The main aim of this article is to explain how the Taiwanese government managed to create institutions conducive to economic development. The paper analyzes the process of institutional transition in Taiwan by applying a conceptual framework proposed by D.C. North, J.J. Wallis, S.B. Webb, and B.R. Weingast. The analysis makes it possible to positively verify the research hypothesis that a security threat from China was an important factor that determined the economic policies of Taiwan. The threat exerted continuous pressure on the country’s elites, as a result of which they were forced to cooperate and their action became more predictable. That is why Taiwan’s authoritarian government has been able to build institutional foundations for economic development. The result of economic growth was the enrichment of society, education and the development of a civil society, which allowed the opposition to exert pressure on the regime and finally led to democratization. Because specific circumstances played a key role in the economic development of Taiwan today’s developing countries would find it difficult, if not impossible, to imitate the Taiwanese development model.
PL
Głównym celem artykułu jest poszukiwanie wyjaśnienia, w jaki sposób na Tajwanie udało się stworzyć sprzyjający rozwojowi gospodarczemu ład instytucjonalny. W artykule zanalizowano proces przemian instytucjonalnych na Tajwanie za pomocą koncepcji teoretycznej D.C. Northa, J.J. Wallisa, S.B. Webb oraz B.R. Weingasta. Dokonana analiza umożliwiła pozytywną weryfikacje hipotezy badawczej, że istotnym czynnikiem determinującym politykę gospodarczą Tajwanu było zagrożenie ze strony Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. Zagrożenie wywierało ciągłą presję na elity, dlatego były one zmuszone kooperować, a ich działanie stało się w większym stopniu przewidywalne. Właśnie dlatego autorytarny rząd na Tajwanie był w stanie stworzyć instytucjonalne fundamenty korzystne dla rozwoju gospodarczego, a korzyści płynące z szybkiego tempa wzrostu gospodarczego trafiały w miarę równomiernie do całego społeczeństwa. Nietypowe warunki, w jakich przeprowadzano reformy polityczne i gospodarcze na Tajwanie sprawiają, że udane skopiowanie modelu rozwojowego Tajwanu w innych krajach, zarówno słabo, jak i średnio rozwiniętych wydaje się mało prawdopodobne.
The purpose of this article is to identify potential sources of failure of the development of economics and new institutional economics in solving problems of economic development, and to present arguments that development economists use the simplified concept of institutions. For this reason they recommend economic policies that do not include the complexity of the process of institutional change. The first part of the article is devoted to outline the current state of research on economic development in the new institutional economics. The elements of the institutional theory of economic change are presented here. The second part presents the impact of the new institutional economics on dominant discourse on economic development, and how the development consensus has evolved. The new consensus has strong institutional character, but in fact, this institutional analysis is quite different from the analysis of the new institutional economics. The third part of the article shows how development economists use institutional analysis in their research. Most of them use the simplified concept of institutions. The economics policy, that they recommend, assumes that institutions could be easily changed, if the local specificities were taken into account. Policy makers want clear guidelines that they could use in practice. New institutional economists often indicate that the process of economic development is complex and, therefore, economic policy would probably not be effective. Moreover there is no workable general theory of institutions available to us. Therefore, it seems that in the case of solving problems of economic development, we should devote less attention to the general theory, and focus more on institutional microanalysis. In this way, it may be easier to create guidelines for a successful economic policy.
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