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EN
The paper recognizes that expectations and the process of their formation are subject to standard decision making and are determined as a part of equilibrium. Accordingly, the paper presents a basic framework in which the form of expectation formation is a choice variable. At any point in time rational economic agents decide on the basis of the level of utility what expectation formation technology to use and as a consequence what expectations to hold. As economic decisions are conditioned on expectations holding proper or rational expectations eliminates the possibility of ex ante inefficiencies. The choice of expectation formation technology is not trivial as the paper assumes that information gathering and processing are costly. Consequently, economic agents must make informed decisions with the regard to the quality of expectation formation technologies they wish to use. The paper shows that agents' optimization over expectations not only adds on to realism, but also can carry non trivial implications for the behavior of macroeconomic variables. Specifically, the paper illustrates that endogenous expectation revisions can be a source of permanent oscillations in aggregate demand and can prevent an economy from settling into a steady state. In addition, the paper quantifies intangible notions such as overheating, over borrowing, and output gap. Finally, the paper shows that active policy measures can limit inefficiencies resulting from output fluctuations.
PL
Na podstawie analizy danych pochodzących z zeznań podatkowych można dowieść, że faktyczny rozkład dochodów osób o wysokich dochodach w Polsce może być dostatecznie dobrze przybliżony przez rozkład Pareto. Oznacza to, że do wyznaczenia optymalnej, krańcowej stopy podatku dochodowego można użyć formuły Saeza [2001]. Z analizy wynika, że obecna taryfa opodatkowania wynagrodzeń w Polsce nie jest optymalna. Jeśli uznać znane szacunki płacowej elastyczności podaży pracy za wiarygodne, optymalna stawka podatku od dochodów z pracy powinna przekroczyć 60%. Inaczej mówiąc, istnieje pole do poprawy efektywności systemu opodatkowania wynagrodzeń w Polsce poprzez podwyższenie krańcowej stopy podatku dla osób o najwyższych dochodach.
EN
In this paper, we use actual data provided by the Polish tax authority and characterise the properties of income distribution in Poland in the case of high-income earners. By employing a variety of techniques we are able to confirm that the distribution of income in Poland can be approximated with a Pareto distribution in its upper tail. This finding makes the formula for the optimal marginal tax rates of Saez [2001] applicable to the Polish case and allows us to provide estimates of the optimal marginal tax rates for Poland. We show that the current tax policy in Poland is not optimal. Specifically, we show, by relying on empirically viable estimates of the elasticity of the labour supply with respect to the wage, that the optimal marginal tax rate at high income levels exceeds 60%. In other words, we suggest that there is room for a welfare-improving reform in Poland, and we argue that high-income individuals should be expected to contribute substantially more at the margin than they currently do.
EN
Research background: The paper investigates the impact of bequest taxation on saving and transfers when parents and children make decisions consistently. It complements the predictions of Gale and Perozek's life-cycle modeling (2001) when decisions of parents and children are set independently and can be time-inconsistent. Purpose of the article: The paper strives to answer the question of whether taxation of bequest harms savings and inter vivos transfers. The previous results indicated that this is possible for some bequest motives. Our results show that this is not likely for the most typical values of parameters. Methods: The analysis involves economic modeling of four bequest motives: altruistic, paternalistic, accidental, and exchange. The method is based on the overlapping generation approach and life-cycle approach in the case of a paternalistic bequest. The results are supplemented with numerical simulations. Findings & value added: For the altruistic motive, savings are smaller if interest rates are low relative to the tax rate and the utility of one's consumption is more valuable than the utility of the next generations. For the accidental motive, savings decrease with small interest rates, high taxation and long-life expectancy. For the paternalistic motive, savings decrease when the interest rate and the value of future utility are low. For the exchange motive, savings are higher after a tax increase, but it depends on the value of attention and life expectancy. The general conclusion is that higher bequest taxation hamper saving behavior and may disturb the intergenerational exchange process. The bequest tax should, therefore, be set low, especially for aging populations, in order to induce higher savings and force the young to provide the elderly with higher attention.
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