The fundamental features of the non-fregean logic (formulated both in structural and in invariant version) are discussed. The difference between two notions introduced by Suszko in his article Reification of Situations is analyzed: semantic homomorphism (projection of the set of sentences of a given language into the universe of situations) and of reification of situations (projection of the universe of situations into the universe of events).
This paper discusses the semantic assumption that Roman Suszko called “the Fregean Axiom.” According to the Fregean Axiom, a logical sentence is a name of its logical value, which means that all true sentences are names of one and the same object called “Truth,” and - by analogy - all false sentences are names of one and the same object called “False.” The Fregean Axiom is at odds with the common-sense intuition. Usually, we think that a sentence is not a name but anexpression that states that a certain state of affairs occurs. The article analyzes the presuppositions underlying the axiom. The second part of the text discusses the consequences of either adoption or rejection of the axiom.
We try to define the essential features of the Fregean paradigm. Then we demonstrate that Suszko's non-fregean logic, Wolniewicz's ontology of situation and Barwise-Perry's situational semantics go meaningfully beyond the fregean paradigm: what is presupposed in all of these theories is that as semantic correlates of sentences serve certain objects which are not logical values of these sentences.