego pomiędzy dwoma spółkami włoskimi (z siedzibą we Włoszech). Autor wyklucza możliwość istnienia relacji lex specialis – lex generalis pomiędzy rozporządzeniem upadłościowym i Rozporządzeniem Rzym I. Wskazuje także na kierunek wykładni – liberalny – występowania elementu obcego w ramach umowy. Artykuł zawiera wniosek, że drogą poszerzania autonomii woli stron jest materialnoprawna zasada swobody umów.
EN
The article focuses on the issue of the choice of law made by the parties to a contract in the situation of the conflict of laws. It includes an analysis of the effects of the choice of law made by the parties in an international contract and in contracts that are limited to the area of one state and do not include a foreign element which would justify the application of conflict-of-law rules. The basis for the analysis is the judgement of 8 June 2017 in case C- 54/16, Vinyls Italia SpA, in liquidation, v Mediterranea di Navigazione SpA, in which the Court of Justice ruled that the provisions of the insolvency regulation are the lex specialis provisions with respect to the Rome I regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations. In the opinion of the Court of Justice, this gives the parties the competencies to elect the applicable law – the law of a third country (a member state), in this case the English law – with the effects of the choice of law in contracts that do not include a foreign element – in this case the charter contract of an Italian ship concluded between two Italian companies (with registered seats in Italy). The article explores and excludes the possibility of the lex specialis – lex generalis relationship between the insolvency regulation and Rome I. Both regulations have separate scopes of regulation. It also indicates the liberal direction of the interpretation of the occurrence of a foreign element in a contract. The conclusion is that in order to extend the autonomy of the will of the parties, it is necessary to apply the substantive principle of the freedom of contracts, not the choice of law, which is related to conflict-of-law situations.
EN
The article is dedicated to the matters of succession in the Agreement of 1993 on Legal Aid concluded between Poland and Ukraine. The author touches upon a number of issues. First, he discusses the role of the “general compatibility clause” provided for in Article 97 of the 1993 Agreement. He concludes that the clause does not produce effects with regard to the Regulation (EU) No 650/2012. Under the “general compatibility clause”, in all situations where the 1993 Agreement does not provide for a rule being the equivalent of the rules laid down in the Hague Convention of 1961 determining the law applicable to the form of a testamentary disposition, in Poland, in relations between Poland and Ukraine, the law applicable to the form of a testament is to be determined pursuant to the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1961.Second, the author discusses the conflict-of-laws rules set out in the Agreement which designate, as the applicable law, either Polish or Ukrainian law. He contends that where the deceased is a Polish and Ukrainian national, in order to determine which of those nationalities have to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 37 (1) of the 1993 Agreement, the criterion of the most effective (more closely connected) nationality should be relied on. However, the situations that involve a deceased of Polish or Ukrainian nationality, who is also a third-State national, do not fall within the scope of the 1993 Agreement. The application of the 1993 Agreement is, on the other hand, not barred by the fact that an immovable property in a third State forms part of the estate. Jurisdiction and the law applicable to the succession of such immovable property must be determined, both in Poland and in Ukraine, pursuant to their general conflict-of-laws regulations on matters of succession. The author explains also that the drafters of the 1993 Agreement (in Articles 37 (1) and (2)) ruled out the principle of unity of succession in favour of the principle of scission, employing the connecting factors of nationality and of location of the immovable property. This results in numerous complications in the determination of the applicable law and in its application. However, the law applicable to succession determined on the basis of Article 37 (1) and (2) of the 1993 Agreement of 1993 governs the succession as a whole, with the exception of issues covered by other rules provided for in that agreement (for example, Article 39) and of the issues that do not fall within its scope of the 1993 Agreement. Although Article 39 (1) of the 1993 Agreement expressly mentions only consequences of defective consent, there is no doubt that the said rule also covers the legal requirements for effective declaration of consent.Third, the author addresses the function of Article 38 of the 1993 Agreement, which is a substantive law provision on the estate without a claimant. This provision enjoys priority over Article 33 of the Regulation No 650/2012. Article 38 solely determines the State (Poland or Ukraine) acquiring the estate without a claimant. The concerned State enjoys the competence to designate the entity that will become the subject of rights and obligations forming part of the estate without a claimant.Finally, the author comments on the pending case resulting from the preliminary question posed by the Opole District Court (Sąd Okręgowy, case no II Czz. 438/21). The Opole Court requested from the European Court a ruling on whether a Ukrainian national residing in Poland may, under Article 22 of the Regulation No 650/2012, choose Ukrainian law. The author suggests, that - although not without a doubt - it is tempting to answer this question in the affirmative. The argument here is that the freedom to choose the applicable law in matters of succession falls entirely outside the ambit of the 1993 Agreement and so the Agreement does not preclude the choice.
