The paper views human sciences as a kind of cultural bond, building unity across all divisions and boundaries. For this purpose it uses arguments proposed by such intellectuals as Nussbaum, Rorty, Markowski and Assmann. It aims at justification of the thesis that humanities serve intrinsic integration and development of personality, social integration, maintaining bonds with the past and history, and creating a sense of common destiny of all human beings. Human sciences expand our horizons, allowing us to transcend the limits of our inborn egoism, they teach us how to imaginatively reach beyond and above the local perspective, creating foundations for interpersonal solidarity, respect, tolerance and compassion. The present political trends in Poland and in the world clearly favor natural and technical sciences, tending to devaluate and to marginalize humanities, which can be a prognostic of cultural regress, with unpredictable consequences for the future.
The main theme of the paper is the issue of the foundations of social life. The author begins by outlining the tradition of the Enlightenment represented by Immanuel Kant, who attempted to justify rationally the basis of social life. Then she moves back to antiquity, to Plato, the sophists and Aristotle, to show their attitude towards the foundations of public life in order to briefly present in the following stage the original concept of Baruch Spinoza and, in more details, the views of Blaise Pascal, who is the main figure of this presentation. The final part of the paper includes a draft of the philosophical thought of postmodernism, represented by such intellectuals as Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. The author additionally presents an exposition of the concept of habitus by Pierre Bourdieu, interpreting it accordingly to her previous reflections. The course of thought in these considerations intends to formulate a thesis which takes a stand against the most obvious opinion of Enlightenment, purporting that neither the contemporary liberal democracy nor people’s respect for it and their will to obey the law are founded on reason.
The paper is an attempt to show science as an huge intellectual enterprise, based on bourgeois virtues such as straightforwardness and honesty. These virtues are reflected in methodology of science, which insists on meticulous, conscientious compliance to scientific rules and on using exactly specified methods of investigation. Scientific knowledge is supposed to be objective and critical, which means that it is to tend (1) to eliminate all extracognitive factors, (2) to check up and prove repeatedly the grounds of scientific statements and to adhere to procedures of scrupulous analysis of scientific arguments.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą ukazania nauki jako wielkiego przedsięwzięcia intelektualnego, u podstaw którego stoją mieszczańskie cnoty rzetelności i uczciwości. Znajdują one odzwierciedlenie w metodologii nauk, która kładzie akcent na skrupulatne przestrzeganie reguł naukowych i stosowanie ściśle określonych metod badawczych. Poznanie naukowe ma się cechować obiektywizmem oraz krytycyzmem, musi zatem (1) dążyć do wyeliminowania wszelkich czynników pozapoznawczych oraz (2) wielokrotnie sprawdzać zasadność wszelkich twierdzeń naukowych i skrupulatnie analizować naukowe dowody i argumentacje.
The text is an analysis of interrelations binding autobiographical narration to individual and social identity. The first part tackles the fundamental connection between narration and individual, personal identity of the narrator – Paul Ricoeur, serving as a guide to this fundamental part of the proposed analysis, assumes that the narrative continuum follows and imitates the temporal continuum, constituting a flow in which it becomes possible to inscribe stories modifying and corroborating the reflected course of life. Conceptualizing and bringing to consciousness one’s course of life, auto-narration constitutes both a form of conscientious self-judgement and an occasion for self-deception. In the second part, the author attempts to show how auto narration and its significance for the individual identity changes, when it gets written down in the form of autobiography, subjected to the rigor of the writing and entering in complex interrelationships with social memory and identity. Here the author’s guides are among others Philippe Lejeune, Janet Verner Gunn and Georges Gusdorf. In the third part, the hitherto reconstructed structure of auto-narration and autobiography is destroyed: referring to such authors as Louis A. Renza, Jean Starobinski, John Sturrock, Michel Beaujour and Jacques Derrida, I demonstrate that the autobiographical undertaking is doubtful, and that the optimistic project of saving oneself by means of auto-narration and autobiography is an illusion. The presence of Derrida in the text is scarcely visible; yet it is Derrida, in dialogue with the late Ricoeur, that show us the way out from the autobiographical and identitary trap.
The paper begins with general considerations on the idea and the ethics of virtue. Next, two of the analyzed virtues – reason and moderation – are described in the way typical for ancient philosophy and Christian thought. Then reason is presented as a tragic wisdom, effectively taught by the ancient tragedy. In the next part of this paper we proceed to the presentation of contemporary times, conceived as a period of crisis of values and as the crisis of ethics of virtue. Some possible reasons of this crisis are enumerated. The triumph of the consumer culture turns out to be the result of the crisis. We can say that the atomized and ill society, as well as solitary and childish individuals suffer from the chronic lack of virtue, understood mainly as reason and moderation. The remedy for this condition may by art, because it is able to move our reason and heart and to reach numerous recipients. The best part of art is poetry, because it is able to cause the conversion of our point of view on our life.
