Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

[tłum.] Elizabeth M. Anscombe, Wojna i morderstwo

100%
Głowala J.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2014
|
vol. 62
|
issue 3
113-127
2
Content available remote

Rozum i natura relacji w etyce. Ordinatio u Akwinaty

100%
Głowala J.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
|
2012
|
vol. 7
|
issue 1
39-55
EN
In his commentary to Nicomachean Ethics Aquinas points out that what is most characteristic for reason is the capacity for order, i.e. various kinds of relation of one thing to another (ordo). Now, there are two principal manners in which reason concerns order: (I) it can recognize order — in its theoretical activity, (II) it can establish order and introduce it into some matter — in its practical proceedings. In this connection there are two main types of relation: ones that occur independently from our cognitive acts, and ones that occur as a result of these acts — insofar as it is reason that establishes it. This reason’s activity of establishing order Aquinas calls: ordinare. In my paper I would like to focus on the second type of relation, on the basis of Aquinas’ thought. In particular I would like to study some special type of relations that occur between an end and a means to the end. Therefore, (1) I show in what sense it is only reason that recognizes and establishes relations. (2) I explain the difference between natural relations that can be acknowledged by theoretical reason and relations that can be founded by practical reason, and what is specific for the latter. (3) I distinguish two further kinds of practical relations: technical and moral ones. (4) I study some moral relations, considering especially the ones between a person and his end, a person and his means, and between means and an end. Finally, (5) I show what connection exists between settling these relations and that kind of ordinare which is taking responsibility for action in an act that Aquinas calls imperium (command). Through that I show what relation is there between an agent and his action.
3
Content available remote

O naturze wiedzy praktycznej. Rozważania Gotfryda z Fontaines i G.E.M. Anscombe

100%
Głowala J.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
|
2012
|
vol. 7
|
issue 2
27-42
EN
In her famous book Intention Anscombe gives an example of a man doing shopping with a list; the man is followed by a detective who observes the shopping and makes his own list of items. This is a good example for discussing theoretical and practical knowledge. In my article I show that practical knowledge is a kind of knowledge different from theoretical one, and the main difference between them is that the former is a cause of its proper object. Thus, in part (I), referring to Anscombe’s example, I show one of the principal differences between theoretical and practical knowledge. Further, in the same part, I elaborate the description of practical knowledge as developed by a scholastic philosopher Godfrey of Fontaines; his general claims about the two kinds of knowledge strikingly coincide with Anscombe’s insights. In part (II) I bring up two important issues connected with the presented account of practical knowledge. In part (III) I draw up, on the basis of (I)–(II), three main traits of practical knowledge which distinguish it from theoretical one.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.