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GOLDIE'S PUZZLING OF TWO FEELINGS: 'BODILY FEELING' AND 'FEELING TOWARD'

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Yang S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 3
317-327
EN
Emotion theorists have divided into two camps in contemporary discussion. The one claims that emotions are reducible to bodily feelings; the other holds that emotions are reducible to belief, desire or evaluative judgement. In an effort to avoid such reduced view, Goldie suggests that emotions involve two kinds of feelings: bodily feelings and feeling towards. In spite of Goldie's efforts, the author argues that explaining our emotional disposition in terms of 'feeling toward' remains distinctly unsatisfactory. Furthermore, though sympathetic to his project, the author gives reasons for doubting that there are two such distinct kinds of feeling, one of which has only borrowed intentionality, while the other has intentionality intrinsically.
2

HOW IS VICARIOUS FEELING POSSIBLE? IN DEFENSE OF REACTIVE ATTITUDES

100%
Yang S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2020
|
vol. 27
|
issue 3
377 – 394
EN
My aim in this paper is to illuminate the question of how vicarious feeling is possible, by advancing our understanding of vicarious emotions. I address this problem by classifying the reactive attitude into two categories: the vicarious, and the self-reactive. I argue that guilt is constitutively tied to personal responsibility and that the appropriateness of vicarious feeling of group harm derives from a reflection on the appropriateness of our own reactive attitude, that is, vicarious reactive attitude, e.g., indignation or outrage.
3

EMOTION, INTENTIONALITY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF EMOTION: IN DEFENSE OF A RESPONSE DEPENDENCE THEORY

100%
Yang S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 1
82-104
EN
In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. The author's aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, he first argues against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. He then argues that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of 'perception' as the 'cognitive element' most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then he shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Doring and by Jesse Prinz. He shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Doring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz's and Doring's views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, he argues that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. He shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions.
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