PL
Artykuł rozpoczyna się od rozważań natury ogólnej na temat pojęcia cnoty oraz etyki cnót. Następnie omówione są dwie podstawowe cnoty etyczne – umiar i rozsądek – w wersjach typowych dla filozofii antycznej oraz myśli chrześcijańskiej. W kolejnej odsłonie ukazany jest rozsądek jako mądrość tragiczna, o której poucza nas antyczna tragedia, po czym prezentowana jest współczesność jako okresu kryzysu etyki cnót. Wskazuje się na kilka możliwych źródeł tego kryzysu. Skutkiem kryzysu jest triumf kultury konsumpcyjnej. Można powiedzieć, że zatomizowane, schorowane społeczeństwo i osamotniona, infantylna jednostka cierpią na chroniczny brak rozsądku i umiaru. W zakończeniu formułuje się wniosek, że remedium na tę dolegliwość może być sztuka, która porusza umysły i serca i dociera do licznych odbiorców, w szczególności zaś poezja, która jest w stanie skutecznie doprowadzić do konwersji naszego spojrzenia na życie.
Body memory is a relatively new philosophical notion, entangled in interiorization of the past – paradoxically this entanglement liberates the individual from the dictature of the present flow and enables her/his autonomy. The author intends to show that this apparent ensnarement, with all its difficult genesis, makes us responsible, active agents, influencing our environment. To achieve this objective, she chooses to describe the painful of ambiguous process of training and drill of the body, immersing us in social patterns, and thus in the living past. This path leads us – a paradox again – to the arduous and painstaking rediscovery of the issue of subject. There is still hope that we can recuperate this vanishing notion, reinterpreting the most essential classical themes of philosophy, such as time and transcendentality. But the subject matter remains opaque, and requires further reflection.
The paper explores the relation between collective memory and social theory, trying in particular to show the key role that the notion of collective memory plays in understanding the dynamics of the social process (structuration, genesis of social structure). It does it by means of a series of reinterpretations of classical authors. Investigating the phenomenon of forgetting as covering up the traces of social change (M. Halbwachs), problematized in the contemporary context (P. Bourdieu), leads us to unraveling the problematic character of social change as such in a vain effort of annulment of memory (A. Touraine), and finally to rediscovering of social memory at a deeper level, as a profound structure of social processes. This discovery points to the necessity of introducing a new, yet undeveloped method of studying the social unconscious (A. Giddens, J. Assmann, and in particular J. Alexander). Jeffrey Alexander overtly postulates such a development, identifying his major project of cultural sociology with a kind of social psychoanalysis. The paper ends with a question – where such a postulate leads us to? Perhaps we need a new kind of art of benevolent interpretation that brings along with new understanding also some kind of soothing the pain of misery, deeply inscribed in social existence.
The text tackles the problem of the condition of university, in a world blindly believing that the only possible worth measure is economic in nature and, in the name of this belief, setting in motion a ruthless bureaucratic machinery that throttles all kinds of creativity and nips in the bud all nonstandard actions and creations. The world apparently is “out of joint”, and things are taking an unexpected turn. University is one of the victims, but also one of active accomplices of this despicable situation. How to speak about the university to those who are exclusively in business of calculating balance of profits and losses? How to speak about it after deconstruction, when all great ideas have been already repeatedly and manifoldly dismounted and discredited? How to speak about it, when the university’s men and women have discredited themselves repeatedly as well, oscillating between libido sciendi and libido dominandi? Trying to solve this puzzle, we are following in the footsteps of Derrida, who in his texts about university makes appeal to Kant, and inspired by his invention, we set in motion two opposite traditions, represented by Lyotard, Bourdieu, Bauman and Readings on the one hand, and by Humboldt, Schleiermacher and Jaspers on the other. With Derrida, we make noises about the return of the ideas of truth, of the light of reason, of the autonomy of university. It is, however, a return of the specters of the past, in alignment with Derrida’s hauntology. Humanists are people of academia who see these specters, but at the same time are already specters themselves – even if they still show up here and there, they are almost insignificant. They are onlyallowed to contemplate their negligibility and to confess their habitual helplessness. University always had to defend itself, and it does defend itself today.
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