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Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

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XX
The aim of this article is to determine how useful to us are the notes from the late work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, in dealing with one of the modern sceptical problems. By determining the usefulness I have in mind whether or not his thoughts and descriptions of everyday linguistic practice help solve the sceptical problem and, if so, in what way. The sceptical problem in question is the Cartesian argument about the external world – the argument of ignorance. We will endeavour to show that if we accept Wittgenstein’s remarks as adequate descriptions of epistemic practice, they will help to make it possible to block the argument in question. However, there arise questions of whether Wittgenstein’s descriptions of epistemic practice are adequate, on the one hand, and whether the sceptical claims about the external world really spring from this practice, on the other hand. I hold the view that these questions are basically empirical. This has the relatively unusual consequence that the worth of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as well as the cogency of the problem of the external world, cannot be judged in a purely philosophical way.
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Racionálnosť eutanázie

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EN
In this paper, I make the case for voluntary euthanasia of adults. My position is that this kind of euthanasia can be rationally justified. Firstly, I present an argument in favour of rationality of suicide and propose a set of general conditions for a rational suicide. Secondly, I argue that if suicide can be rational, then euthanasia can be rational. Then I anticipate counter-arguments against my position and suggest their refutations. I answer the following objections: that i) it is not possible to preferentially compare life and death and prefer the latter; that ii) it is not possible for life to not be worth living; and that iii) the judgement, that life is not worth living, is necessarily irrational. Concerning objection i) I show that it is possible to preferentially compare life and death and prefer the latter; concerning ii) I show that two possible justifications for this objection are untenable; and concerning iii) I show that three possible justifications for this objection are untenable. Finally, I conclude that euthanasia can be rational.
SK
V tomto článku obhajujem názor, že dobrovoľná eutanázia dospelých môže byť racionálna. Najprv ponúknem argument v prospech racionálnosti sebausmrtenia a následne navrhnem všeobecnú sadu podmienok pre racionálne sebausmrtenie. Potom argumentujem, že ak môže byť sebausmrtenie racionálne, tak aj eutanázia môže byť racionálna. Následne anticipujem námietky a reagujem na ne. Odpovedám na námietky, že i) nie je možné preferenčne porovnávať život a smrť a preferovať smrť; že ii) nie je možné, aby život nebol hoden žitia; a že ii) súd, že život nie je hoden žitia, je nevyhnutne iracionálny. Ohľadom námietky i) ukazujem, že je možné preferenčne porovnávať medzi životom a smrťou a preferovať smrť, ohľadom ii) ukazujem, že dva možné spôsoby zdôvodnenia tejto námietky nie sú udržateľné a ohľadom iii) ukazujem, že tri možné spôsoby zdôvodnenia tejto námietky nie sú udržateľné. Nakoniec uzatváram, že eutanázia môže byť racionálna.
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