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Extended choice functionals – a cardinal framework for the analysis of choice under risk

100%
Lahiri S.
Multiple Criteria Decision Making
|
2020
|
vol. 15
66-78
EN
We propose a framework that extends the one developed by Professor Amartya Sen (with Arrowian roots), for the analysis of choice under risk by an individual, hereafter referred to as a decision maker. The framework is based on the decision maker’s state dependent numerical evaluations − referred to as utility, worth, or pay-off − of the alternatives. We provide several examples to illustrate meaningful possibilities in the model proposed here. The expected utility choice functional assigns to each given state- -dependent data profile (i.e., a pair consisting of a profile of state-dependent evaluation functions and a probability distribution over states of nature) the non-empty set of alternatives obtained by maximizing expected utility. A significant result in this paper, which illustrates the workability of our frameworks of analysis, is an axiomatic characterization of the expected utility choice functional using purely combinatorial techniques. Aim/Purpose: To use a minor extension of the Arrow-Sen model of social choice theory to study individual decision making/aiding under risk and with state dependent evaluation functions. Methodology: Combinatorics (theory of finite sets). Findings: Plausible decision-aids for decision making under uncertainty with state dependent evaluation functions. Research Implications: Exactly same model and results apply for the study of “weighted” multi-criteria decision making/aiding with state dependent evaluation functions. Contribution: Apart from useful decision-aids for managerial decision making under risk and operations research, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the expected utility choice functional.
2
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The No-Spoiler Condition for Choice Correspondences

100%
Lahiri S.
Multiple Criteria Decision Making
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2019
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vol. 14
60-74
EN
We show that any choice correspondence which satisfies the weak Pareto criterion and the Majority property must violate the no-spoiler condition. Subsequently we strengthen the weak Pareto criterion. We show that if the number of criteria or individuals or states of nature is odd, then there is no choice correspondence which satisfies this strengthened version of weak Pareto criteria, Majority property and no-loser spoiler condition. However if the number of criteria/individuals/states of nature is even, we need two more properties to ensure the impossibility result. The first of these two properties is top neutrality. The second property is top anonymity.
3
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Consumer surplus and budget constrained preference maximization: A note

100%
Lahiri S.
Managerial Economics
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2020
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vol. 21
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issue 1
49-65
EN
The paper attempts to rectify what appear to be popular but elementary misconceptions about the concept of consumer surplus in the context of Marshallian demand curves. It is primarily addressed to teachers of microeconomics at the undergraduate level or in MBA programs of business schools. The main text informs the reader about the model/context and the results we are concerned with, all of the latter being a comprehensive teaching note, relegated to an appendix of the paper. Thus, the potential instructor may use the main text to motivate himself/herself and at the same time inform his/her students as to the topic i.e. the rehabilitation of consumer surplus as an exact measure of welfare from the stand-point of cost benefit analysis. Thereafter the appendix can be referred to for a more formal presentation. The technical results contained in the appendix begin by showing that willingness to pay is the area under the demand curve if and only if consumers are surplus maximizers. The last result in the appendix is a theoretically ‘happy ending’ since it shows that for purposes of applied economics, budget constrained preference maximization implies surplus maximization and hence for such consumers, willingness to pay is indeed the area under the demand curve up to the quantity consumed.
4
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An example to illustrate several aspects of optimization theory in Managerial Economics

100%
Lahiri S.
Managerial Economics
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2021
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vol. 22
|
issue 1
23-34
EN
We provide a single example that illustrates all aspects of linear, integer and dynamic programming, including such concepts such as value of perfect and imperfect information. Such problems, though extremely plausible and realistic are hardly ever discussed in managerial economics.
5
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Three Welfare Orderings that are Fully Comparable Revisited

100%
Lahiri S.
Multiple Criteria Decision Making
|
2018
|
vol. 13
133-148
EN
We are concerned with welfare orderings on the set of evaluation vectors. In our framework the number of agents, criteria or states of nature is fixed and an evaluation vector assigns a real valued evaluation to each criteria, agent or state of nature. Hence the space of evaluation vectors is a finite dimensional Euclidean space. In such a context we provide axiomatic characterizations of the utilitarian, maximin and leximin welfare orderings. The axiomatic characterization of the utilitarian welfare ordering is based on a quasi-linearity property. The axiomatic characterizations of the maximin and leximin welfare orderings are obtained by suitably modifying the axioms used by Barbera and Jackson (1988).
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