The article examines the key aspects of a debate on the concept of the state and the relationship between freedom and the rule of law in economic studies. On the basis of selected research reports, the authors discuss the results of studies on the influence of economic freedom and the rule of law on prosperity. The paper reviews the most common definitions of economic freedom and the rule of law and methods for measuring them. It follows up with a description of the results of studies on how economic freedom and the rule of law influence economic growth. The analysis made in the paper shows that economic freedom and the rule of law are indispensable for sustained economic growth. They have a major positive influence on the rate of growth. Economic freedom promotes innovation in business and prosperity. However, the government tends to limit economic freedom and forces businesses to behave in a specific way to benefit the economy and the public. This works when the government acts in keeping with the rule of law, the authors say. The rule of law promotes business efficiency and leads to lower transaction costs, which results in faster economic growth, the authors conclude.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of digital technologies in business and daily life. The paper aims to explore the theoretical and empirical aspects of the relation between digitalisation and income inequality in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries between the years 2000-2020. It contributes to existing research on determinants of income inequality, focussing on the potential negative role of digitalisation as an unnoticeable driver of income inequality in CEE countries. To investigate the potential impact of digitalisation on income inequality, empirical analysis was performed for the sample of 10 CEE countries, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The results of canonical correlation analysis indicated that the sets of variables related to digitalisation and inequality as a group are significantly related to each other and a strong correlation exists between them. The relative contribution of each indicator to each standardised function showed that the highest values of significant standardised coefficients were observed for income inequality indicators such as the top 10% share, the Gini coefficient, and the top 1% share, while in digitalisation measures, the highest value was observed for Internet users and fixed and mobile broadband subscriptions.
This paper aims to describe the characteristics of members of management and supervisory boards in 6,489 joint-stock companies registered in the Polish National Court Register from 2001 to 2017 and to highlight differences between companies depending on their ownership structure: private vs. state-owned. We analysed features such as the term of office, gender, age, and nationality. The average term of a management board is two years and three months. In state-owned enterprises (SOE), this period is several days shorter. Meanwhile, supervisory boards have terms of two years and six months on average. In private companies, the term of office is two months longer than in SOEs. The average board member was 43.5 years old when appointed in private companies and about 45 years old in SOEs. Men predominate in the boardrooms. Comparing management boards, the underrepresentation of women is greater in SOEs. Meanwhile, in the case of private companies, women are more underrepresented on the supervisory boards. We show that the features of board members are statistically significant depending on the ownership structure, but these differences are not large.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza porównawcza zarządów i rad nadzorczych w spółkach akcyjnych w Polsce w latach 2001–2017 w zależności od struktury własności (państwowe vs prywatne). Użyto kryteriów: długość kadencji, płeć, wiek, narodowość członków zarządów i rad. Przedmiotem analizy są spółki akcyjne zarejestrowane w Krajowym Rejestrze Sądowym w latach 2001–2017 (ogółem 6489 spółek). Kadencje w zarządach spółek trwają średnio ok. dwa lata i trzy miesiące. W spółkach państwowych kadencje są krótsze o kilkanaście dni. Kadencje w radach nadzorczych trwają średnio dwa lata i sześć miesięcy i w spółkach prywatnych są dłuższe o ponad dwa miesiące w porównaniu ze spółkami państwowymi. Średni wiek kandydata w momencie powołania do zarządu i rad nadzorczych wynosi około 43,5 roku w przedsiębiorstwach prywatnych i około 45 lat w przedsiębiorstwach państwowych. Kadencje w zarządach i radach nadzorczych są zdominowane przez mężczyzn. W zarządach większą skalą niedoreprezentowania kobiet charakteryzują się spółki państwowe. Z kolei w radach nadzorczych niedoreprezentowanie kobiet jest większe w spółkach prywatnych. Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że cechy członków rad nadzorczych i zarządów są statystycznie istotnie różne w zależności od struktury właścicielskiej przedsiębiorstwa, jednak różnice te nie są duże.
This paper aims to analyse the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds from the perspective of the political alignment hypothesis. eTh authors focus on the allocation of the second and third rounds of the Governmental Fund for Local Investments (part of the COVID-19 Response Fund) in Poland. Using the logit and OLS models and the regression discontinuity design the authors show that mayors aligned with the central government were significantly more likely to receive the funds, as well as in higher per capita values, than mayors aligned with the opposition or unaligned with any party in parliament when the allocation was based on a discretionary decision. eTh results support the political alignment hypothesis and highlight the danger of partiality in the allocation of the COVID-19 response funds.
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