PL
W umowach konsumenckich zawieranych przez Internet (z elementem międzynarodowym) zwiększa się ryzyko trudności z ustaleniem prawa właściwego, a w razie sporu na tle umowy z przedsiębiorcą zagranicznym, konsument może napotkać także trudności natury proceduralnej. Ponadto, może okazać się, że zastosowane prawo nie zapewnia konsumentowi takiej ochrony, jaką miałby w miejscu swojego zwykłego pobytu. Problematyka ta była przedmiotem rozważań Sądu Najwyższego, który w wyroku z dnia 17 września 2014 r., (Sygn. akt I CSK 555/13), orzekł, że zamieszczenie we wzorcu umowy konsumenckiej postanowienia przewidującego zastosowanie prawa obcego dla konsumenta, a właściwego dla twórcy wzorca, stanowi klauzulę niedozwoloną w rozumieniu art. 3851 § 1 k.c. Niniejszy wyrok skłania do pytania: czy w relacjach B2C (business to consumer) w praktyce dochodzi do wyłączenia możliwości wyboru prawa.
EN
An increased risk exists now related to the correct determination of the applicable law in consumer contracts (with an international aspect) concluded online. In case of a dispute regarding contracts between a consumer and a foreign entrepreneur, the consumer may face procedural difficulties. It is also possible that the law which has been applied, on the basis of the ‘choice of law’ clause, does not provide the type of protection which the consumer may have in his own place of residence. The Polish Supreme Court Such analysed this issue in a judgment dated 17 September 2014 (I CSK 555/13). The Court ruled therein that a clause in standard consumer contracts predetermining the application of law foreign to the consumer, but ‘domestic’ to the entrepreneur, should be considered an unfair contractual provision in light of Article 385(1) § 1 of the Polish Civil Code. The above mentioned ruling leads to the question if, in practice, the ‘choice of law’ clause is thus excluded in consumer transactions (B2C).
EN
All employment relationships, including strictly employment relationships, may be related to the legal areas of two or more countries, which raises the question of the law applicable to a specific legal relationship. The Rome I Regulation has a key importance in determining the applicable law to which the employment relationship is to be subjected. In this respect, the decree of Art. 8 of the Regulation has a fundamental importance, which was analyzed in the first part of this publication. However, the mechanism according to which the lex labori will be corrected by the provisions forcing their application, the issues of which are presented later in the publication, should be distinguished from the scheme presented in the above-mentioned regulation. According to the EU legislator, one of the matters of employment relationships regulated by such provisions is the standardization of the terms and conditions of employment of employees posted to perform work in the territory of a European Union Member State. Answers to the question whether it is appropriate to assign a nature of the rules enforcing its application provisions to this regulation (concerning the terms and conditions of employment of posted workers) has been made at the end of this publication.
PL
Wszelkie stosunki zatrudnienia, w tym także stricte stosunki pracy, mogą być powiązane z obszarami prawnymi dwóch lub więcej państw, co rodzi pytanie o prawo właściwe dla określonego stosunku prawnego. Kluczowe znaczenie w zakresie ustalenia właściwego prawa, jakiemu ma podlegać stosunek pracy, posiada Rozporządzenie Rzym I. W tym względzie podstawowe znaczenie posiada regulacja art. 8 Rozporządzenia, który poddany został analizie w pierwszej części niniejszego opracowania. Jednakże od schematu ujętego w przywołanej powyżej regulacji należy odróżnić mechanizm, zgodnie z którym lex labori zostanie skorygowana przez przepisy wymuszające swoje zastosowanie, których problematykę przedstawiono w dalszej części artykułu. Według ustawodawcy unijnego jedną z materii stosunków pracy regulowaną przepisami o takim charakterze stanowi unormowanie warunków zatrudnienia pracowników delegowanych do wykonywania pracy na terytorium państwa członkowskiego Unii Europejskiej. Odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy nadanie tejże regulacji (dotyczącej warunków zatrudnienia pracowników delegowanych) charakteru przepisów wymuszających swoje zastosowanie jest właściwe, podjęto w końcowej części niniejszego opracowania.
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