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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 8
590 – 607
EN
The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of noncausal explanations.
EN
The paper concerns a contemporary problem emerging in philosophy of science about the explanatory status of mathematical models as abstractions. The starting point lies in the analysis of Morrison’s discrimination of models as idealizations and models as abstractions. There abstraction has a special status because its non-realistic nature (e.g. an infinite number of particles, an infinite structure of fractal etc.) is the very reason for its explanatory success and usefulness. The paper presents two new examples of mathematical models as abstractions – the fractal invariant of phase space transformations in the dynamic systems theory and infinite sets in the formal grammar and automata theory. The author is convinced about the indispensability of mathematical models as abstraction, but somehow disagrees with the interpretation of its explanatory power.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 6
407 – 422
EN
In this paper, I provide a conceptual analysis of the issue of asymmetry in non-causal explanations. I aim to fulfil three sub-tasks: 1) To define a conceptual space for problem solving (Cf. Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018; Lange 2017); 2) To reflect ongoing debates (Cf. Jansson and Saatsi 2019; Lange 2019; Khalifa et al. 2018); 3) To reflect a model of topological explanation (Cf. Kostić 2020). I focus only on non-causal explanations in the context of scientific research. I formulate several counter-arguments against distinctively mathematical explanations. I reflect the ongoing debate on the question of the universal applicability of a counterfactual solution to the problem of asymmetry for both causal and non-causal explanations (Cf. Woodward 2018). I reveal that none of the approaches discussed is without problems and that the proposed solutions to them are unsatisfactory. I consider the model of topological explanation in Kostić's view to be the most cogent solution to the discussed problem. His model successfully incorporates a counterfactual approach and also offers a solution to the problem of explanation asymmetry in non-causal explanations from a pragmatic point of view.
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